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-,--.. ··· ~ nnw a:'iai:e •. These and other. exaiiiPles. lntelliieuce 
• • · • ·--:?: ...... '"\.-".<• ~,t..- liiiiowed 111s 1'~ ' 1nto-·the-:CIA's . exl)erts say attest to tbe'Skill of the prind· 
S. W' ·~ ,, .. .;;~r:<~ ~>..,.. f· . bloc" mvtslon~Eile ln~gellee~c;:fals pal.Soviet ~y semce, ,the KGB .• ~ys Mr. PY aT..., .. ·::. '. . · . ..;~. ·. ". U}'. 'Tbe j!X}Stence 1)f such a nde·w_as men· Helms; the former CIA director: You can 
Exp. -.. · .F ... Th t u .. · s· t:lbnedb. r.seural Sovietdetec~lirtmves·. say what you like about the Russians: .that erts ' ear • a A ~ -"Jleftt'~~~ their .agricultural system doesn't wof.!t or 
' · · ,.., · ·· : ' '~7Ms'~' ~~~ that they're too bureaucratic. But there s no 
Lo · ~ · ' · · · D ~.U.l · SUspec:tl:ft' :&:~~ .. t~- country in .the.'vorld that unde,r.stands intelli· . Se5 '~Splq~ag~2.~~~ t.herciAiiirho·'w~.sfbased~~~the. renee ·t>etter.:''The KGB is a ilamned good 
· · • . . :; .. .. \ · 1950s .ani! .mo ;helped ~ JJ$iples- who rganization·:' ·• 
With the SoVIet ·Uruon vlere ~~l~brtO~e · Soviet ~,.ne~ 0 The KGB'S recent ·success ~ries lead 
. · , : ''t-:r · · was~Jater:;,botographed•entenng the SOViet some u.S. intelligence people to wonder 
· · . . : ' . embaisy ·1lere~;Bait h.e -was·never formally whether the CIA and the FBI are equal to They Say Russians Penetrate $fged··by·t,be ... U.S., -'8Ild be. JIOW. lives in ,.,, m rm::;:;=n.• • 
• . • ·· t • ·" virginia as ~ :A~erican .citizen. • , . the challenge .. B~th u.s: agenc1es have been 
C lA Secunty; New .Reins ·. '-sovtelf.9ies · i'bave ·;<recen.t~Y.!;C>btained battered "Qy pubhc critici~ i.p the last se~· 
. .. • · , - · . s&ne ilf'ltbe. most precious u.s.~-in· era1 years for past misdeeds,-~ moraie-;-
Could Further Hurt ;U.S. c}udlnt"11.etalls·about America'~thods of esptcially . at the CIA-:is saggmg. Whats 
. .,_ .,· ~- ;_' verHying .Sovlet compliance with the strate- more, many intelllgence offic~als fear that 
- . -- . " r • \ ~.~~: gtc arms-limiiatlon treaty-by ~~gdisaf· the 'public 's aversi()n tQ the agencies' use of 
Mofes- 'in a Hall' . df<Mirrors· fecten yowig .Americans. ~ ye~~ a~ dirty tricks and secret-snOOJ?ing could lead 
· '"'· . ~ ~· -·. <'; man '.who bad .;worked briefly .~··the CIA Congress to enact a'·new:teg~slatlve charter 
---: · • -~ 7:, ... ~·. was c:Onvicted for ·selling 'the, ~ans a for u .s. Intelligence that would place exces· 
By DAVID IGN~Titts · . · . .' manUal describing a top·secreru.-s: spy-sat· sively severe limits on -~I and CIA ac_~vi-
sta/JHeportero/THEWALi:.STREF.TJorRNAL ~ entte system, · known· as the·!KH-ll. _And in ties. (Such counterintelligence legislation 
WASHINGTON-The centralln~lllgence 1977, a former ~ploye of TRW- Inc. was would supplement the FB~'s .new charte~.) 
Agency's station chief in· Katmandu. Nepal, convicted for selling 1he Russi~ ·~· These officials maintain that suc:h criti· 
some years ago liked to invite- his local tion about clasSified TRW .proJects; mtelli· cized methods as wiretaps and mali open· 
counterpart in Soviet ·mllitaey intelligence gence -officials .'fear he may ·ha:l'e ~ealed ings may be necessary to crack certain spy 
over to the .house for dinner. . -::, u.s. :.systems 1fo~ monitoring -~ rnisslle ·operations. They cite as an example what the 
It wasn't idle socializing. ~e CIA officer developm~t. !:: ;~ • ·,,_:"' .;_ > FBI believes is a KGB network ~ so-call~ . 
was trying to recruit th~ Sovtet:qffidal to • ·:...ciA !)perations within the ·SOvletUnion illegal agents ~at may be operating within 
spy for the U.S. The Russian, a military offi· in ·recent years have been .. hamstrung by the u.S., handlmg such sensitive inte~gence 
cer named Pecherov, ·happily_ accepted the blowp covers ;and .by SoViet deception. In chores as recruiting informers to work in· 
invitation~. F~r Mr. P,echerov was also July -1977, the~Russians grabbed .a CIA offi· side u.s. defense con~actors. Unlike 
trying to recru1t the CIA s man. In the end. cer· .named 'Martha : Peterson as she was "legar· KGB officers, who typi~y are in 
the Katmandu affair "proved to be a stale- planting :a ~a~he -of equipmen~ for . ~ ·~ the UA$. . under Soviet ~plomatic .. cover'·. 
mate. :. · .. · ~ . · · , ' ·-. . agent in Moscow. Several prormnent.mtelli· these ~·megal" agents usually hold passpof1S 
Every day, arollD:d the world, such esp1o- gence exper!s·~onder whether the Russi~ from various countries. , 
nage games are bemg played out between were tipped off ·about Miss Peterson's nus· Critics of the FBI contend that the 
u.s. and Soviet intelligence services. These sion by a mole within the CIA. These _former agency didn't have much luck combating 
spying operations 1:an _become crucial when intelligence officials also, believe that during such "illegals" even when it could bug of· 
a U.S.·Soviet crisis anses, such as the cur· 1975 ud. l976, 'the CIA_ was duped into re- fices and open mall of Suspects. 
rent commotion over Soviet-troops in CUba.- cruiting -as an .agent a sup~:-dissident The spy war is further complicated by 
But even when rela~ons are ~ bo~ Soviet doctor, .1l~ed Sanya Lipavsky, who what .former .intelligence officers <:9ntend is 
sides are quietly wor~g to place !f!oles, was ac~ally under Sovietcontro1. · . a attem of Soviet "disinformation" -
penetration agents, Within the opposmg SIJ! -Soviet.spies have infil~ted the ~ruted pla!ted by the KGB to confuse and demoral· . 
service~ and to pry loose the other sides Nation~ Secre~at, accordirig ·to Sovtet de- ize u.s. intelligence. The CIA. of course, 
most vttal secrets. · . fector- Arkady N. ·Shevchen1ro. Mr . . Shev· tries ·similar ploys with some success. A 
Wh_at conc~rns ~any U.S. mtelligenc~ ex· chenko, who was a prominent Soviet diplo- CIA official even ~ted. years ago, of the 
perts 1s growmg ev1de~ce that the RusSlans mat at the UN until he defected last year, ency's ability to plant stories around the 
have been winning th1s cov_ert war. Th~ told a British interviewer recently that the. :rld and play the press .like -'a "mighty 
cite examples of an aggressive Soviet esplo- UN has become "the most im~t base of Wurlitzer." . 
nage effort that over ~e years has compro- all Soviet intelligence operations in the Soviet deception, however, tends to be 
mised U.S. spy·.satellJte technology, pene- world." He contends, for example, that a So- more subtle; and for the CIA. it can create 
trated CIA ~ecunty and subverted the da~en· viet special assistant to UN Secretary·Gen· a kind of paranoia, in which ·every event 
cy's operat10ns. These experts ~te~ at eral Kurt Waldheim is a Soviet mole and seems part of a larger, sinister puzzle. 
new controls on U.~. counterintelligence, that the chief of personnel at · th~ UN's of· · Take the · case of the Soviet mole Sasha. 
such as have been discussed by Con~ss, fices in Geneva is also a "high·level" Soviet For nearly 2o..years. the mail suspected of 
co~d fur!her weaken U.S. ~efe~ against intelligence ·officer. · spying for the Russians under this name has 
So~e~ sp1es. . · · . . The Russians also may have placed ~ been living in a Virginia suburb of Washing· 
I m worn~ that th~ ~read will keep agent within the Federal Bureau of Investi· ton, quietly managing a small business with 
~yeling until there lsn_ t any sweater gation, according to the late William ~i· his wife . By his own account, he ~as one of 
left, says former CIA director Richard van, who served for many years as chief of the CIA's "best .men in operati~ns while he 
Helms. FBI counterintelligence. In a :ecently put: was a contract agent, handling _some of the 
Dangers 10f Soviet Intelligence lished book written before he died, Mr. S~- agency's most sensitive spy missions from 
current CIA officials won't discuss the van said that when he left the bureau m his base in west Berlin. · 
Soviet ·spy threat in any· detail. But former 1971, he was convinced that a "Russian spy" was this man actually a Soviet agent? He 
intelligence officials .4escribe · a series .of in the FBI's New York office hat;! blo~ the denies the allegation. And the FBI, ·despite 
cases that; in their view, illustrate the dan· cover of a major FBI countenntelligence months of interrogation, has never been able 
gers of Soviet intelligence to U.S. security: · operation. 
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lowed Igc)r ti-I96ftOpretend to ''recruit" as 
a Soviet_ agent a RUSSian ·1Ulval deer wbo 
. ha&f defected to this countr)'' lD 1959 and was 
Uvlng ·here ·under ~e ·name Nicholas Shad· 
rin . . The CIA arid ·. the FBI :hoped ·that the 
· controlled · Iior·Shadrin Telatlmsbip 'WOuld 
~--------------1 yield info~ation about KGB ·operations lD' 
to reach a:ttnal.conclusion.'nie case me ·on' tbe'U.S., but the gambit ended-in•disaster ln 
him remains ' open; one former intelligence '1975; ·when · Mt:·. Shadrin · disappeared in VI-
official says sardonically . that he doubts the' enna -while · maiclng contact 'With' 'his SOViet . 
case will be~resolved "until ' the KGB has a handlers.) - .. · ·: "· , 
freedom-of-information act" MeanwhUe,' Hall of Mlrror.s .:~ '. • 
any judgments about Sasha's true identity ,. As these spy tales suggeSt, the World of 
must hinge on the InterPretation. of ·· a .intelligence sometimes resembles a ball of 
strange series of interlocking cases. · mirrors, where it is impossible to tell image 
The existence of a Soviet rode with the from reality . 
. code name ·sasha was first mentioned in One intelligence ,expert . says that it 
1962 by a KGB defector named Anatoli Gol~ . _wasn't until1968, .- for example;thai U.S. offi-
itsin. Mr. Golitsin had heard tales from his 'dais had conclusive evidence that ·a Russian 
former colleagues. in the KGB about Sasha's ·based in Istanbul who headed·a supposedly 
exploits, and he thought this Sasha had '· 
worked as a contract agent for the CIA in anti·Soviet network during WOrld War 11-
West Germany. But he wasn't 'sure of the ·and passed voluminous milltary information 
to the German high command-was actually 
man's Identity. a KGB agent. If so, the Russians apparently 
Suspicions of a Plant ·were willing to jeopardize thousams of their 
Two years later, Sasha was mentioned by soldiers to preserve the credibility of this 
another KGB defector, named Yurt N()o agent-so that he could plant .false informa· 
senko. But Mr. Nosenko's Information .about tion· at ·a crucial moment. ·:· ·' ·· 
Sasha pointed in an entirely different direc· The suspicion · about Soviet intelligence 
tion, away from any relationship with the activities can sometimes .get :out of hand, 
. CIA. Mr. Nosenko's version came to be however. Some former CIA officials contend 
doubted; CIA officials, after analyzing many that happened during the 19als, when a 
of his statements, suspected that he ·was a search for Soviet moles within the CIA 
Soviet plant. nearly paralyzed the agency's own inteUi-
Then, in 1966, .a third KGB.official; who ,ence·gatherlng operations. · 
called himself Igor. contacted the CIA while . The web · of ·internal suipldoo · had be· 
he was on temporary assignment in Wasll- come so . tight at the agency .. by the late 
ington-offerlng to serve as a CIA mole 1960s, one CIA official remembers. that di· 
within the KGB. According to one account, rect permission was required from the bead 
Igor did more than simply identify Sasha as of the agency's clandestine servi_!:e simply to 
the former contract agent living in Virginia: arrange a letter . drop .for <an agent in Mos· 
He said that because.this man was a prized cow. "We were so convinced that everything 
"ideological" agent (as -opposed 'to a crass was controlled by the KGB 'that we never 
mercenary one l, the KGB hoped to arrange had the heart 'to start anything," this official 
his defection from the U.S. to Russia. recalls. The Russians, he says. were viewed 
Igor even helped provide hard evidence. as "10 feet tall" and "too smart for us." 
He told his interrogators that if the FBI Former CIA Director WUliam Colby 
checked its records of surveillance at the So- argues that . excessive counterintelligence 
viet embassy in Washington, it would find . a . worries were. hindering the CIA's effective-
photograph of Sasha entering the embassy ness. "Every director · was doubted, -every 
by the back door. The FBI checked its files, · potential agent was doubted," he remem· 
and sure enough, there was a photo of the bers. 
former agent who is living in'VIrginia. (The Despite all the intrigue and suspicions, 
suspect~ Sasha concedes in an interview there apparently are certain rules to be fol· 
that he had visited the embassy, but he says lowed in the spy business. Howard "Rocky" 
his purpose there was innocent.) Stone, the CIA officer who tried to recruit 
The Russians never brought Sasha back his Soviet counterpart ln Katmandu, discov· 
home, and Igor never convinced some CIA · .ered that such rules can be enforced when 
officials that his offer to spy for the · U.S. necessary. While he was stationed in 'Nepal, 
was genuine. Although the CIA. maintained Mr. Stone took a vacation with his wife to 
contact with him when he returned to Mos· Bombay, India, to attend a Catholic Eucha· 
cow, the. Agency felt he should be treated ristic conference. When he arrived ln Born- · 
with extreme caution. · bay, he found his name plastered across the 
(Despite these suspicions, the U.S. al· cover of an Indian magazine called Blitz," 
~----------------------------------------------------------~ 
.whi~ · .identified binl"{as.~a >u~· -·~~ I 
spy ---·· - ' .. .. ,._ ... =-.... ,.. .• o,. - ;ll.iroo ... ~ 
' 'Mr. ·stone was.furiolla.' 1'hil was the Jat- · 
est in a series .of jtortes that 'hwslaDI bad 
been planting ·aboat.Jdm Jor"Jie8l'JY· a-dee-
Ide, and lt threatened tO eodan,er Ids fam. 
Uy aDd destroy .b1s effectlveDeSS ln Nepal. 
Mr. Stone .d.1scussect tbe matter With Rich-
ard Helms,- then dlrector·'Of tbe CIA's clan- · 
destine se"ice. . _. . · 
· ~·Tell the Russians In Katmandu to bock 
it off," Mr. Helms said. "Tell tbem that U 
they don't, we'll hit them all over the world" 
by exposing Soviet agents. The RussliDJ-got 
the message, and Mr. ·Stone's name · W.S 
never planted ln the press apln. ' 
. ' . . . . . ' . . ' . . ··· ·· ··· ········ ·· ·· ···· .. .. ... ... . . ········ · ··· ············· 
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P<MA. 
The Soviet_ 'Forgery Offensive' 




The decision l>Y Iranian militants to 
show the world an alleged "secret" doc· 
ument that they said had been pur-. 
Joined ftom files in the occupied U.S. 
Embassy adds an ominous new factor 
in the battle of American intelligence 
against Soviet forgeries aimed at dis-
crediting the United States. 
Whether the militants have what 
they claim to have or whether the al· 
leged CIA assignments for the two new 
staffers at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran 
are bogus, the surfacing of the docu~ 
ment compounds the problem of identi· 
fying and exposing proliferating Soviet 
forgeries. These forgeries are now 
known to have drawn both President 
·Carter and Vice President Walter Mon-
dale into their worldwide operations. 
The Soviet forgery game was· 
analyzed early this year in a classified 
·government document called "the for· 
gery offensive," which opened with 
this flat assertion: the dangerous Soviet 
game of lying about the United States 
Jb the struggle between the two super-
powers is undergoing "an appreciable 
upsurge." 
~ : ~ : ; 
"The political purpose of these for- The "Soviets have a closed society and 
geries, their technical sophistication no known scruples against dirty tricks 
and intelligence reporting all point to of any kind. But the efforts-described 
the Soviet Union, its various East Euro- as being "of suspected Soviet origin"-
pean alUes and Cuba as being the re- to put false words in ·the mouths of the 
sponsible parties," the document said. president and the vice president of the 
The study containing that charge United States touched a new low. The 
against Moscow was followed in late falsification of Jimmy Carter's spoken 
summer by a second analysis, limited to word came in December 1977, in the 
"official use only" and published by the form of a bogus press release from 
Defense Intelligence Agency-a major the United States Information Agency 
branch of the U.S. intelligence commu- (now the International Communica· 
nity. It proclaimed that Moscow has tions Agency). It purported to be a ver-
"continually employed forged docu- batim report on a speech Carter gave in 
ments to implement foreign policy, sup- the "American perspective series." 
port political objectives and to lend Newspapers in Greece-and almost · 
substance, credibility and authenticity certainly in other countries where the 
to their propaganda claims." forgery never surfaced-received the 
The United States has never played phony Carter speech in the mall. Two 
the forgeries game against Russia or newspapers in Athens published it. In 
any other country. One reason could be his "speech," Carter flayed the Greeks 
that in an open society forgeries would for letting down NATO; demanded far 
almost surely be exposed by those op- higher defense spending by Greece and 
posing the practice-by politicians, for made demeaning remarks about this 
example, who in the. past have taken major Meiliterranean ally. 
pride in exposing undercover opera- The forgery involving Mondale came 
tions by the CIA, regardless of foreign just over a year ago when Xeroxed cop-
policy objectives. ies of an interview he allegedly gave to a 
. . . . . . . . . l . . . . 
'\ :~ !':-H'i .. 
. . 
' · 
European newspaperman named "Karl 
Douglas" were mailed to Paris-based cor-
respondents of several newspapers. 
In the "interview," the vice president 
cast aspersions on Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem. Begin. Mondale, according 
to the bogus "interview," called Sadat 
not the master of his own house (imply-
ing the then-pending treaty with Israel 
would not be adhered to) and claimed 
that Begin was suffering from a "ter-
minal illness." 
Both. these efforts were crude, and 
neither one did American policy much, 
if any, damage. But they illustrate this · 
point: there is no limit to the Soviet ef-
fort to "disinform" governments and 
peoples of the world about the perfidy 
of the United States by exploiting all 
techniques of forgery and black propa-
ganda. Moreover, other attempts to 
undermine the United States have had 
conspicuous success. 
In 1978, in an altered vers.lon of a gen-
uine State Department document 
known as "Airgram A8950," dated Dec. 
3, 1974, U.S. embassies in Europe were 
.· . 
ordered to collect information "on ways 
to bribe European officials and to devel-
op other covert means by which to dam-
age or eliminate foreign trade competi-
tion" with the .United States. The timing 
was calculated to cash in on the uproar 
in the United States over bribery accu-
sations against U.S. corporations. 
This forgery, American intelligence 
now believes, vias "an eminent Soviet 
~orgery success" despite some sloppy 
discrepancies, such as bad punctuation 
in the covering letter that came with 
fuzzy copies of the alleged airgram. 
With superpower competition now 
heating up, partly under the stress of 
the Iran crisis, to'p intelligence officials 
have ordered the anti-forgery watch 
put on overtime duty. But for every 
"forgery discovered, there probably are 
half a dozen that go undiscovered. The 
whole world Is a forgery market and it 
1s inconceivable that the United States 
will riot be damaged in the days of 
heated rivalry that lie ahead with an 
adversary who plays by only one rule: 
the rule to win. 
Clli711, Field Enlierpr!Jea,Jne. 
THE WASHINGTON STAR Wednesday, February 20, 1980 
ustices Back CIA Control of Agent's Writing 
Must Pay U.S. 
II Profit From Book 
By a Washmgton Star Staff Wnter 
The Supreme Court yesterday 
I. 
a sweeping endorsement of the 
power to control what its 
and employees write for pu~ 
. The decision split the court 
With or without its employees' 
t, the court said, the CIA 
s power to require advance clear-
ce of anything that an employee 
to write for use outside the 
cy. 
upheld an order by U.S. District 
Oren R. Lewis of Alexandria, 
ring former agent Frank W. 
III to get the CIA's approval be-
he writes anything- secret or 
t - about the agency. That will 
apply not only to a book he has al-
ready published, titled Decent Inter-
val, but also apparently to a roman-
tic novel he has written. 
That part of Judge Lewis' order 
has aroused worry in the nation's 
publishing industry, fearing it 
would put strict limits on dealings 
with government employees who 
write books, articles or scripts. 
While the court's ruling appeared 
to be aimed primarily at CIA employ-
ees, it did contain language that 
could apply to an employee of any 
agency that uses "sensitive informa-
tion." 
Yesterday's decision also upheld 
Lewis' order requiring Snepp to pay 
to the U.S. Treasury all of the money 
he has earned in the past and any he 
will earn in the future from his book 
about the agency. That order also 
applies to earnings if the book is 
made into a movie. 
Agreeing witb the judge that 
Snepp had violated his duty not to 
publish without advance clearance, 
the court majority said the CIA's 
only effective remedy JNould be 
recapture of his "unjust gain." 
The court rejected a conclusion of 
the 4th U.S. Court of Appeals that the · 
CIA might be able to recover "puni-
tive" damages, too, if it could prove 
that what Snepp had done actually 
had harmed the agency's interests. 
Trying to prove that, the court 
said, might force the CIA to disclose 
secret information - something it 
would not be likely to do, even in 
pursuit of money damages. 
The decision came in a nine-page 
opinion that was unsigned. The 
court made its ruling without even 
holding a hearing on the case. 
Snepp's case arose after he pu~ 
lished, without CIA clearance, his 
highly critical book about the U.S. 
withdrawal from Vietnam at the end 
of the war there. 
Complaining that yesterday's rul-
ing against Snepp was "unprece-
dented and drastic," Justices Wil-
liam J. Brennan Jr., Thurgood 
Marshall and John Paul Stevens dis-
sented. 
Here were the other results in 
press-related cases yesterday: 
• The court, without comment, 
cleared the way for a trial of a $1 mil-
lion libel lawsuit that consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader has filed in 
Superior Court here against conser-
vative newspaper columnist Ralph 
De Toledano. 
• The court left intact a lower 
federal court ruling that public_ 
school officials may not punish stu-
dents for publishing an under-
ground newspaper full of dirty 
words, if the newspaper is mostly 
written and exclusively sold away 
from the school grounds. 
_:Lyle Denniston 
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Catholic Bishops,· Church Council 
Oppose Return of Military Draft 
By Jim Castelli 
Washmgton Star Religion Edttor 
The nation's Catholic bishops and 
the National Council of Churches, in 
separate statements, have opposed a 
return to the military draft. 
The NCC also opposed the Carter 
administration's proposal to resume 
draft registration as "an inevitable 
and essential step to a military 
draft." 
The bishops said they have "no 
obj~ction in principle" to draft regis· 
tration, but added that "convincing" 
reasons must be advanced before 
registration begins. 
In their statement, the bishops op-
posed including women in a draft 
called for a national defense emer-
gency, while the NCC did not men-
tion the question of drafting women. 
The bishops also opposed a "uni-
versal national service," which 
would draft young people for civil-
ian as well as military purposes. 
Both the bishops and the NCC 
pledged support for education and 
counseling programs for young men 
faced with the possibility of the 
draft. 
The bishops' statement was issued 
by the administrative board of the 
U:S. Catholic Conference, the bish-
ops' civil action arm. The NCC state-
ment was issued by its executive 
committee. 
The bishops supported the present 
standby draft system, which would 
require the president to get congres-
sional approval before conscription 
could begin. 
They said any draft should allow 
selective conscientious objection to 
particular wars regarded as unjust 
"The experience of the Vie 
War highighted the mor.~• 
cal significance of -
question," the bi" 
A-7 
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:· Two years ago Mr. Frank Snepp III <;trew on his government. That judgll,lent .was overtur~ed by 
e~p~riences as a CIA agent in Vietnam to publish the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. It IS now 
'- without• prior screening - a book about the reinstated by the Supreme Court. 1 · • 
·fall of Saigon called Decent Interval. A lingering The three dissenters are troubled, .however, by · 
climate of -hostility lo the CIA - and a lazy- that "uninhibited ... exercise in lawmaking." 
minded tendency to confuse the issues- made.it · They contend that the proper recourse ·for the 
inevitable that his defiance of contractual obli- ·CIA was to sue for punitive damages. The Court, · 
gations to the CI~ would be def~nded as a daring, apparently on its own inotion, rejeCted that argu-
even admirable, exercise of First Amendment -ment as unrealistic.~ saying that "proof of 
rights. · · · (wtongful) conduct necessary to sustain an 
The U.S. Sup,reme Court doesn't see it that way. award of punitive damages might force the go~- ' 
rlts brisk and unceremonious disposition of Mr. ernment to disclose some of the very confl-
. Snepp's appeal frO"m a conviction in the lower dences that Snepp promised to protect ; · . • When 
· courts, in an unsigned opinion delivered with- the government cannot secu_re its remedy with-
out benefit of oral argument, is a ,clear sign of out unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all." 
. ' changing climates. The collapse ·of Iran and the This may be "lawmaking" by the high court; but 
. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have reminded of the force of the sustaining argument there 
. those who needed reminding that there's ·a dan- can be no doubt. 1 • 
· . ger'ous world out there - in which it is foolish The Snepp cas~~ we say agaip., has givei:uise to 
·for the U.S. to treat its intelligence needs and much confusion,,not to say nonsense -::- pri-
practices casually. · ·. · . · · · inarily a confusion between a case involving the 
.. The Supreme. Court recognizes. and reaffirms enforcem'ent of a lawful. contract (which it is) : 
that the CIA mustbe empowered to prevent its .and a case involving Mr. Snepp's constitu~ional 
·~ employees from bolting from the fold with their . "right" to publish unimpeded (which is what ... 
memoirs and briefcases overflowing with··un- , Mr. Snepp's ingenious ·lawyers SQUght tQ make · .. 
screened agency information. It also recognizes it). But a First Amendment defense of Mr. 
· that the CIA must have effective means of penal- Snepp's behavior· closely approximates what is · 
izing disregard of its covenants with agents. •often cited as the classic case of chutzpah- the 
1 ~ Mr. Snepp unq~estionably -a~? apparently case of, the boy who murdered his p~rents and 
.. ~nashamedly- ~1d so. When he J?ll~ed the CIA . .then threw himself on the' mercy of the court 
~~ 1968, and a gam when .?e _left lt m 1976, h.e . pleading that he was an orphan, No one ·COJV.pel-
: signed ~gree~ents to seek p~wr ~pproval of the · led Mr. Snepp at gunpoint to join the CIA, or to 
a~ency and the ~xpress wntte_n c,?nsent of ~he sign away his r!ght to publish without 'prior 
' J:?Ire~tor.; · · ~r h1s rep~esentatlve -~efo!e ~u~ clearance. But having done so, he will be ex-
.· hshmg any mformatlon concernmg mtell~- pected to face the legal consequences. · · 
gence or the CIA that has not been made pubhc . . 
. by CIA." The obligation was. clear. Yet Mr. Snepp No intelligence service conducted on the lax 
went right ahead and published his book with· and permissive principles implicit in Mr. Snepp's 
out clearance. His profits are reportedly in defense would be other than an .incontinent 
excess ol $115,000. . ·· ~ shambles, valueless to :the ~ation it served. In 
· . None of the three courts, incidentally, has most other countries, including Great Brita'in, 
found that ,a contractual ob.ligation of the kind Mr. Snepp's violation of his terms of employment 
~ Mr. Snepp was under may be waved aside on ' a· '-~ in the intelligence s~rvice would have brought 
' pleading of First Amendment rights. The'cpntro- him more than the ~onfiscatiQn of his ill-got 
.. versial point in the case was the penalty. The gains, possibly even imprisonment. ' · , 
<trial judge held that Mr. Snepp's profits, ,hpving He is hicky, though he is out a good bit of 
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·: ::::.·.·. The ~:~ . Supreme Court ruled this week in the 
·: ::::·.-.- Frank SJ?.epp-CIA case even as the Senate began 
:,:,:/ii work on ;{l "charter" for the legal domestication 
n\:/i:: .of CIA work, and when· The Brethren has spot: 
'"'-=. ·::,. lighted the techniques of judicial review. 
These circumstances are pertinent, for in rul-
~~~~~~~:~ ing on the enforcibility of CIA contracts with 
....... former agents the Court brushed the issues with 
which the Senate must grapple; and the Court 
also, according to some critics, flouted strict con-
structionism to penalize Mr. Snepp. 
As yesterday's comment suggested, we _don't 
....... agree wilh that criticism. But since it sprang 
from sharp dissidence within the Court, and 
since it is even said that the Court "showed con-
······· tempt for the rule of law," a second look may be 
appropriate. 
Let us focus, this time, on the dissenters' con-
....... · demnation of the Court's confiscation of Mr. 
...... Snepp's roy,alties. Here, a gentlemanly disagree-
······· ment among the justices over the law of trusts, 
....... which was the legal heart of the matter, has 
been magnified into a charge that the Court 
ruled lawlessly. . . · 
Yet Mr. Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissent, 
and Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined 
...... . him, agreed that if Mr. Snepp had disclosed 
classified information, the forfeiture of his 
profits would be appropriate. Since the CIA had 
not charged him with a breach of classified 
information the dissenters thought the remedy 
excessive and unjust. 
The government, however, did not flatly de-
clare that Mr. Snepp's book had revealed no 
"information concerning intelligence or CIA"-
only that "for purposes of this action" that was 
not the contention. · 
Was this conditional clause insignificant? The . 
dissenters assume so; we do not. While it's any-
one's guess, the CIA and the Justice Department 
may have been trying to avoid revealing "for 
purposes of this action" what it seemed to them 
······· in the national interest to conceal. Yet the dis-
. senters drew 'from the conditional stipulation 
the startling conclusion that "by definition, the· 
. .-.·.·.·.·.· interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract' 
was designed to protect has not been com pro- · 
····· ·· mised." They do not really know that. They know 
.. .... only that no compromise of that "interest in 
confidentiality" had been charged. 
The dissenters ' broad interpretation of the , 
RtJ AltY 2 2. 1980 
For the Record 
From the satirical Hungaria~ 
weekly Ludas Matyi, by Sandor N01J0.o 
baczky: 
Kovacs knows as much about foreign 
policy as a chicken about the ABCs. I 
can't drum into his stupid head what 
the international situation is. He tells 
me: 
''I just don't nnderstand this Iranian 
thint. After an. these are religious fa-
natics!'" 
''You fool, It's not Important wbai 
kind of fanatics they are. The lmpor· 
tant thing is that objectively they serve 
progress." 
''You mean we must like these fa· 
natic Moslems?" 
"Yes, we must like them." 
At this the anti-dialectical blockhead 
shouts: 
"'Then long live an the fanatical Mos-
lems in Iran! And in Afghanistan!" 
· "What did you say? We weren't talk· ·~ 
tng about Afghanistan." 
"But I just read 'that the religious fa-
natics there are also rebelling. So we 
should like them, too." 
"Them we don't have to like, because 
they objectively want to turn back the 
wheel of history. They want an Islamic 
Republic." 
"Like in Iran?" 
"Iran is one thing, Afghanistan is an· 
other. The Iranians are positive Moslem 
fanatics, the Afghans are negative Mos-
lem fanatics." 
I see I have him convinced. He bows 
his head. 
"You see what a simpleton I am? I 
cannot grasp such clear things. For ex• 
ample, take this boxer." 
"Which boxer?" 
"Idi Amin. Who's already out." 
"What's the problem here?" 
"Is he positive or negative?" 
''Posinegative. He was a harmful 
charlatan, but for a while he was objec-
tive •••• " 
• 
~ H,Jc•4·1&( ..,~~- t/- -~ 
.... THE W.\SHL\'GTOX POST Fritlny; Februnry 22, ]11811 ~ ~ 4IL ~~C.'L  ~ ~~ ~ 
4-~~ ~~\.1 • . •, I • 
Snepp Decisions'een Helping Court to Plug Its Own Leak 
By Fred Barbash 
Washmcton Post Staff Writer 
The Supreme Court's government 
secrecy opinion, issued Tuesday to 
help the CIA solve a problem with 
leakers. may also help to solve a simi-
lar problem at the Supreme Court. 
In the \·iew of many lawyers. the 
opinion in the Frank Snepp case gave 
the ;:!overnment broad new powers to 
restrict release of information nJt 
only by intelligence operatives, but 
also by a wide variety of government 
employes, including people who work 
at the Supreme Court. 
And it is court employes. particu-
larly clerks, who ha\ e been blamed 
for a series of court leaks in the past 
two years, some of which produced the 
best-selling book, "The Brethren." 
~Iany lawyers also feel the court 
acted with unw:ual haste. unusual 
reach and with a phrase at the end of 
the opinion that reflected unusual ve-
hemence. The opinion. the court said, 
requires Snepp to "disgo,·ge the bene-
fits of his faithlessness. Since the rem-
edy is swift and sure, it is tailored to 
deter those who would place sensitive 
information at risk." 
"Whether it was the court's purpose 
or not." said Gerald Hollingsworth, 
general counsel and vice president of 
Random House, Snepp's Publisher. 
"the justices have seemingly fash-
ioned a remedy which could enable 
the court to reach its own employes 
leaking its own secrets." 
The case was prompted by Snepp's 
publication two years ago of "Decent 
Interval," a book based on his experi-
ences as a CIA official in Vietnam. 
Though the government did not allege 
that the book revealed secret informa-
tion. it pursued Snepp for not submit-
ting his manuscript for prepublication 
screening by the CIA. He was re-
quired to do so under a secrecy agreE:-
ment he signed as a CIA agent, the 
government contended. 
The government moved to seize all 
of Snepp's earnings from the book 
(now about $115,000) and to enjoin any 
further violations of the prepub!Ica-
tion screening requirement. It won all 
it sought, including an extension of 
the injunction to cover anyone acting 
"in concert·• with Snepp, in this 1case 
Random House. 
Since Random House is preparing 
to publish further Snepp writings, ac-
cording to Hollingsworth, the ; com-
pany now believes that for the first 
time a publisher has been plac~ un-
der "prior restraint" against putting 
out a book. 1 
The court's approval of the District 
Court's orders in the case went well 
beyond the CIA. lawyers pointed out, 
and secrecy agreements by employe<>. 
Government employes with access 
to "sensitive information" have a trust 
relationship with their ~mployers, the 
court said. The trust may be 1 estab-
lished, in part, by "access to confiden-
tial sources and materials," not ~ust to 
national security secrets. 
''\\"ithout a dependable prepublica-
tion review procedure no intelligence 
agency or responsible government of-
ficial could be assured that an em-
ploye privy to sensitive information 
might not conclude on his own"-inno-
cently or otherwise-that it should be 
disclosed to the world," the majority 
said. 
The remedy imposed. the confisca-
tion of earnings, '·is the natural and 
customary censequence of a breach 
of trust." 
At the ceurt, law clerks and some 
other empleyes are privy to the secre-
tive memerantia and conversations 
which lead to decisions b~- the jus-
tices. 
Beb WH41warfl and Scott Arm-
strong, authers ef "The Brethren," say 
they relieti en hundreds of interviews 
with clerks te aescribe those secret 
delilteratiens e\·er a seven-year period 
at the ceurt. Previous leaks, notably 
an advance en a major Supreme 
Ctturt •~tbtien te ABC reporter Tim 
O'Brien, have alse been attributed to 
court empleyes. 
Though there is no law governing 
secrecy ameng ceurt employes. Chief 
Justice Warren Burger has said that 
one is net required to solve the prob-
lem. · 
In his dissent in the Pentagon Pa-
pen; case in 1971. Burger wrote: ":\o 
statute gives this court express power 
to establish and enforce the utmost 
security measures for the secrecy of 
our deliberations and records. Yet I 
have little doubt as to the inherent 
power of the court to protect the con-
fidentiality of its internal operations 
by whatever judicial measures may 
be required." 
The Snepp opinion may have been 
the first judicial measure, some law-
yers believe. ·'A clerk is clearly in a 
position of trust in dealing with sensi-
tive information." said American Civil 
Liberties Union lawyer :\lark Lynch, 
who represented Snepp. "I think 
there 's no question that the decision 
could apply to them.'' 
··r see the decision as in part a reac-
tion to confidences improperly 
breached" in "The Brethren," said 
Bruce Fein, an American Enterprise 
Institute court expert. 
··r can't say that conclusively. But in 
the procedure used by the court, the 
decision reflected a kind of instinctive 
hostility" unusual for the justices. 
Procedurally, the court chose to is-
sue its unsigned opinion without argu-
ments from either side. Accordin 
Eugene Gressman, coauthor of a 
on Supreme Court practice, tha 
common in m a j or cases but 
unique· It is, he said, ··unfair. 
wake up in the morning and 
you've lost your case without ever 
ing had the chance to argue it." 
In addition, the court gave the 
ernment more than It or anyone 
had asked for. The Fourth U.S. 
cuit Court of Appeals had overtur 
the seizure of Snepp's earnings a.:; 
harsh a penalty. The government t 
the Supreme Court that if it rejec 
Snepp's appeal of the rest of 
lower court decision , it should also 
ject the gO\·ernment's appeal of t 
earnings seizure decision. The co 
disregarded the government's reque 
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dl 
sent along with Justices William Br 
nan and Thurgood Marshall, .:all 
that action "unprecedented." He 
scribed that and the decision in g 
era! as an "uninhibited ... exercise 
lawmaking." 
• 
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By Fred Barbash 
Washm~ton Po% St.a!f Writer 
Supreme Court's government 
' opinion, issued Tuesday to 
1e CIA solve a problem with 
;, may also help to solve a simi-
blem at the Supreme Court. 
1e view of many lawyers, the 
1 in the Frank Snepp case gave 
·ernment broad new powers to 
release of information nJt 
y intelliE:ence operatives, but 
a wide variety of government 
·es, including people who work 
;upreme Court. 
it is court employes. particu-
lerks, who ha•e been blamed 
~ries of court leaks in the past 
trs, some of 1vhich produced the 
ling book, "The Brethren." 
• lawyers also feel the court 
with unusual haste, unusual 
nd with a phrase at the end of 
nion that reflected unusual ,·e-
~e. The opinion, the court said, 
s Snepp to "disgorge the bene-
tis faithlessness. Since the rem-
;wift and sure. it is tailored to 
deter those who would place sensitive 
information at risk." 
"Whether it was the court's purpose 
or not," said Gerald Hollingsworth, 
general counsel and vice president of 
Random House, Snepp's publisher. 
"the justices have seemingly fash-
ioned a remedy which could enable 
the court to reach its own employes 
leaking its own secrets." 
The case was prompted by Snepp's 
publication two years ago of "Decent 
Interval," a book based on his experi-
ences as a CIA official in Vietnam. 
Though the government did not allege 
that the book revealed secret informa-
tion, it pursued Snepp for not submit-
ting his manuscript for prepublication 
screening by the CIA. He was re-
quired to do so under a secrecy agreE:· 
ment he signed as a CIA agent, the 
government contended. 
The government moved to seize all 
of Snepp's earnings from the book 
(now about $115,000) and to enjoin any 
further violations of the prepublica-
tion screening requirement. It won all 
it sought, including an extension of 
the injunction to cover anyone acting 




Since Random House is preparing 
to publish further Snepp writings, ac-
cording to Hollingsworth, the ,com-
pany now believes that for the first 
time a publishet· has been placed un-
der "prior restraint" against putting 
out a book. 
The court's approval of the District 
Court's orders in the case went well 
beyond the CIA, lawyers pointed out, 
and secrecy agreements by emlJ!loye~. 
Government employes with access 
to "sensitive information" have li trust 
relationship with their employers, the 
court said. The trust may be 1estab-
lished, in part, by "access to confiden-
tial sources and materials," not just to 
national security secrets. 
"Without a dependable preptiblica-
tion review procedure no intelligence 
agency or responsible government of-
ficial could be assured that ah em-
ploye privy to sensitive information 
might not conclude on his ownT-inno-
cently or otherwise-that it should be 
disclosed to the world," the majority 
said. 
The remedy imposed, the 'confisca-
tion of earnings, "is the natural and 
customary censequence of a breach 
of trust." 
At the ceurt, law clerks and some 
other empleyes are privy to the secre-
tive memeranlia and conversations 
which lead to decisions by the jus-
tices. 
Beb WM4wartl and Scott Arm-
strong. authers ef "The Brethren," say 
they relieli en hundreds of interviews 
with clerks te aescribe those secret 
delilteratiens ever a seven-year period 
at the ceurt. Previous leaks, notably 
an advance en a major Supreme 
C"urt •l'illien te ABC reporter Tim 
O'Brien, have alse been attributed to 
court empleyes. 
Though there is no law governing 
secrecy ameng ceurt employes. Chief 
Justice Warren Burger has said that 
one is not required to solve the prob-
lem. ' 
In his dissent in the Pentagon Pa-
pers case in 1971, Burger wrote: "Xo 
statute gives this court express power 
to establish and enforce the utmost 
security measures for the secrecy of 
our deliberations . and records. Yet I 
have little doubt as to the inherent 
power of the court to protect the con-
fidentiality of its internal operations 
by whatever judicial measures may 
be required." 
The Snepp opinion may have been 
the first judicial measure, some law-
yers believe. "A clerk is clearly in a 
position of trust in dealing with sensi-
tive information." said American Civil 
Liberties Union lawyer .:\lark Lynch, 
who represented Snepp. "I think 
there 's no question that the decision 
could apply to them." 
"I see the decision as in part a reac-
tion to confidences improperly 
breached" in "The Brethren," said 
Bruce Fein, an American Enterprise 
Institute court expert. 
"I can't say that conclusively. But in 
the procedure used by the court, the 
decision reflected a kind of instinctive 
hostility" unusual for the justices. 
Procedurally, the court chose to is-
sue its unsigned opinion without argu-
ments from either side. According to 
Eugene Gressman, coauthor of a book 
on Supreme Court practice, that i8 
common in m a j or cases but not 
unique· It is, he said, "unfair. You 
wake up in the morning and find 
you've lost your case without ever hav-
ing had the chance to argue it." 
In addition. the court gave the gov-
ernment more than it or anyone else 
had asked for. The Fourth U.S. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals had overturned 
the seizure of Snepp's earnings as too 
harsh a penalty. The government told 
the Supreme Court that if it rejected 
Snepp 's appeal of the rest of the 
lower court decision, it should also re-
ject the government's appeal of the 
earnings seizure decision. The court 
disregarded the government's request. 
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dis-
sent along with Justices William Bren-
nan and Thurgood .Marshall, .::ailed 
that action "unprecedented." He de-
scribed that and the decision in gen· 
era! as an "uninhibited ... exercise is 
lawmaking." 
• 
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In defense of confiscation 
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled this week in the 
Frank Snepp-CIA case even as the Senate began 
work on a "charter" for the legal domestication 
of CIA work, and when The Brethren has spot-
lighted the techniques of judicial review. 
These circumstances are pertinent, for in rul-
ing on the enforcibility of CIA contracts with 
former agents the Court brushed the issues with 
which the Senate must grapple; and the Court 
also, according to some critics, flouted strict con-
structionism to penalize Mr. Snepp. 
As yesterday's comment suggested, we don't 
agree with that criticism. But since it sprang 
from sharp dissidence within the Court, and 
since it is even said that the Court "showed con-
tempt for the rule of law," a second look may be 
appropriate. 
Let us focus, this time, on the dissenters' con-
demnation of the Court's confiscation of Mr. 
Snepp's royalties. Here, a gentlemanly disagree-
ment among the justices over the law of trusts, 
which was the legal heart of the matter, has 
been magnified into a charge that the Court 
ruled lawlessly. 
Yet Mr. Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissent, 
and Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined 
him, agreed that if Mr. Snepp had disclosed 
classified information, the forfeiture of his 
profits would be appropriate. Since the CIA had 
not charged him with a breach of classified 
information the dissenters thought the remedy 
excessive and unjust. 
The government, however, did not flatly de-
clare that Mr. Snepp's book had revealed no 
"information concerning intelligence or CIA"-
only that "for purposes of this action" that was 
not the contention. 
Was this conditional clause insignificant? The 
dissenters assume so; we do not. While it's any-
one's guess, the CIA and the Justice Department 
may have been trying to avoid revealing "for 
purposes of this action" what it seemed to them 
in the national interest to conceal. Yet the dis-
senters drew from the conditional stipulation 
the startling conclusion that "by definition, the· 
interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract 
was designed to protect has not been compro-
mised." They do not really know that. They know 
only that no compromise of that "interest in 
co fiden.tiality" had been charged. 
'1 he d:s·senters' broad interpretation of the 
government's plea is question-begging. It carries 
us swiftly back to the quandary that bothered 
the Court - that a "remedy" risking the disclo-
sure the CIA seeks to avoid is no remedy. 
Another frailty of the dissenters' position, as 
the Court's unsigned opinion noted, is that "the 
dissent (divides in two) Snepp's 1968 agreement 
and treats its interdependent provisions as if 
they imposed unrelated obligations." Mr. Snepp 
not only agreed not to publish classified infor-
mation without clearance, he agreed to clear all 
information "relating to the Agency, its activi- · 
ties or intelligence activities generally" before 
publishing. 
If you assume, as we do, that the Agency is bet-
ter situated than former agents to judge when 
disclosure could cause harm, tl\e inclusiveness 
of the contract is all-important. Yet the dissent-
ers - speaking of "lawmaking" - gratuitously 
distinguish between classified information and 
more general information, ignoring that in some 
ways the disclosure of the latter could be as com-
promising as the disclosure of the former. What 
a form~r agent imagined to be harmless informa-
tion could lay a trail to undercover sources, or to 
foreign intelligence agencies cooperating with 
the CIA. 
Justice Stevens and the other dissenters indi-
cated, oddly, that they would be at ease if the 
Court confiscated book profits in response to a 
breach of classified information, but not in re-
sponse to the other kind of disclosure. How or 
why they distinguish between the two, in the 
light of a trust relationship explicitly restrain-
ing both, is not blindingly clear. That is why the 
disagreement is, in essence, a disagreement 
about the law of trusts. And on that question Mr. 
Justice Stevens has six votes against him. 
Of course - to take passing note of more 
fundamental objections to the Court's decision 
-the Supreme Court may be no better than Con-
gress at balancing the needs of a working intelli-
gence system against the claims of openness, 
free speech and constitutionality. It may be a 
fond illusion in any case that the nation can 
have it both ways - that it can function effec-
tively in the shadowy, extra-legal world of for-
eig~ intelligence and indulge the publishing 
whims of former agents. Not even the mo'3t in-
genious legislative or judicial acrobatics, we sus-
pect, could quite square that circle .• 
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Why Decision in Snepp Case Disturbs P 
By RICHARD EDER 
T HE recent Supreme Court deci-sion curtailing the right of for-mer Government employees to write about their experiences 
has left publishers and constitutiopal 
lawyers seriously disturbed; It bas left 
Frank Snepp both gagged and broke. 
All professions have their powerful 
mysteries: medicine has psychiatry, 
journalism bas unattributable sources, 
and the legal profession 
bas injunctions and equity 
News jurisprudence. When the 
Analysis Supreme Court decided 
three weeks ago that Mr. 
Snepp had violated his 
contract with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, his former employer, by put>. 
lishing his account of the last days of 
the United States presence in Vietnam, 
without clearing it with the agency, it 
applied a punishment not out of law but 
equity; and left him tied up with an in-
junction to boot. 
The court did not grant Mr. Snepp's 
request to be heard in appeal. Instead, 
it issued an opinion confirming, in ef-
fect, an original Federal District Court 
judgment against him two years ago. It 
permanently enjoined him from circu-
lating any of his writing arising from 
his years in the C.I.A., unless it was 
first cleared by the agency. It went on 
to punish his failure to clear his book, 
"Decent Interval," with something 
considerably beyond the normal legal 
remedy for a breach of contract. Such a 
remedy, as recommended by the inter-
mediate Circuit Court of Appeals, 
would have been an order for a new 
lower-court trial to determine dam-
ages. 
Bacltgrouncl of Other Books 
Instead, the Supreme Court applied a 
punishment based on equity jurispru-
dence. More than simply breaching a 
contract, it held, Mr. Snepp had 
breached a position of trust - even 
though classified material was not held 
to be at stake. Therefore, he must pay 
to the Government not a specific sum to 
be determined, but all present and fu-
ture profits from "Decent Interval." 
The Government's prosecution of 
Mr. Snepp was taken against a back-
ground of numerous other books that 
former agents have published or are 
seeking to publish. It sought to estat>. 
lisli the C.I.A.'s widespread right of 
clearance on all material, classified or 
not. It cited as specific justification the 
contract that all its agents must sign; 
more generally, it argued that an intel-
ligence agency must be sole judge of 
whether material would be damaging. 
A minority of the court- Justices 
John Paul Stevens, Thurgood Marshall 
and William J. Brennan Jr. - sup-
ported the Snepp defense argument 
that the contract could not reasonably 
cover more than classified material, 
and that to extend it further might be a 
violation of the First Amendment. 
The majority, however, said • '1\,fr. 
Snepp's failure to get clearance was 
the kind of action that could cause the 
United States "irreparable harm and 
loss" and was in violation of his con-
tract. It ordered the trust remedy on 
the grounds that a new trial for specific 
damages could risk exposure of confi-
dential Government affairs - even 
though the Government had accepted 
the less sweeping Circuit Court trial 
order. 
$120,008 Held In Eserow 
For publishers, the court decision 
raises serious questions about the free-
dom to write and publish; enunciating, 
as it does, a concept of breach of trust 
that could theoretically bind all kinds 
of former public or even private em-
ployees who wanted to write about 
their experiences. For lawyers, apart 
from these First Amendment issues, it 
raises questions about the temper and 
procedures of the present Supreme 
Court. For Mr. Snepp, the concern is 
more urgent and odder. 
The $120,000 that he has earned from 
his book is tied up in an escrow account 
at a local bank. Barring an unlikely 
decision by the Court to rehear the 
case, it must be paid to the Govern-
ment. Mr. Snepp has been writing 
steadily for the last two years and bas 
virtually completed two other manu-
scripts: a novel about the C.I.A. and 
the assassination of President Ken-
nedy, and an account of his legal diffi-
culties. 
His publisher, Random House, bas 
lent him $12,000 for livin8 expenses, in 
expectation of being shown the manu-
scripts. These were lying on the table in 
a borrowed apartment when Mr. Snepp 
was in town the other day, but he can-
not let Random House even see them, 
let alone publish them. The injunction 
requires Mr. Snepp to let the C.I.A. see 
them first and make whatever dele-
tions it decides upon, before showing 
them to anyone else. Thus, Mr. Snepp 
cannot convert his debt into the ad-
vance that his publisher would provide 
if it could look at his manuscripts. 
Submlssloa to C.I.A. PI~ 
"I'm absolutely impoverished," said 
the author, who was the C.I.A.'s princi-
pal analyst and briefer in Saigon before 
the evacuation at the end of the Viet-
nam War. "I've spent the last two 
years writing; I couldn't go out and get 
a job because I was going to pay back 
Random House with the advances on 
the new books. Now the novel is ready 
and I can't even submit it. This must be 
the first novel in American history that 
Is en joinable in advance." 
Mr Snepp intends to submit his novel 
to the C.I.A. review appa 
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Art: Portraiture by Hendrie 
Detail from "Doc and Ruby's 
Oldest Boy," a self-portrait 
by Barkley Hendricks. 
By HILTON KRAMER 
WORKING in a style of meticulous, mirror-bright Realism, the American painter Barkley Hendricks 
concentrates for the most part on 
producing portrait figures of young 
blacks. A large, uncommonly interest-
ing exhibition of these paintings is on 
view at the Studio Museum in Harlem, 
2033 Fifth Avenue, at 125th Street. 
Mr. Hendricks's subjects are often 
drawn from the artist's native Phila-
delphia, and much attention is lavished 
on their sartorial splendor. Clothes are, 
indeed, something of a fetish in this 
painting-not only for Mr. Hendricks's 
subjects, but also for the artist himself. 
Even in his own nude self-portrait of 
1978, the white cap and multicolor 
socks worn by the figure are rendered a 
good deal more persuasively than the 
structure of the anatomy. 
• 
The glittering, light-reflecting sur-
faces of watches, rings, bracelets, eye-
glasses and other personal jewelry are 
likewise brilliantly rendered. But all of 
these details, while remaining remark-
able feats of pictorial representation, 
are secondary to the painter's principal 
stylistic device. This consists of silhou-
etting the figure, or figures, in a bril-
liantly tinted empty space, devoid of 
everything but light, and playing off 
the vivid chromatic elem 
clothing and the skin tones 
This pictorial strategy is no 
slick side- and Mr. Hen 
as slick as any Realist now 
but it is particularly eff 
the palette is dominated 
pearly grays and off-whites 
In an interesting depart 
pictorial scheme, there is 
of a female figure on a cou 
forms other than the figu~ 
the entire space. From the~ 
rug in the foreground to th 
the wallpaper along the u 
painting attempts a far m 
structure than Mr. Hendri 
allows himself and Is all the 
esting because of it. In so 
this is the most thoughtful 
the show. 
In addition to the paint 
also a selection of recent 
collages and photographs. 
colors, though at times a s~ 
in execution, usually achi 
pealing delicacy. But to 
photography Mr. Hendrie 
one feels, turned the full 
talents. Except for one 
photograph of people stan 
ington"Square, the photogr 
be commonplace and 
.slight. It is in the paint! 
Hendricks remai!'lS some 
tuoso. 
The exhibition will be 
through March 30. 
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to submit his novel 
to the C.I.A. review apparatus in the 
next week or two. Because of the vigor 
with. which the Government moved 
against his first book- it details the 
haste with which United States officials 
evacuated Saigon, making few provi-
sions for wlnerable Vietnamese who 
had worked with the C.I.A. and other 
agencies - he doubts that it will be 
cleared without major deletions. 
The peculiarities in Mr. Snepp's 
situation are considerable. For one 
thing, his British publisher plans to 
send him on a promotional tour in Brit-
ain when "Decent Interval" is pub-
lished there. "Assuming that the tour 
sells books, I'll really be working for 
the Government: they'll get my prof-
its. But at least I'll be fed," he said, 
passing over the theoretical possibility 
that the C.I.A. would bill him for the 
price of his food. 
To the publishing world, the implica-
tions of the Supreme Court opinion are 
highly disturbing. The freedom to read 
committee of the Association of Ameri-
can Publishers is expected to consider 
the matter when it meets later this 
month. It will have before it a lengthy 
memorandum by the association's gen-
eral counsel, Henry R. Kaufman. 
"The entire opinion, from beginning 
to end, including several absolutely in-
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s consists of silhou-
'r figures, in a bril-
space, devoid of 
t, and playing off 
the vivid chromatic elementS ot the 
clothing and the skin tones against it. 
This pictorial strategy is not without its 
slick side- and Mr. Hendricks can be 
as slick as any Realist now painting -
but it is particularly effective where 
the palette is dominated by blacks, 
pearly grays and off-whites. 
In an interesting departure from this 
pictorial scheme, there is one painting 
of a female figure on a couch in whicli 
forms other than the figure itself fill 
the entire space. From the design of the 
rug in the foreground to the pattern of 
the wallpaper along the upper edge, the 
painting attempts a far more complex 
structure than Mr. Hendricks usually 
allows himself and is all the more inter-
esting because of it. In some respects, 
this is the most thoughtful painting in 
the show. 
In addition to the paintings, there is 
also a selection of recent watercolors, 
collages and photographs. The water-
colors, though at times a shade hesitant 
in execution, usually achieve an ap. 
pealing delicacy. But to collage and 
photography Mr. Hendricks has no~, 
one feels, turned the full weight of his 
talents. Except for one hand-tinted 
photograph of people standing in Wash-
ington-square, the photographs tend to 
be commonplace and the collages 
slight. It is in the paintings that Mr. 
Hendricks remaL'l.S something of a vir-
tuoso. ' 
The exhibition will be on view 
through March 30. 
credible footnotes, is an unadulterated 
disaster,"' Mr. Kaufman wrote. He 
pointed out, among other things, that 
the Supreme Court opinion, and its use 
of the equity concept of "trust," could 
be used to penalize the writings of any 
former Government employee deemed 
to have violated confidences. 
"Furthermore," Mr. Kaufman said 
in an interview, "the notion of the con-
structive trust could allow the Govern-
ment to get money from the publishers 
as well.'' In the Snepp case, the Gov-
ernment did not ask for Random 
House's profits, but It could have, In 
theory. 
Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard Law 
School professor who specializes In 
First Amendment cases and wbo as-
sisted in Mr: Snepp's defense, noted 
that the implications could go further. 
"Take Deep Throat, in the Woodward-
Bernstein book," he said. "If he turns 
out to be an official under fiduciary ob-
ligation, which surely he was, then the 
authors and The Washington Post could 
be sued for their profits." 
EdltiDg Question Raised 
At Random House, Its president, 
Robert Bernstein, called the situation 
"very serious and very sad." "They 
have set up a ceJJSOrship system. There 
are no rules of any kind. They have said 
that an organization that is criticized 
can censor its critic." 
"Furthermore," Mr. Bernstein con-
tinued, "how do you edit a book? Sup. 
posing the original manuscript is 
cleared and sent to us. How do we sug-
gest changes? Each change would have 
to go off to Washington, unless tbey bad 
a C.I.A. man sitting in our office." 
Among constitutional lawyers, the 
opinion by the court is causing a consid-
erable stir. "I am appalled," Prof. 
Thomas Emerson of Yale said. "I look 
at it as a continuation of what they have 
been doing in other cases, but moving 
beyond them. They have been treating 
this as if it were a private contract. If 
one thing is clear, it Is that for a Gov-
ernment to Impose that kind of blanket 
inhibition on its employees is a kind of 
action that is simply not governed by 
normal contract rules. It raises First 
Amendment rules about the right of an 
employee, and the right of the public to 
obtain information and the right of the. 
press to publish it." 
'It's a Loaded Gun' 
Professor Dershowitz and other law-
yers expressed concern not merely at 
the substantive results of the decision, 
but at the procedures used. Reflecting 
the dissent submitted by Justices Ste-
vens, Marshall and Brennan, they 
noted that the Court had decided grave 
constitutional matters without hearing 
arguments from the two sides; by sim-
ply deciding the question upon submis-
sion of the Writ of certiorari. 
"It's a loaded gun," Professor Der-
showitz said of the decision. "It con-
tains extraordinarily open and loose 
language. It comes from writing the 
decision without briefs. My God, when 




hear the briefs, doesn't simple courtesy 
call for arguments to be heard?" 
Noting that the Government bad 
asked for less than the Court awarded, 
Mr. Dershowitzsaid: 
"It's the greatest example of over-
reaching and lack of judicial restraint 
in our memory. None of us can think of 
any other example where the Govern-
ment asked for a remedy and the Court 
gave so much more. There was one ex-
ample, in an antitrust suit, but then 
there was full argument by both sides." 
Both publishers and lawyers ex-
pressed hope that Congress might be 
persuaded to limit the theoretical ef-
fects of the Court ruling. Two pending 
pieces of legislation - the unified 
crime bill and a C.I.A. charter- were 
mentioned as areas where limiting lan-
guage might be adopted. 
'Scenes From King Kong' 
And 'Mister Lincoln' Close 
Two Broadway productions closed 
over the weekend. "Mister Lincoln" by 
Herbert Mitgang closed Sunday at the 
Morosco Theater after five preview.· 
and 16 regular performances. The star 
of this one-man play was Roy Dotrice, 
the British actor. The producers were 
David Susskind and Isobel Robins. 
"Mister Lincoln" opened last fall at the 
Citadel Theater in Edmonton, Alberta, 
and also played at Ford's Theater in 
Washington before opening on Broad-
way. Peter Coe directed. 
The other closing was Howard 
Schuman's "Censored Scenes From 
King Kong," which closed Sunday at 
the Princess Theater. This revue, 
which had a brief run in London, gave 
11 previews and five regular perform-
ances. The cast included Carrie Fislier, 
Stephen Collins, Chris Sarandon and 
Peter Riegert. Michael White, Eddie 
Kulukundis and Robert S. Fishko were 
the producers. 
The CIA's Case Against Snepp 
MY TURN/GEORGE A. CARVER JR. 
O n February 19, the Supreme Court issued a 6-3 decision in Snepp v. U.S., 
No. 78-1871 that generated a predictable 
firestorm of press criticism. (One New 
York Times columnist termed it "lawless," 
a sign of "disorder in the court.") Much of 
this impassioned criticism, however, has 
been flawed by factual error or a misunder-
standing of the questions at issue. 
ThecaseinvolvesaformerCentrallntelli-
gence Agency officer, Frank Snepp, who 
was stationed in Saigon at the time it fell and 
who subsequently wrote a book about Viet-
nam entitled "Decent Interval." The gov-
ernment took Mr. Snepp to court because he 
did not submit his manuscript to the CIA for 
security review prior to its publication-
arguing that in so acting, Mr. Snepp violated 
the secrecy agreement he had signed in ini-
tially accepting CIA employment, as a con-
dition of that employment. 
Mr. Snepp's basic defense, argued by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, was that 
his secrecy agreement did not apply be-
cause nothing in his book was "classified." 
The Supreme Court ruled unambiguously 
in the government's favor, endorsing the 
government's contention that the question 
of whether or not "Decent Interval" con-
tained any classified material was irrelevant 
in this action; that this was a breach-of-
contract case, not one raising First Amend-
ment issues; and upholding a lower-court 
ruling that for breaching his contract, Mr. 
1 Snepp had to forfeit all earnings derived 
from his book. 
Appeals: The issues raised by this case are 
complex and important. Though not a law-
.yer, I have considerable familiarity with all 
sidesofallofthem. From 1966to 1973, I was 
special assistant for Vietnamese affairs to 
three successive directors of Central Intelli-
gence; for the following three years, I was 
deputy for national intelligence to two. In 
that latter capacity, I was a member of the 
CIA's highest appellate board (under the 
director), considering appeals on, among 
other things, recommended deletions in 
manuscripts submitted for prepublication 
review by current or former employees. I am 
now retired and on the other side of the 
fence, earning much of the money needed to 
support my family by writing. 
I have known Frank Snepp and his work 
for many years. We have often disagreed, 
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but our disagreements have always been 
within a context of reciprocal professional 
respect and personal regard. He and the 
ACLU, in fact, had me subpoenaed-from 
overseas-as a defense witness in this case, 
and voluntarily bore the expense of my 
round-trip travel. Frank Snepp cannot be 
legitimately faulted for writing or publish-
ing "Decent Interval." His mistake lay in 
not submitting his manuscript for prepubli-
cation review, as required by the secrecy 
agreement he had signed-voluntarily-
since no one is obliged to work for the CIA. 
Despite mythology to the contrary, CIA 
prepublication security review of employ-
ees' manuscripts is not "censorship" as that 
term is normally understood. As I know 
To have good 
intelligence, our 
nation must effectively 
protect legitimate 
intelligence secrets. 
from my own experience on both sides of 
this fence, such review focuses on one thing 
only: the exposure of information that, in 
the agency's institutional opinion, needs to 
be kept classified to protect sensitive intelli-
gence or intelligence sources and meth-
ods-not on criticism, accuracy, personal 
opinions or anything else. 
As the government argued and the Su-
preme Court ruled, whether or not any-
thing in "Decent Interval" still required the 
protection of classification was irrelevant. I 
think several passages in it should have 
been considered classified, and would have 
so ruled had I been officially reviewing Mr. 
Snepp's manuscript; but since I did not 
review the manuscript officially, this is a 
strictly private, personal opinion. That, 
however, is precisely the central point here 
involved. No former agency employee, let 
alone any journalist, has any private right 
to determine what is or is not properly 
classified. The right to make that determi-
nation is institutional, vested by statute in 
the United States Government. 
Ruling on classification is not censor-
ship. Any claim that it is, or that our 
government's exercise of this legitimate, 
legally sanctioned right has a "chilling 
effect" on former government employees' 
exercise of their private rights of free ex-
pression as protected under the First 
Amendment is hogwash-as I also know 
from my own experience. Since retiring last 
September, I have published several arti-
cles, and signed a book contract. All my 
manuscripts have been or will be submitted 
for prepublication security review in com-
pliance with the secrecy agreement which I 
freely signed (as did Frank Snepp). Honor-
ing this obligation, however, has been no 
bar to remunerative productivity; nor, as 
anyone who reads my published prose will 
see, has it been any impediment to criticiz-
ing the U.S. Government or its policies. 
We are unlikely to survive this strife-
ridden and now thermonuclear era without 
good intelligence, and our nation cannot 
have good intelligence without an effective 
ability to protect legitimate intelligence 
secrets. Prepublication screening of CIA 
employees' or former employees' manu-
scripts-for this purpose-is essential; for 
legitimate secrets can hardly be protected 
if every employee or former employee as-
sumes a private right to make declassi-
fication determinations individually and 
unilaterally. 
Remedies: I would be more than .pre-
pared to go to the mat with the agency and 
the government and fight tooth and nail, in 
the courts if necessary, if I were ever to feel 
that any CIA prepublication review of my 
prose was being expanded beyond what I 
considered legitimate classification deter-
minations into anything I considered ille-
gitimate censorship. This has not hap-
pened, however, and there are ample 
remedies available to me, as an American 
citizen. if it ever should. 
Even though I now earn a major portion 
of my living with my pen and typewriter, I 
applaud the Supreme Court's "Decent In-
terval" decision. It was wise, sound, just-
and necessary to protect me as an American 
citizen and to protect our country. 
George A. Carver Jr., a retired CIA offi· 
cer, is currently a senior fellow at George-
town University's Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
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Griffin B. Bell 
Secrecy After the Snepp Case 
The legal principle underlying the case of the -------------------------------------
United States v. Frank Snepp is a simple one; 
but it may well be the glue that -preserves our 
intelligence agencies from the ravages of a pur-
ported absolutism, described under the euphe-
mism of "the public's right to know." , 
Continued disclosures by ex-agent Philip 
Agee, books by Snepp and others, had alarmed 
intelligence officials in the United States and 
abroad, American and allied. The CIA and re-
lated American intelligence agencies, :vere 
more and more viewed as existing in an unsta-
ble environment. 
Now that the Supreme Court has sustained 
the principle that the CIA may contractually re-
quire its employees to clear any publication con-
cerning the agency, careful consideration 
should be focused on how the government is to 
operate with this right. 
Clearly, the government's successful action 
against Frank Snepp, the ex·CIA agent who had 
signed at least two agreements with the CIA to 
submit matters proposed for publication con-
cerning the agency for clearance-and who had 
represented personally to Adm. Stansfield 
Turner that he would-is one of the more sig-
nificant recent steps to buttress our nation's in-
telligence capacity. The rush to disclose by ex-
employees and officials had reverberated 
throughout the international intelligence com-
munity. Our longtime allies seriously ques-
tioned our ability to maintain their confidence 
and trust, and sources questioned our ability to 
protect them. Our own operatives in the field 
were endangered by the disclosures of their ex-
colleagues. . 
We are beyond the day of Le Carre·like cloak 
and daggers in furnishing adequate and timely 
intelligence to the president and his advisers 
The writer, former attorney general in the 
Carter administration, is in private practice in 
Atlanta. 
"In embracing. the principle of the Snepp case, there is no 
lessening of our nation's resolv~ to channel the activities of 
our intelligence agencies in a proper and lawful manner." 
·for responding to the social, political and eco-
nomic complexities of today's world. Protecting 
our intelligence secrets, and the sources and 
methods by which we derive them, is the cor-
nerstone of an effective CIA. 
But in embracing the principle of the Snepp 
case, there is no lessening of our nation's re-
solve or ability to channel the activities of our 
intelligence agencies in a proper and lawful 
manner, to live within those safeguards and es-
tablished bounds that prevent proscribed activi-
ties both at horne and abroad. · 
In a significant article on the First Amend-
ment -and a responsible press, which caused 
much comment on these pages (September 5, 
1977), the late Alan Barth, a discerning First 
Amendment advocate, wrote: 
"There are many matters, it must be recog- . 
nized, that governments-including the govern-
ments of dernocracie~ught and must keep 
secret .... But the responsibility for guarding 
them is a government responsibility. It is not a 
responsibility of the press. Nor should the press 
be considered in any sense a partner or agent of 
the government in discharging this responsibili-
ty." . 
The eminent British jurist and scholar Lord 
Scarman put it well when he observed that 
while freedom of the press, including the right 
of the public to be informed, is a transcendent 
right, it is a right subject in some instances and 
to some extent to the security of the nation, the 
security of the individual , property rights, the 
right of privacy and the right of the individual 
to reputation. 
In foreign intelligence and counterintelligence 
there is no danger of covering up wrongdoing if 
one wishes to report it. Specifically, there are in-
ternal agency and executive branch mechanisms 
for disclosures, including taking the matter to the 
intelligence oversight board or to the president 
himself. In addition, our shared system of checks 
and balances between the executive and legisla-
tive branches provides-through the congres-
sional oversight function of the Senate and House 
intelligence committees-additional means for 
the "whistle blowers'" redress-all without public 
disclosure necessarily of those matters that 
should be protected. 
Beyond a possible criminal sanction in a 
clearly definable area, such as publishing the 
names of CIA agents abroad, no statutory 
scheme, given the limitations in definition, can 
be as effective, fair or limited as the simple con-
tractual preclearance requirement. Nor is the 
argument persuasive that the contract should 
distinguish between classified and nonclassified 
data. The relevance of whether the matter is 
classified, nonclassified or classifiable is better 
left to the agency. review process. Moreover, 
this across-the-board formula facilitates applica-
tion of the clearance requirement to all levels 
of the agency, as it should, whether the pro-
posed author is a former head of the agency or 
the lowest·level agent. 
Now that the contract principle is firmly in 
place, the government's own responsibility is to 
see that such contracts are carefully and nar-
rowly drafted to ensure the reasonableness of 
the basic contract in relation to the job and 
trust imposed, as well as to ensure the reason-
ableness of the agency's response. This impor-
tantly includes the speed of the review process 
and the basic fairness of the review to exclude 
only from publication those matters that are 
and should be truly secrets. For the most part, 
the greatest burden is on the reviewing agency 
to ensure this. But because of the understanda-
ble reluctance of the courts to undertake a 
review of the fairness of the agency review 
process, not to mention the outright difficulty, - · 
consideration should be given to the creation: of 
a special review panel inside the executive 
branch, but apart from the agency itself, to 
review any· appeals of the employee from the 
agencY's own review. ThiS addresses the impor-
tant concern of keeping secret those things that 
should be, and not necessarily that which is 
merely embarrassing or disconcerting. Resort 
to the courts as is presently the case could then 
be had. 
The contractual principle of the Snepp case 
should be limited to those_ engaged in foreign in-
telligence and counterintelligence. That many 
governmental agencies employ persons who 
hold positions of trust and confidentiality does 
not sufficiently distinguish the very special 
character and national needs of our foreign in-
telligence operations. 
The issues in the Snepp case were not those of 
the First Amendment, but rather whether the 
government might exercise its responsibilities 
in foreign intelligence by conditioning the em-
ployment of those who seek to enter into its em-
ploy on a publication-preclearance process. The 
courts, on every level, found such a condition to 
be valid and reasonable. The required forfeit-
ure of profits was no more than an application 
of the ancient maxim that one should not profit 
from his own wrongdoing. The legal principles 
involved and the lack of disputed facts ren-
dered the case so simple as to warrant summary 
disposition in the Supreme Court. The nation is 
the better for the decision.' 
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employment contract between the parties. The United States cross petitionee 
on the question of remedies. 
2. FACTS: Petr Snepp, was first employed by the CIA in 1968. At 
that time, he executed a secrecy agre_e~nt, in which he undertook "not 
... __.-: w.-
to publish any information or material relating to the Agency ..• 
either during or after the term of my employment without specific 
prior approval by the Agency. I understand that it is established Agency 
policy to refuse approval to publication of or participation in publi-
cation of any such information or material." Petr served in Viet Nam 
for four and one half years for the CIA. 
Petr was dissatisfied with the manner in which the CIA had conducted 
its affairs in Viet Nam and resolved to write a book on the topic, nego-
} tiating a publication advance with a publisher prior to his resignation 
~ from the CIA, effective January 26, 1976. At the time of his resignation 
in 1976, he executed a "Termination Secrecy Agreement" in which he agreed 
'-=- ~..... - --
not to publish •.. any classified information, or any information con-
cerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA ... 
without the express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligenc( 
or his representative." Defendant was told that his responsibilities 
under this agreement were the same as those under the agreement that he 
signed when he was employed. 
Petr's book, Decent Interval, was published in November 1977. Petr 
did not submit the book to the CIA for prior approval before publication . 
...... 
Petr maintains that he did not do so because he feared that approval would 
not be given. The governmen'c brought an action against petr in 1978, 
.... 
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alleging that petr had breached his contractual and fiduciary obligations 
to the CIA by failing to submit the manuscript of his book for pre-publi-
cation review pursuant to the original secrecy agreement. The CIA sought 
damages for breach of contract and an injunction against future breaches 
as well as a constructive trust over all past and future revenues from 
the sale of the book. The CIA does not contend that Decent Interval 
reveals any classified information or any information concerning intelli-
gence that has not been made public by the CIA. The only issue was 
whether a breach had occurred because of petr's refusal to submit the 
book prior to publication. 
3. DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS: The DC ruled that petr had 
breached his contractual and fiduciary duty to submit his manuscript for 
pre-publication review. Finding that petr's breach caused the government 
irreparable harm, the DC enjoined petr from future violations and imposed 
........,_ 
a constructive trust on all revenues derived from Decent Interval for the 
benefit of the government. The DC injunction provided that petr must 
submit all manuscripts to the CIA prior to publication but imposed upon 
the CIA the condition that it complete its review within 30 days after 
submission and that it withhold approval for publication of materials only 
if they are classified. In determining the remedy, the DC found that 
the measure of damage inflicted on the United States by petr's breach was -
not calculable. 
Petr appealed to the CA 4. TheCA affirmed the lower court's deter-
mination tha~ the s~crecy ag2:~ment was v~id and had been breached. 
Although upholding injunctive relief, the court declined to approve the 
- 4 -
imposition of a constructive trust. The court construed the 1968 and 1976 
employment agreements as imposing an obligation to submit all publications, 
and not just those containing classified or secret information, for ap-
proval. The court did not determine whether the 1976 agreement superseded 
the 1968 agreement, reading both agreements, contrary to the arguments of. 
petr, as imposing the same obligation. In reliance on two prior decisions 
of theCA, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (CA 4), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (Marchetti I); and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 
509 F.2d 1362 (CA 4) cert denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (Marchetti II), the 
court concluded that the prior restraints imposed by the employment agree-
ments did not violate the First Amendment. In the Marchetti cases, the 
~~ CA 4 found that the CIA could constitutionally prohibit employees from 
publishing classified information. The court also found that as a means 
of enforcing this interest, the CIA could impose pre-publication review 
for all intelligence-related materials for the sole purpose of permitting 
the CIA to identify ' and to withhold permission for the disclosure of 
classified information. The court recognized an obligation on the part of 
the CIA to respond promptly to a request for authority to publish and 
held that there was a right of judicial review if permission was withheld. 
\ The court concluded that employees did have a First Amendment right to 
( publish non-classified information. 
The majority of the pane l departed from the DC on the issue of reme ~ 
dies. The court first concluded ·that a constructive trust was inappropri-
~
ate. The court found that the contract only created a fiduciary obligatio1 
to submit classified informa tion for pre-publication review. The obligatir. 
- 5 -
( 
to submit non-classified information was stric·tly contractual, and not 
fiduciary in nature. The court therefore concluded that there was no 
fiduciary relationship established to support the imposition of the con-
structive trust. 
The court concluded however, that on a proper factual showing, the 
government would be entitled to recover punitive damages from petr.* 
.___ ~----~----------------~-------------------------
Although the court acknowledged that punitive damages ordinarily are not 
recoverable for breach of contract, it stated that the evidence at trial, 
viewed in a light most favorable to the government., was sufficient to 
permit a trier of fact to find that petr had falsely represented to Agency 
officials that he would comply with his contractual obligation to submit 
( his manuscript for pre-publication review and that the agency had relied 
(~~ 
on these false representations in determining not to take legal action 
to enjoin the publication of Decent Interval. Under these circumstances, 
) the court held petr's breach of contract may also have embraced the tort 
t of deceit, for which punitive damages may properly be assessed. The 
court ruled that the amount of punitive damages that the government may 
recover does not bear any necessary relationship to the amount of compen-
satory damages that can be proved, but rather should depend on petr's 
culpability and financial circumstances. It therefore remanded for a jury 
trial on these disputed factual issues, and in the event those issues are 
-wz - ~-
resolved favorably to the government, for a jury determination of the 
amount of punitive damages which should be awarded. 
Judge Hoffman dissented on the remedy question. He found that the 
1968 secrecy agreement did establish a fiduciary relationship, and in 
~ \ - ----.fThe-comRlaint does not claim punitive damage~ but theCA s8id 
lP.!H7t=> tn .!'lmPnf-1 !=:hn11lri h P lih P r::~llv & 1·::~nt P ri . 
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light of the government's conceded difficulty in proving compensatory 
damages, he concluded that imposition of a constructive trust was an 
appropriate remedy. He also found that the majority's conclusion on the 
potential availability of punitive damages was in error. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr, Snepp. Petr first argues that he was not in 
breach of contract. This argument is premised on his conclusion that 
the 1976 agreement superseded the 1.968 agreement. He maintains that the 
1976 agreement, by its terms, only requires the submission of non-public 
information for pre-publication review. 
Petr next argues that this Court's decisions require that a system 
of censorship by a government agency must be supported by explicit 
congressional authorization. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
u.s. 579, 585-86 (1952). Petr maintains that no such statutory authori-
zation supports the CIA's agreement. 
Petr also maintains that the agreements contravene the First Amend-
ment. First, petr maintains that the government has not upheld its 
burden of sustaining the need for the system of prior restraint, alleging 
only speculative injury from the publication of unclassified information 
without prior review. Moreover, petr maintains that he did not waive 
his First Amendment rights by signing the 1968 secrecy agreement and 
accepting employment with the CIA. Petr relies on this Court's decision 
in cole v. Richardson, 405 u.s. 676, 680 (1972) in which the court stated 
that government employment may not "be conditioned on an oath that one 
has not engaged, or will not engage, in protected speech activities such 
as •.. criticizing institutions of government . II See also Elrod 
- 7 -
c· v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
Finally, petr alleges that punitive damages are inappropriate in 
this case, both as a construction of contract law, and because they con-
travene decisions of this court. Petr reasons that this court places 
strict limitations on the assessment of damages against those who publish 
inforrration of public importance. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 
254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). Petr 
also cites Electrical Workers v. Foust, 47 U.S.L.W. 4600 (May 29, 1979) 
holding that punitive damages may never be awarded against a union in a 
fair representation case because of the general labor policy against 
punishment and the potentially disruptive consequences of such awards. 
Petr maintains that similar policies against the imposition of punitive 
damages are applicable here. 
Amicus submissions. Both the Reporters committee for Freedom of 
·~{the Press and the Association of American Publishers have submitted briefs 
----- in support of petr. The briefs reiterate petr's contentions and add one. 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press maintains that the 
action by the government, seeking d9mages and a constructive trust, is 
in essence an action in copyright. Amicus maintains that Congress has 
prohibited the federal government from restraining a publication based 
on any concept of government proprietaryinterest, common law or statutory 
copyright under 17 u.s.c. § 105 (1976). 
Respondent's contentions. The SG argues first that the lower court's 
construction of the 1967 and 1976 agreements is both correct and not 
certworthy. The SG also reject.s petr • s statutory authority argument 
- 8 -
citing 50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) which expressly states that "The Director of 
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence 
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." In the exercise of 
this responsibility, the SG maintains that the Director may proscribe 
reasonable requirements designed to safeguard asainst the improper release 
of information, including pre-publication review. 
The SG also contends that the pre-publication review procedure is 
a valid condition of employment which does not violate the First Amendment. 
The SG identifies the appropriate standard for determination in Pickering 
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), where the Court stated 
that: 
"The State has interest as an employer in regu-
lating the speech of its employees that differ 
significantly from those it possesses in 
connection with regulation of the speech of 
the citizenry in general. The problem in any 
case is to arrive at a balance between the 
interest of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and 
the interest of the state, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services 
it performs through its employees." 
The SG contends that it is entirely reasonable for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, whose principal function concerns the most sensitive and 
confidential matters regarding the national defense to condition employ-
ment on a promise not to make unauthorized disclosure of classified infer-
mation. Only by requiring pre-publication review can the Agency hope 
to prevent the compromise of important governmental functions that would 
result if classified information were revealed. The SG characterizes 
the burden on the employee's First Amendment rights as minimal since under 
- 9 -
the DC's decision the Agency must complete its review of submitted 
materials within 30 days and must approve the publication of all non-
classified material. The SG concludes that so long as the contract itself 
does not infringe First Amendment rights, a court injunction ensuring 
adherence to that contract is also not an invalid prior restraint. 
On the issue of punitive damages, the SG suggests that the claim is 
premature. If such damages are awarded after a jury trial on remand, 
petr could then seek review of that question. In any event, the SG main-
tains that since the evidence may support the conclusion that petr 
11Willfully, deliberately, and surreptitiously" breached the 1968 secrecy 
agreement in a manner specifically designed to mislead the Agency, the 
imposition of punitive damages would be appropriate. 
Cross petition of the United States. The United States has submitted 
a cross petition on the question of the propriety of theCA's rejection 
of the constructive trust. The petition states however that the United 
States only seeks to review this question if Snepp's petition is g.ranted. 
In the event that Snepp's petition is denied, the United States requests 
the Court to deny the cross petition as well. On the merits, the SG 
-~----,--~'--,---------------~--------------------------
argues that the CA construed the fiduciary obligation too narrowly and 
that a constructive trust was an appropriate remedy for the breach of the 
fiduciary obligation. Snepp maintains that the decision of the CA on 
this question was correct. 
5. DISCUSSION: Snepp's contrActual construction anG st~tutory 
author ~ ~ation 8rguments would not Bppear certworthy 
-10-
Fir~r Amenrlment 
inrlepenrlent of the con~titutional aue~tions. SimilAr'ouestions 
were presenterl in Marchetti I, in which cert was rlenierl. (Tustices 
Pouglas, Brennan and Stewart dissenting.) Marchetti does appear, 
howeverr to .. impose only an obligation to submit classified·±nfor-
m~tion for prepublication review, perhaps on the basi~ of the 
court's reading of the secrecy agreement. The constitutional 
auestions are not insubstantial, and a conflict in the circuit~ 
is unlikely to develop since the United States will probably 
continue to bring such action~ in rhe CA4 where it is winning. 
The remedies ouestions are prob~bly premature. At this 
point in the litigation, the United States' complaint has 
not even been amended to see~ recovery of punitive rl~mages. If 
punitive damages Pre a~sessed after a jury trial the nueption 
coulrl be reviewerl. 
Respon~e filed. 
Mahoney Opn in Petn 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 78-1871 
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MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 18 October 1979 
From: Gregory May 
No. 78-1871: Snepp v. United States 
No. 79-265: United States v. Snepp 
You asked me to review recent cases supporting the 
proposition that the government may put reasonable restrictions 
on its employees' exercise of their first amendment rights. I 
think that the cases support United States v. Marchetti, 466 
F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), and confirm the validity of the CIA 
secrecy agreement as construed by CA4 in this case. 
I. General Principles 
(A) Mr. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-63 (1976), summarizes the guiding 
principles: 
( 1) "[T] he prohibition on encroachment of First 
Amendment protections is not absolute. Restraints are permitted 
for appropriate reasons." 
·, 
2. 
(2) "The denial of a public benefit may not be used by 
the government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling 
it to achieve what it may not command directly." See Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 ( 1967); Speiser v. Randall, 357 
u.s. 513, 526. 
(3) The justification advanced by the government for 
the impairment of first amendment rights "must survive exacting 
scrutiny." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976). This last 
principle, of course, has three components. (a) The government 
interest "must be paramount, one of vi tal importance, and the 
burden is on the government to show the existence of such an 
interest." Speiser v. Randall, supra. (b) "The gain to the 
subordinating interest provided by the means [employed by the 
government] must outweight the incurred loss of protected 
rights." See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 
(1947). (c) "[T]he government must 'emplo[y] means closely 
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement 
at 25. 
" Buckley, supra, 
In Elrod v. Burns, you agreed with these principles, 
but struck a different balance on the matter at hand. See 427 
U.S. at 381-89 (Powell, J., dissenting). The same principles 
find more measured expression in the passage that the SG's Brief 
in Opposition quotes from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 
u.s. 563, 568 (1968). [Quoted at 8.] The Pickering language 
3. 
more frankly acknowledges the legitimacy of reasonable 
restrictions on a government employee's exercise of his first 
amendment rights. 
(B) Among the most helpful recent cases are Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. (1976): Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter 
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), and Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 
676 (1972). 
(1) Buckley upheld, among other things, a limitation on 
the size of individual contributions to candidates for federal 
elective office. Applying close scrutiny, 424 U.S. at 25, the 
Court found that the government's interest in preventing "the 
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large 
individual financial contributions" was enough to justify the 
infringement on protected rights of expression, id. at 26. 
Furthermore, the Court held, Congress was not required to rely 
on "less restrictive means" of policing corruption, such as 
criminal bribery laws and disclosure requirements. Id. at 27-
28. L 
Both holdings support the CIA's secrecy agreement. The 
CIA has a clear interest in preventing "the actuality and 
appearance" of leaks. And, in light of that interest, the 
agency need not rely on after-the-fact sanctions. Indeed, the 
need for forestalling interferences with the government interest 
is much clearer when the government is concerned with the 
security of information and the confidence of its informants 
than when it is concerned with preventing corruption. 
·' 
(2) Letter Carriers reaffirmed the validity of the 
Hatch Act's limitations on political activity by federal civil 
servants. The Court found the restriction justified not only by 
the need to keep government employees free from partisan 
influences, but also by the need to present the appearance of 
such freedom. "[I]t is not only important that the Government 
and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice," 
wrote the Court, "but it is also critical that they appear to 
the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of 
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous 
extent." 413 U.S. at 565. 
The decision, reaffirming United Public Workers v. 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), surprised many commentators who 
had believed that United Public Workers was a derelict. See T. 
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 587, 590 (1970); G. 
Robinson & E. Gellhorn, The Administrative Process 687-88 
(1974). Letter Carriers, like Buckley, demonstrates that the 
government has not only an interest in its integrity, but also 
an interest in the appearance of integrity. And Letter Carriers 
clearly stands for the proposition that the government can 
restrict its employees' first amendment activities in order to 
advance these interests. 
(3) Richardson upheld (by a 4-3 vote) the loyalty oath 
that Mass. exacts as a condition of state employment. The Court 
had invalidated other oaths that required a prospective employee 
5. 
"to reach back into [his] past to recall minor, sometimes 
innocent, [political] activities." 405 u.s. at 681. But the 
Court found no bar to an oath "addressed to the future," id., 
that simply required the employee to foreswear the use of 
"illegal and constitutionally unprotected force to change the 
constitutional system," id. at 684. 
~Richardson is helpful because it upheld a condition on 
government employment. But the case does not go very far 
because, as the majority interpreted it, the oath did not 
interfere with an employee's constitutionally protected rights. 
Indeed, a passage in The Chief Justice's opinion went so far as 
to say that public employment may not "be conditioned on an oath 
that one • • will not engage[] in protected speech activities 
such as the following: criticizing institutions of government; 
discussing political doctrine that approves the overthrow of 
certain forms of government; and supporting candidates for 
political office. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 
(1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board 
of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961)." Id. at 680. The 
cases which The Chief Justice cited invalidated oaths 
foreswearing association with the Communist Party or other 
subversive organizations. 
6. 
II. Origins of Marchetti 
The Supreme Court cases upon which Judge Haynsworth 
relied when considering the secrecy agreement in Marchetti I, 
supra, are less instructive on the issue with which you are 
concerned. 
(A) E. W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37 
(1918), involved a contract dispute between the federal 
government and a defense contractor who wanted to sell to other 
powers torpedos like those manufactured for the u.s. government. 
A large part of the dispute turned on whether the contractor had 
a proprietary or patented interest in the weapon's design. But 
the Court found that "secrecy was an especial object" of the 
parties' contract which 1 imi ted whatever property or contract 
rights the contractor otherwise might have had. Id. at 45-46. 
The case contains no mention of the first amendment and no 
discussion of whether the design was "classified" in the current 
sense. 
(B) Freedman v. Maryland, 380 u.s. 51 (1965), 
invalidated a state statute providing for pre-screening 
clearance of all motion pictures. The Court held that such 
statutes were valid only if they contained "procedural 
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship 
system." Id. at 58. First, the censor must bear the burden of 
proving that the film is unprotected expression. Id. Second, 
the censor himself can have no powers of suppression. He must 
• • 
seek "a prompt final judicial decision" on his claims within a 
"specific brief period." Id. at 59. 
Marchetti I drew upon Freedman to reach the conclusions 
that (a) the CIA had an interest in suppressing only classified 
information ["unprotected expression"?] , (b) the CIA must reach 
its decision promptly, and (c) the employee whose writings are 
disapproved has a right to judicial review of the agency's 
decision. 466 F.2d at 1317. Given the "sensitivity of the area 
and confidentiality of the relationship in which the information 
was obtained," however, CA4 held that the employee should bear 
the burden of seeking judicial review and that the court would 
have no authority to review the agency's secrecy 
classifications. Id. at 1317-18. The court did not say who 
should bear the burden of proof at the judicial hearing. But 
Judge Craven's concurrence suggests that the burden should fall 
on the employee. Id. at 1318. 
III. Conclusion 
Although the constitutional bar against restraints on 
speech is not absolute, the government may not impose 
unreasonable restraints as a condition of public employment. 
The restraints impose must be closely tailored to a legitimate 
government interest, and they must be no more restrictive than 
necessary to protect that interest. 
8. 
The CIA secrecy agreement, as construed by CA4, 
satisfies these requirements. The CIA has clear interests in 
preventing leaks of classified information and preserving the 
appearance of confidentiality. Requiring new employees to agree 
to prepublication review of their writings on the agency is a 
reasonable means for protecting these interests. Post-
publications sanctions are not a viable alternative because they 
are less likely to prevent unacceptable breaches of security. 
Your concern that certain scraps of information, while 
unclassified, might fit into a pattern that would damage CIA 
operations is important, and CA4's language seems to give the 
agency little protection against that danger. The court, 
--------------------------- -----however, has not been faced with a case where the agency seeks 
enforcement of the "information about the agency not previously 
disclosed" part of its secrecy agreement. [Snepp' s Petn at 
61 a, ~~ 3. ] It seems to me that disclosures that would undermine 
the security of officially classified information ought 
themselves to be taken as "classified" in the common sense of 
that word, and Marchetti I leaves CA4 free to reach that 
conclusion. It is less likely, however, that disclosures that 
would undermine the agency's appearance of inviolability--thus 
damaging its ability to garner the confidence of informants--can 
fit within CA4's language. To the extent that CA4 would not 
enforce a secrecy agreement against such disclosures, it appears 
to be conceiving the government's interests too narrowly. The ------
9. 
appearance of inviolability is as important to the CIA as the 
appearance of integrity is to the government in general. See 
Buckley, supra; Letter Carriers, supra. 
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No. 78-1871 Snepp v. u.s. 
No. 78-265 n.s. v. Snepp 
Dear Harry: 
You would do me ~ favor if, at your convenience, 
you would read the enclosed draft of a dissent that I have 
prepared in the above cases that are relisted for me. 
F.ven though the qovernment se~ks cert only if we 
grant Snepp's petition, I am persua~ed that it would be in 
the interest of our country to reinstate the District Court's 
judgment - one that seems clearly correct. This would 
require granting of both petitions, and a summary reversal 
only of the portion of CA4's judgment limiting damaqes. The 
issue is RO clear cut, and the dissent by Judqe Roffman so 
riqht, that I see no reason to take the case for argument. 
Indeed, my guess is that the government is nervous 
about this case, as it would be quite disastrous if Snepp's 
cross petition were qrante~ and this Court went on to 
invalidate the secrecy agreement altogether. I cannot 
imagine the Court reaching such a result, and yet we know 
that the CIA has taken such a "beating" in recent years its 
nervousness may be understandable. A bill is still pending 
(according to what former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, has 
told me) that would damage even further the capacity of the 
CIA to function effectively in the national interest. 
You may wonder why I trouble you with 
precirculation review. I would prefer not to take the cases 
for argument, and thus I would like to know what the chances 
are of four other Justices joining me in a summary reversal. 
At this time, I have spoken only to Potter, who - at the 
first Conference on this case - indicated to me some 





interest. I believe he will •join 4" to deal with the cases 
summarily. Although I have not yet talked to the CJ or WHR, 
I am sure they will be influenced by your thinkinq. ,, 
I commend to you Judge Hoffman's dissent from CA4's I ,. 
on the damage (constructive trust) issue. 
Sincerely 








No. 78-1871 Snepp v. United States 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL dissenting. 
The petitioner in 78-1871J , Frank W. 
Snepp, III, a former employee of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), published a book sharply 
critical of specific CIA activities in South 
Vietnam. At the time of his employment by the CIA 
in 1968 Snepp executed a secrecy agreement that 
provided, in pertinent part, that he would "not 
• publish ••• any information or material 
relating to the Agency, its activities or 
intelligence activities generally, either during 
or after the term of [his] employment ••• without 
specific prior approval of the Agency."2 As Snepp 
published his book without seeking or obtaininq 
prior approval, the government filed this suit 
seeking a declaration that the preclearance 
agreement had been breached, an injunction against 
further publications except in strict compliance 
with the agreement, and the imposition of a 
constructive trust for the benefit of the 
government on all monies which Snepp had earned or 
2. 
will earn from the publication of his book. As of 
the t~ of suit, his realized profits totaled 
about $60,000, with additional royalties expected. 
Pet. 6a. The claim for recovery of these monies 
was based on an asserted violation of a fiduciary 
duty by Snepp. 
I 
In a nonjury trial (there being no issues 
of fact), the District Court found Snepp liable for 
breach of his preclearance agreement, found a 
breach of fiduciary duty, enjoined further 
publications without compliance with his agreement, 
and imposed a constructive trust on his profits 
from the book~The court made specific findings 
of fact, accepted by the Court of Appeals, 
including a finding that Snepp "willfully, 
deliberately and surreptitously breached his 
position of trust with the CIA and the secrecy 
agreement dated September 16, 1968. • " Pet. Sa, 
6a. It was further found that Snepp also had 
deliberately misled CIA officials as to his 
intention to publish a book without submitting it 
for prior review.4 
3. 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court 
with respect to the breach of the agreement and the 
injunction against future publications. But the 
Court of Appeals reversed as to the finding of a 
constructive trust. The government had stipulated 
that, for the purposes of this litigation, it did 
not contend that any information in the book was 
classified. Focusing solely on that concession, 
the court concluded that "on this record • • • 
[Snepp] breached [no] fiduciary obligation". It 
held that the government was entitled to "nominal 
damages", and left open the possibility of punitive 
damages if the government, in a jury trial, is 
able to prove that classified material had been 
published with tortious intent. 
District Judge Hoffman, sitting on the 
panel of the Court of Appeals, dissented from the 
majority decision that there was no constructive 
trust. In an opinion that I find persuasive, Judge 
Hoffman concluded that a constructive trust on 
profits was established and that, absent such a 
trust, the government is left with no dependable 
4. 
and effective remedy from this sort of violation of 
secrecy agreements made by employees of the CIA. I 
will state my reasons for agreeing with Judge 
Hoffman. 
II 
It is difficult to think of any 
employment with the government of the United States 
that involves a higher degree of trust than Snepp's 
employment with the CIA. Indeed, the first 
sentence in the secrecy agreement expressly 
recognized the trust relationship: 
"I, Frank w. Snepp, III, understand that 
upon entering upon duty with the Central 
Intelligency Agency, I am undertaking a 
position of trust in that Aqency ••• " 
Pet. 4a. 
In the stipulation of certain facts, Snepp agreed 
that he had been "assigned to various positions of 
trust, including two tours of duty in South Vietnam 
" . , and that hehad been granted "frequent 
access to classified information, including 
information regarding intelligence sources and 
methods". Pet. 4a. 
Snepp thus had access to information of 
the highest sensitivity. He published his book on 
5. 
intelligence operations of the CIA with this 
background and experience. He published without 
complying with his preclearance agreement, and did 
so deliberately. Whether he violated a 
relationship and agreement of trust does not depend 
upon whether the information in his book was 
classified. 
The secrecy agreement executed by Snepp 
contained two separate restrictions upon the 
disclosure or publication of information. 
Paragraph 3 thereof was limited to classified 
information, and contains no preclearance 
provision. Paragraph 8, however, obligated Snepp 
"not to publish • • • any information" relating to 
the agency or its intelligence activities without 
the prior approval of the agency. This case 
therefore differs from 
466 F.2d 1309, cert. den. 409 u.s. 1063 (1972), 
where the constraint was limited to classified 
material. The undisputed evidence in this case 
( ~'" v-f}o-
shows that the mere publication, by a prior aqent, 
of information relating to intelligence activities 
may be as detrimental to national interests as the 
6. 
publication of specific classified information. 
Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified in 
this case. When asked whether there had been any 
adverse effect resulting from Snepp's publication 
of his book, he replied in part as follows: 
"There clearly has. Over the last six to 
nine months, we had had a number of 
sources discontinue work with us. We 
have had more sources tell us that they 
are very nervous about continuing work 
with us. We have had very strong 
complaints from a number of foreign 
intelligence services with whom we 
conduct liaison, who have questioned 
whether they should continue exchanging 
information with us, for fear it will not 
remain secret. I cannot estimate to you 
how many potential sources or liaison 
arrangements have never germinated 
because people were unwilling to enter 
into business with us •••• "Pet. 7a.5 
In view of the foregoing, and similar testimony, 
the Court of Appeals recognized that "the 
[government of the United States] has suffered 
irreparable harm from [Snepp's] breach" of his 
agreement to preclear the publishing of information 
whether specifically classified or not. If a 
former agent can publish with impunity, relying on 
his own judgment as to what may be harmful, the 
intelligence services of friendly countries and -
particularly agents recruited by the CIA - would 
never be certain of the secrecy upon which their 
7. 
willingness to cooperate depends. 
Every major country in the world has a 
secret intelligence service. The CIA, whatever 
fairly may be said about some of its past 
activities, is an agency essential to the security 
of the United States6, and - in a sense - the free 
world. It is impossible for a government wisely to 
make critical decisions affecting foreign policy 
and national defense without the benefit of 
dependable foreign intelligence. And the 
availability of such intelligence depends in 
significant part upon (i) the sharing of secret 
information by intelligence services of friendly 
foreign nations, and (ii) espionage conducted 
primarily by foreign nationals recruited for the 
purpose.? Admiral Turner's uncontradicted 
testimony (partially set forth above) states that 
Snepp's violation of his secrecy agreement has 
affected adversely the capacity of the United 
States to obtain needed intelligence. Pet. 7a. 
Althouqh the entire panel[;he Court of 
Appeals accepted as fact these consequences of 
Snepp's breach, a majority nevertheless found no 
8. 
violation of a trust. This conclusion was reached 
because the government had elected not to reveal 
whether or not information disclosed by Snepp was 
classified. The Court reasoned that Snepp "has a 
First Amendment right to publish anything not 
classified". Pet. 33a. It is here, it seems to 
me, that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the 
issue in this case. The government does not deny -
as a general principal - Snepp's right to publish 
unclassified information. Rather, the issue is the 
~el--i~ i'~(' ~~the prec l ~: r .an:e .. agreement that would 
enable the government to determine whether material 
proposed to be published includes or could 
compromise classified information or sources. 
Although the Court of Appeals sustained the 
validity of this preclearance procedure and held 
-f" 
that Snepp has violated it, the court neve~heless 
seemed to reason that the obligation to preclear 
unclassified information - thouqh valid and 
enforceable - did not create a trust relation 
~ because of a perceived First Amendment right to 
publish "anything not classified." I find it 




The agreement - by its expressed terms -
created a trust. The trust was not limited to 
classified material, but included as well the 
obligation not to publish ~ny information relatinq 
to the agency or its activities without 
preclearance. Pet. 27a, 32a, 58a, 59a, 6la. 
Moreover, as Judge Hoffman stated, the "secrecy 
agreement was no ordinary contract: it qave life 
to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp 
the trust of the CIA". Pet. 4la.7 The Court of 
Appeals found that Snepp's violation had~ 
"irreparable harm". The disclosure of classified 
information hardly could do more. The distinction 
drawn by the Court of Appeals is one without a 
difference. 
III 
The holding of the Court of Appeals that 
there was no constructive trust may well leave the 
government, as a practical matter, with no 
effective deterrent against similar breaches of 
security. It is conceded that actual monetary 
damages from a publication such as Snepp's rarely 
can be proved. The suggestion that nominal damages 
1 0 • 
are available is an empty one, certain to deter no 
one. This leaves, under that court's opinion, the 
possibility of the recovery in a subsequent jury 
trial of punitive damages. Yet, for the reasons 
ably stated by Judge Hoffman, this remedy is likely 
to be more illusory than real. 
In view of the thoroughness of Judge 
Hoffman's opinion on this point, I will not 
elaborate. As the Court of Appeals recognized, 
punitive damages ordinarily are not available for 
breach of contract. Pet. 36a. If, as seem 
likely,state law determines the availability of 
punitive damages, even this speculative recourse 
-I ":1 
would vary dependt upon the jurisdiction in which a 
suit can be brought. More fundamentally, for the 
very reason that the government in this case 
elected not to rely on the disclosure of classified 
information, proof that information is classified 
normally will require disclosure and thus frustrate 
the purpose of a secrecy agreement. 
The majority opinion of the Court of 
Appeals largely ignores the seriousness of this 
problem. It held, as I understand its opinion, 
11. 
that before the government may even attempt to seek 
punitive damages it must amend its answer to 
Snepp's interrogatories and prove that classified 
material was published. As Judqe Hoffman observed 
"[o]nce this has been done, [the material] is 
available to the public and the media and the 
purpose of any classification has been destroyed." 
Pet 40a. The same point - an obvious one - was 
made by William E. Colby in a letter to the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
admitted in evidence in this case. In commenting 
on constraints against the bringing of a criminal 
action, Colby stated that "[existing law] requires 
the revelation in open court of confirming or 
additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes 
prosecution". Pet. 68a. In sum, the government 
rarely will be willing to run the risk of probing 
discovery by the defendant and a resulting 
disclosure of the very material or information it 
seeks to protect. It is for this reason that the 
type of preclearance procedure has been designed by 
the CIA. It is intended to protect the national 
1 2 • 
interest without undue interference with the right 
of a former · CIA employee to publish innocent 
material. 
The impressing of the profits of the 
violator of the secrecy agreement with a 
constructive trust avoids the foregoing problems. 
As it is a remedy likely to be swift and certain, 
depriving the offender of profits gained by 
violation of his trust, it would have a significant 
deterrent effect. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals, however, may deprive the government of its 
only effective means of asssuring enforcement of 
preclearance agreements that the Court of Appeals 
has held to be valid. This could impair seriously 
the capability of the CIA to discharge its 
statutory responsibilities: the providing of 
secret intelligence essential to decision making by 
our government. I therefore would grant the 
petition and the cross petition in this case, and 
l 
summarily affirm the Court of Appeals except its 
holding that there was no constructive trust. As 
to this portion of that court's holding, I would 
1 3. 





' • The second 
Fe>e>TNe>TES 
case, referred in the 
caption above, No. 79-295 5nited ~ states · v; · Snepp, 
is a cross petition. It is conditioned on the 
granting of the petition filed in No. 78-1871. 
rtv- 2. 
/ 
2. Snepp also executed a "termination 
c 
secrecy agreement" in 197/J upon the eve of his 
leaving the Agency. 
He thereupon reaffirmed his obligation 
"never" to reveal "any classified information, or 
any information concerning intelligence or CIA that 
has not been made public by CIA ••• without the 
express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 6la. 
F/11- 3. 
3. Snepp advanced several defense~o the 
claim he had violated his agreement, all of which 
c r(c; ~ 
were resolved against him by the court} below.~ In 
his petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily 
upon the First Amendment argument that his secrecy 
agreement is a prior restraint and therefore 
unenforceable. 
(Greg will write the answer - briefly -
the First Amendment argument). 
F~4. 
/ 
4. "Although [Snepp] assured, or at least 
lead both Admiral Turner and Morrison of the CIA 
legal staff to believe that he would submit his 
manuscripts for Agency review before publication -
the Court finds he had no intention of so doing 
because [he] was then making secret arrangements 
with Random House, Inc. to publish the book - all 
negotiations were conducted on park benches, in 
restaurants and/or in the public library. Snep? 
admits he did everything he could to keep the CIA 





Turner did not attribute the entire 
loss of confidence in the CIA to Snepp's breach of 
security. He said: 
" [Snepp's case] is one, and a very 
serious one, of a number of incidents 
that have diminished • • • world-wide 
confidence in our ability. 
"His [case], in particular, because 
[he]has flaunted the basic system of 
control that we have. If he is able to 
get away with this, it will appear to all 
those other people that we have no 
control, we have no way of enforcing the 
guarantee which we attempt to give them 
when we go to work with them." Pet. 7a. 
f!/-6. 
The CIA was established following 
World War II, our government having learned 
belatedly that such an agency was essential. The 
need for a central, foreign intelligence aqency has 
been recognized by every President since Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. By definition, foreign intelligence 
operations most be secret. 
FN-7. 
In addition to these sources, the CIA 
relies extensively on modern technology, including 
satellites and other types of sophisticated 
survelliance. The various sources complement each 
other, and facilitate verification and 
clarification of informaation. A recent 
contemporary comment documents the extent to which 
the Soviet Union relies upon espionage, and states 
that "many U.S. intelligence experts [are concerned 
by] growing evidence that the Russians have been 
winning [the] covert war". The Wall Street 
Journal, Oct. 4, 1979, p. 1. 
F!V- 8. 
8. It also is evident that the 
consequences of the violation of the preclearance 
component of the secrecy agreement, as described 
by Admiral Turner, could be no less serious than 
the release of some specific item of classified 
information. Pet. 7a, 32a. 
9. Indeed, quite apart from the plain 
language of the agreement (see Pet 8a.), the 
relationship itself, the nature of Snepp's duties, 
and his conceded access to classified material and 
secret sources of intelligence, could have 
established a constructive trust. 
lfp/ss 10/19/79 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL dissentinq. 
The petitioner in 78-18711, Frank w. 
Snepp, III, a former employee of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), published a book sharply 
critical of specific CIA activities in South 
Vietnam. At the time of his employment by the CIA 
in 1968 Snepp executed a secrecy agreement that 
provided, in pertinent part, that he would "not 
• publish any information or material 
relating to the Agency, its activities or 
intelligence activities generally, either during 
or after the term of [his] employment ••• without 
specific prior approval of the Agency."2 As Snepp 
published his book without seeking or obtaining 
prior approval, the government filed this suit 
seeking a declaration that the preclearance 
agreement had been breached, an iniunction against 
further publications except in strict compliance 
with the agreement, and the imposition of a 
constructive trust for the benefit of the 
government on all monies which Snepp had earned or 
2. 
will earn from the publication of his book. As of 
the tiem of suit, his realized profits totaled 
about $60,000, with additional royalties expected. 
Pet. 6a. The claim for recovery of these monies 
was based on an asserted violation of a fiduciary 
duty by Snepp. 
I 
In a nonjury trial (there being no issues 
of fact), the District Court found Snepp liable for 
breach of his preclearance aqreement, found a 
breach of fiduciary duty, enjoined further 
publications without compliance with his aqreement, 
and imposed a constructive trust on his profits 
from the book.3 The court made specific findings 
of fact, accepted by the Court of Appeals, 
includinq a findinq that Snepp "willfully, 
deliberately and surreptitously breached his 
position of trust with the CIA and the secrecy 
agreement dated September 16, 1968 •• " Pet. 5a, 
6a. It was further found that Snepp also had 
deliberately misled CIA officials as to his 
intention to publish a book without submitting it 
for prior review.4 
3. 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court 
with respect to the breach of the agreement and the 
injunction against future publications. But the 
Court of Appeals reversed as to the finding of a 
constructive trust. The government had stipulated 
that, for the purposes of this litigation, it did 
not contend that any information in the book was 
classified. Focusing solely on that concession, 
the court concluded that "on this record • • • 
[Snepp] breached [no] fiduciary obligation". It 
held that the government was entitled to "nominal 
damages", and left open the possibility of punitive 
damages if the government, in a jury trial, is 
able to prove that classified material had been 
published with tortious intent. 
District Judge Hoffman, sitting on the 
panel of the Court of Appeals, dissented from the 
majority decision that there was no constructive 
trust. In an opinion that I find persuasive, Judge 
Hoffman concluded that a constructive trust on 
profits was established and that, absent such a 
trust, the government is left with no dependable 
4. 
and effective remedy from this sort of violation of 
secrecy agreements made by employees of the CIA. I 
will state my reasons for agreeing with Judge 
Hoffman. 
II 
It is difficult to think of any 
employment with the government of the United States 
that involves a higher degree of trust than Snepp's 
employment with the CIA. Indeed, the first 
sentence in the secrecy agreement expressly 
recognized the trust relationship: 
"I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand that 
upon entering upon duty with the Central 
Intelligency Agency, I am undertaking a 
posit ion of trust in that Agency. • • " 
Pet. 4a. 
In the stipulation of certain facts, Snepp aqreed 
that he had been "assiqned to various positions of 
trust, includinq two tours of duty in South Vietnam 
" . , and that herad been granted "frequent 
access to classified information, includinq 
information regarding intelligence sources and 
methods". Pet. 4a. 
Snepp thus had access to information of 
the highest sensitivity. He published his book on 
5. 
intelligence operations of the CIA with this 
background and experience. He published without 
complying with his preclearance agreement, and did 
so deliberately. Whether he violated a 
relationship and agreement of trust does not depend 
upon whether the information in his book was 
classified. 
The secrecy agreement executed by Snepp 
contained two separate restrictions upon the 
disclosure or publication of information. 
Paragraph 3 thereof was limited to classified 
information, and contains no preclearance 
provision. Paragraph 8, however, obligated Snepp 
"not to publish • • • any information" relating to 
the agency or its intelligence activities without 
the prior approval of the agency. This case 
therefore differs from Hnited · States · v: · Marchetti, 
466 F.2d 1309, cert. den. 409 u.s. 1063 (1972), 
where the constraint was limited to classified 
material. The undisputed evidence in this case 
shows that the mere publication, by a prior agent, 
of information relating to intelligence activities 
may be as detrimental to national interests as the 
6. 
publication of specific classified information. 
Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified in 
this case. When asked whether there had been any 
adverse effect resulting from Snepp's publication 
of his book, he replied in part as follows: 
"There clearly has. Over the last six to 
nine months, we had had a number of 
sources discontinue work with us. We 
have had more sources tell us that they 
are very nervous about continuing work 
with us. We have had very strong 
complaints from a number of foreign 
intelligence services with whom we 
conduct liaison, who have questioned 
whether they should continue exchanginq 
information with us, for fear it will not 
remain secret. I cannot estimate to you 
how many potential sources or liaison 
arrangements have never germinated 
because people were unwilling to enter 
into business with us •••• "Pet. 7a.5 
In view of the foregoing, and similar testimony, 
the Court of Appeals recognized that "the 
[government of the United States] has suffered 
irreparable harm from [Snepp's] breach" of his 
agreement to preclear the publishing of information 
whether specifically classified or not. If a 
former agent can publish with impunity, relying on 
his own judgment as to what may be harmful, the 
intelligence services of friendly countries and -
particularly agents recruited by the CIA - would 
never be certain of the secrecy upon which their 
willingness to cooperate depends. 
~ ~very major country in the world has a 
secret intelligence service. The CIA, whatever 
fairly may be said about some of its past 
7. 
activities, is an agency essential to the security 
of the United States6, and - in a sense - the free 
world. It is impossible for a government wisely to 
make critical decisions affecting foreign policy 
and national defense without the benefit of 
dependable foreign intelligence. And the 
availability of such intelligence depends in 
significant part upon (i) the sharing of secret 
information by intelligence services of friendly 
foreign nations, and (ii) espionage conducted 
primarily by foreign nationals recruited for the 
purpose.? Admiral Turner's uncontradicted 
testimony (partially set forth above) states that 
Snepp's violation of his secrecy agreement has 
affected adversely the capacity of the United 
States to obtain needed intelligence. Pet. 7a. 
Although the entire panel the Court of 
Appeals accepted as fact these consequences of 
Snepp's breach, a majority nevertheless found no 
8. 
violation of a trost. This conclusion was reached 
because the government had elected not to reveal 
whether or not information disclosed by Snepp was 
classified. The Court reasoned that Snepp "has a 
First Amendment right to publish anything not 
classified". Pet. 33a. It is here, it seems to 
me, that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the 
issue in this case. The government does not deny -
as a general principal - Snepp's right to publish 
unclassified information. Rather, the issue is the 
validity of the preclearance agreement that would 
enable the government to determine whether material 
proposed to be published includes or could 
compromise classified information or sources. 
Although the Court of Appeals sustained the 
validity of this preclearance procedure and held 
that Snepp has violated it, the court nevetheless 
seemed to reason that the obligation to preclear 
unclassified information - though valid and 
enforceable - did not create a trust relation 
because of a perceived First Amendment right to 
publish "anything not classified." I find it 
difficult to follow this reasoning. 
9. 
The agreement - by its expressed terms -
created a trust. The trust was not limited to 
classified material, but included as well the 
obligation not to publish any information relating 
to the agency or its activities without 
preclearance. Pet. 27a, 32a, 58a, 59a, 6la. 
Moreover, as Judge Hoffman stated, the "secrecy 
agreement was no ordinary contract: it gave life 
to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp 
the trust of the CIA". Pet. 4la.7 The Court of 
~ 
Appeals found that Snepp's violation had Greaeed 
"irreparable harm". The disclosure of classified 
information hardly could do more. The distinction 
drawn by the Court of Appeals is one without a 
difference. 
III 
The holding of the Court of Appeals that 
there was no constructive trust may well leave the 
government, as a practical matter, with no 
effective deterrent against similar breaches of 
security. It is conceded that actual monetary 
damages from a publication such as Snepp's rarely 
can be proved. The suggestion that nominal damages 
1 0 • 
are available is an empty one, certain to deter no 
one. This leaves, under that court's opinion, the 
possibility of the recovery in a subsequent iury 
trial of punitive damages. Yet, for the reasons 
ably stated by Judge Hoffman, this remedy is likely 
to be more illusory than real. 
In view of the thoroughness of Judge 
Hoffman's opinion on this point, I will not 
elaborate. As the Court of Appeals recognized, 
punitive damages ordinarily are not available for 
breach of contract. Pet. 36a. If, as seem 
likely,state law determines the availability of 
punitive damages, even this speculative recourse 
would vary depend upon the jurisdiction in which a 
suit can be brought. More fundamentally, for the 
very reason that the government in this case 
elected not to rely on the disclosure of classified 
information, proof that information is classified 
normally will require disclosure and thus frustrate 
the purpose of a secrecy agreement. 
The majority opinion of the Court of 
Appeals largely ignores the seriousness of this 
problem. It held, as I understand its opinion, 
1 1 • 
that before the government may even attempt to seek 
punitive damages it must amend its answer to 
Snepp's interrogatories and prove that classified 
material was published. As Judge Hoffman observed 
"[o]nce this has been done, [the material] is 
available to the public and the media and the 
purpose of any classification has been destroyed." 
Pet 40a. The same point - an obvious one - was 
made by William F.. Colby in a letter to the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budqet, 
admitted in evidence in this case. In commenting 
on constraints against the bringing of a criminal 
action, Colby stated that "[existing law] requires 
the revelation in open court of confirming or 
additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes 
prosecution". Pet. 68a. In sum, the government 
rarely will be willing to run the risk of probing 
discovery by the defendant and a resulting 
disclosure of the very material or information it 
seeks to protect. It is for this reason that the 
type of preclearance procedure has been designed by 
the CIA. It is intended to protect the national 
12. 
interest without undue interference with the right 
of a former CIA employee to publish innocent 
material. 
The impressing of the profits of the 
violator of the secrecy agreement with a 
constructive trust avoids the foregoing problems. 
As it is a remedy likely to be swift and certain, 
depriving the offender of profits gained by 
violation of his trust, it would have a significant 
deterrent effect. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals, however, may deprive the government of its 
only effective means of asssuring enforcement of 
preclearance agreements that the Court of Appeals 
has held to be valid. This could impair seriously 
the capability of the CIA to discharge its 
statutory responsibilities: the providing of 
secret intelligence essential to decision making by 
our government. I therefore would grant the 
petition and the cross petition in this case, and 
summarily affirm the Court of Appeals except its 
holding that there was no constructive trust. As 
to this portion of that court's holding, I would 
1 3. 





1. The second case, referred in the 
caption above, No. 79-295 tlnited AStates Av; · Snepp, 
is a cross petition. It is conditioned on the 
granting of the petition filed in No. 78-1871. 
2. Snepp also executed a "termination 
secrecy agreement" in 1978, upon the eve of his 
leaving the Agency. 
He thereupon reaffirmed his obliqation 
"never" to reveal "any classified information, or 
any information concerning intelligence or CIA that 
has not been made public by CIA ••• without the 
express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 6la. 
fW-3. 
3. Snepp advanced several defensesto the 
claim he had violated his agreement, all of which 
were resolved against him by the courts below. In 
his petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily 
upon the First Amendment argument that his secrecy 
agreement is a prior restraint and therefore 
unenforceable. 
(Greg will write the answer - briefly -
the First Amendment argument). 
Ftl- 4. 
4. "Although [Sneppl assured, or at least 
lead both Admiral Turner and Morrison of the CIA 
legal staff to believe that he would submit his 
manuscripts for Agency review before publication -
the Court finds he had no intention of so doing 
because [he] was then making secret arrangements 
with Random House, Inc. to publish the book - all 
negotiations were conducted on park benches, in 
restaurants and/or in the public library. Snepp 
admits he did everything he could to keep the CIA 
from knowing about it prior to publication." Pet. 
Sa, 32a. 
5. Turner did not attribute the entire 
loss of confidence in the CIA to Snepp•s breach of 
security. He said: 
" [Snepp•s easel is one, and a very 
serious one, of a number of incidents 
that have diminished ••• world-wide 
confidence in our ability. 
"His [case], in particular, because 
[he]has flaunted the basic system of 
control that we have. If he is able to 
get away with this, it will appear to all 
those other people that we have no 
control, we have no way of enforcing the 
guarantee which we attempt to give them 
when we go to work with them." Pet. 7a. 
fl/·6. 
6. The CIA was established following 
World War II, our government having learned 
belatedly that such an agency was essential. The 
need for a central, foreign intelligence agency has 
been recognized by every President since Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. By definition, foreign intelligence 
operations most be secret. 
ffJ-7. 
7. In addition to these sources, the CIA 
relies extensively on modern technology, including 
satellites and other types of sophisticated 
survelliance. The various sources complement each 
other, and facilitate verification and 
clarification of informaation. A recent 
contemporary comment documents the extent to which 
the Soviet Union relies upon espionage, and states 
that "many U.S. intelligence experts [are concerned 
by] growing evidence that the Russians have been 
winning [the] covert war". The Wall Street 
Journal, Oct. 4, 1979, p. 1. 
8. It also is evident that the 
consequences of the violation of the preclearance 
component of the secrecy agreement, as described 
by Admiral Turner, could be no less serious than 
the release of some specific item of classified 
information. Pet. 7a, 32a. 
.. . 
ftl-- 9 0 
9. Indeed, quite apart from the plain 
language of the agreement (see Pet 8a.), the 
relationship itself, the nature of Snepp's duties, 
and his conceded access to classified material and 
secret sources of intelligence, could have 
established a constructive trust. 
No. 78-1871: Snepp v. United States 
No. 79-265: United States v. Snepp 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting: 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, 
seeks review of a judgment enforcing the secrecy 
agreement that he signed when he accepted 
employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) . In No. 79-265, the United States 
conditionally cross-petitions from a judgment 
refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach of that agreement arefmpressed with 
a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions 
for certiorari in order to reimpose the 
i I 
constructive trust fr~ I h; ~e..,c":l~~ ~ & 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, 
Snepp published a book highly critical of certain 
CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published 
the account without submitting it to the Agency for 
prepublication review. At the time he accepted 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he 
2 • 
would "not • . publish • • any information or 
material relating to the Agency, its activities or 
intelligence activities generally, either during or 
after the term of [his) employment • without 
specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. 
The promise was in addition to, and in aid of, 
Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any 
classified information relating to the Agency 
without proper authorization." Id. 58a. _l/ The 
Government brought this suit to enforce Snepp's 
agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring 
Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication 
review, and an order imposing a constructive trust 
for the Government's benefit on all profits that 
Snepp might earn from publishing the book in 
violation of his fiduciary obligations to the 
Agency. ~/ 
The District Court found that Snepp had 
"willfully, deliberately and surreptitously 
breached his position of trust with the CIA and the 
[1968) secrecy agreement" by publishing his book 
without submitting it to prepublication review. 
3. 
456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court 
also found that Snepp deliberately misled CIA 
officials into believing that he would submit the 
book for prepublication clearance. The District 
Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust 
on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of 
~ J..k-~---f$, K<..L ~"-d-~ 
Appeals agreed that Snepp ~ 
" had breached a valid contract. il It also agreed 
that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for 
prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable 
harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F.2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). 
Thus, the court upheld the injunction against 
future violations of Snepp's prepublication 
obligation. The court, however, concluded that the 
record did not support imposition of a constructive 
trust. The conclusion rested on the court's 
perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right 
to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession--for the purposes of this 
litigation--that Snepp's book divulged no 
classified intelligence. Id. at 935-36. !/ In 
.. 
other words, the court thought 
fiduciary obligation extended only 




F n= g 
- that the Government probably would not divulge 
classified information in order to prove that Snepp 
had breach his trust, the court suggested 
alternative remedies. First, the court thought 
that breach of contract entitled the Government to 
at least nominal damages. Furthermore, 
1 held, proof that the breach was tortious 
l all~w the Government to recover punitive damages. { 
--......_ ~~~....... ........ . .-- ~·-
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, 
dissenting from the refusal to find a constructive 
r-V 
trust. I n an opinion that I find persuasive, hlf 
-saw no basis for separating Snepp's fiduciary 
obligation to protect classified intelligence from 
his obligation to submit all manuscripts for 
prepublication review. He concluded that both 
obligations derived from the same trust 
relationship. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he 
.. 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract~ it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the 
trust of the CIA." Id. at 938. Prepublication 
4. 
other words, the court thought 
that Snepp' s 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving ~ 
--~ -----
the secrecy of classif~_ma~.ri .;;tl p. 4 snep_E. ____ R1der A, 
----- LFP/1~ 10/23/79 
I 
I 
It therefore limite 
nominal damages, 




- in a jury 
conduct. 
of punitive damages if the 
l d shoW tortious trial - cou 
~ recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information 
and the other to submit all manuscripts for pre-
publication review. Both served the purpose of 
enabling the CIA to oreserve necessary secrecy and 
discharge effectively the duties imposed upon it by 
law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations 
derived from the same trust relationship, and he 
saw no basis for finding that a trust existed as to 
one but not the other. 
5. 
clearance was part of Snepp•s undertaking to 
protect confidences associated with his trust. 
Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a 
speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp• s 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp 
breached a fiduciary obligation and that the 
proceeds of his breach are impressed with a 
constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp•s employment with the CIA involved . 
an ~m~high degree of trust. In the opening 
sentence of his secrecy agreement, Snepp explicitly 
recognized that he was entering a trust 
relationship. ~/ The trust agreement specifically 
imposed the obligation not to publish 
information relating to the Agency without 
submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated at 
trial that--after undertaking this obligation--he 
had been 11 assigned to various positions of trust 11 
and that he had been granted 11 frequent access to 
classified information, including information 
6. 
regarding intelligence sources and methods~" 4 56 
F • S u pp • at 1 7 8 • .§./ Snepp published his book 
about CIA activities on the basis of this 
background and exposure. He deliberately violated 
his obligation to submit all material for 
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret 
information with which he had been entrusted to the 
risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not 
depend upon whether his book actually contained 
classified information. The Government does not 
deny--as a general principle--Snepp's riqht to 
publish unclassified information. Nor does it 
contend--at this stage of the litigation--that 
Snepp's book contains classified material. The 
Government simply claims that in light of the 
special trust reposed in him, Snepp should have 
given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether 
the material he proposed to publish would 
compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts 
its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to 
prepublication review was a breach of his trust. 
1 
7. 
The undisputed evidence in this case 
shows that publication by a former intelligence 
agent of information relating to intelligence 
activities can be detrimental to our national 
interests. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, 
testified that Snepp's book and others like it have 
seriously impaired the effectiveness of American 
intelligence operations. "Over the last six to 
nine months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources 
discontinue work with us. We have had 
more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. 
We have had very strong complaints from a 
number of foreign intelligence services 
with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue 
exchanging information with us, for fear 
it will not remain secret. I cannot 
estimate to you how many potential 
sources or liaison arrangements have 
never germinated because people were 
unwilling to enter into business with 
us." 456 F. Supp. at 179-80. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment 
about what information is harmful, the intelligence 
services of friendly nations and the foreign agents 
recruited by the CIA cannot be assured of the /p./ \ 
secrecy upon which their cooperation 
~ ' l .----
depends. In 
view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
recognized that Snepp's breach of his distinct 
obligation to submit his material--classified or 
8. 
not--for prepublication clearance has irreparably 





The decision of the Court of Appeals 
denies the Government the most appropriate remedy 
for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. Indeed, as a 
( 
practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security. No one disputes that 
the actual damages attributable to a publication 
such as Snepp's generally are unquantifiable. 
Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain 
to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable 
after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. 
Even if recovered, they may bear no relation to 
either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's 
unjust gain. 
{t_L/-~k~ 
~ur-sui t" of""\ the only remedy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it, 21 the Government 
may lose the benefit of the bargain it seeks to 
enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct necessary 
8. 




~ harmed the United States 
III 
LFP/lab 10/23/79 
Rider A, p. 8 Snepp 
I 
. 'th 
In sum~ this was no ordinary fa1lure to comply Wl 
1 . t' It was a deliberate a contractual ob 1ga 10n. 
breach of a very special trust relationship with 
our government. 
after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. 
Even if recovered, they, may bear no relation to 
either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's 
unjust gain. 
Court of Appeals has left it, 21 the Government 
may lose the benefit of the bargain it seeks to 
enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct necessary 
9. 
to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose at trial some of the 
protect. G t \ 
___.-) <;; ......,. 
very secrets that Snepp promised to 
he least, the Government's need to delve into 
Snepp's knowledge, motivation, and representations 
to CIA officials may open it to probing discovery 
~to the Agency's 
~ 
confidential affairs Rarely 
will the Government run this risk. In a letter 
introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal 
cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the 
revelation in open court of confirming or 
addi tiona! information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes 
prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government 
cannot secure its remedy without unacceptable 
danger, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, 
protects both the Government and the former agent 
from unwarranted risks. It is the natural and 
ordinary consequence of a breach of trust. ~/ It 
deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief 
to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
I 
9. 
to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose at trial some of the 
very secrets that Snepp promised to protect. l At 
_.-J 
e least, the Government's need to delve into 
nepp's knowledge, motivation, and representations 
o CIA officials may open it to probing disco_v_e_r:...y~-.1.---
LFP/lab 10/23/79 Rider A, p. 9 Snepp 
The trial of such a suit, before a jury if the 
5", . 
defendant so elec~, would subject the CIA and 1ts 
i\ 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's 
highly confidential affairs. 
cannot secure its remedy without unacceptable 
danger, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, 
protects both the Government and the former agent 
from unwarranted risks. It is the natural and 
ordinary consequence of a breach of trust. ~/ It 
deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief 
to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
1 0. 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish 
with no fear of liability. Even ~f the agent 
publishes unreviewed material in violation of his 
fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is likely to be 
swift and sure, 
~~1-o 
it ~1 deter those who would place 
sensitive information at risk. As the remedy 
reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it 
cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary 
damages out of all proportion to his gain. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals deprives the 
Government of this equitable and effective means of 
protecting the secret intelligence so essential to 
our national security. I therefore would grant the 
~ ~ 
petitions in this case '" euler t A reinstate.S:he 
full judgment of the District Court. 
SNEPP: FOOTNOTES 
1. Upon the eve of his departure from the 
Agency in 1976, Snepp also executed a "termination 
secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed his 
obligation "never" to reveal "any classified 
information, or any information concerning 
intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA . . • without the express written consent of 
the Director of Central Intelligence or his 
representative." Pet. 61a. 
2. 
2. At the time of suit, Snepp already had 
received about $60,000 in advance payments. His 
contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 
(ED Va. 1978). 
3. 
3. The Court of Appeals and the District 
Court rejected each of Snepp's defenses to the 
enforcement of his contract. 595 F.2d 926, 931-34 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp. at 180-81. In his 
petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily on 
the claim that his secrecy agreement is 
unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected 
speech. 
~~~PI~ .Le~.fl_J 
The claim is without merit. In Civil 
1\ 
Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
565 ( 1973), this Court explicitly recognized that 
the Government can impose reasonable restrictions 
on its employees' exercise of their First Amendment 
rights in order to preserve both governmental 
integrity and the appearance of integrity. See 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Cole v. 
Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 ( 1972). The Government 
has a like interest in protecting both the secrecy 
of information harmful to our national security and 
the appearance of confidentiality so essential to 
the effective operation of our foreign intelligence 
service. 
r.,· , 
See '-t,' infra. Snepp's secrecy agreement 
is a reasonable means for protecting this vi tal 
interest. 
4. 
4. The Government's concession 
distinguished this case from United States v. 
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1063 (1972), on which the Court of Appeals relied. 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA 
employee intended to violate an agreement against 
publication of classified information. Id. at 
1 31 3. The court therefore did not consider the 
appropriate remedy for the ~d breach of 
an agreement to submit all material for 
prepublication review. By relying on Marchetti in 
this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the 
difference between Snepp's breach and the violation 
at issue in Marchetti. 
5. 
5. The first sentence of the 1968 secrecy 
agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand 
that upon entering duty with the Central 
Intelligence Agency, I am undertaking a position of 




6. Quite apart from the plain language of 
the secrecy agreement, the nature of Snepp's duties 
and his conceded access to secret sources and 
materials could establish a trust relationship. 
See 595 F.2d at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
LFP/lab 10/23/79 Rider A, Footnote 6 Snepp 
Few types of government employment ~ involve a 
higher degree of trust than that ~n 
;'\ 
employee of the CIA with Snepp's duties. 
FAI6 
LFP/lab 10/23/79 Rider Snepp 
-
Every major country in the world has a 
secret intelligence service. The CIA, whatever 
fairly may be said about some of its past . Q _ /~ . 
~~4~4-e•y~~~ 
activities, is an agency/\ essential to the security ~" 
+o-k 
of the United States6, and - in a sense - the free 
world. It is impossible for a government wisely to 
make critical decisions affecting foreign policy 
and national defense without the benefit of 
dependable foreign intelligence. {And the 
availability of such intelligence depends in 
significant part upon (i) the sharing of secret 
information by intelligence services of friendly 
foreign nations, and (ii) espionage conducted 
primarily by foreign nationals recruited for the 
'Z § 3 
7. 
r • 
' r· Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that 
even this remedy may be unavailable if the 
Government must bring suit in a state that allow 
punitive damages only upon proof of compensatory 
damages. Id. at 940. The Court of Appeals 
majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach 
of a secrecy agreement will support an exemplary 
award. See id. at 936 & n.10, 937-38. 
8. 
q 
p. See 595 F.2d at 939 (Hoffman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
No. 78-1871: Snepp v. United States 
No. 79-265: United States v. Snepp 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting: 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, 
seeks review of a judgment enforcing the secrecy 
agreement that he signed when he accepted 
employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) . In No. 79-265, 
a. 
the United 
c-,.,-11:· • -. ~ 
States )cross- I 
4A-
petitions from the part:._ o:E-~ judgment refusing to 
tif ?{.,a.( ~ Y"~J 
breachL were find that profits Snepp earned by his 
impressed with a constructive trust. I would grant 
the petitions for certiorari in order to reinstate 
the constructive trust. 
Based on his experiences as a CIA 
~o.-.r; 
e Snepp published a book highly critical of 
certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the 
Agency for prepublication review. At the time he 
accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, 
Snepp had executed a secrecy agreement promising 
that he would "not publish any 
2. 
information or material relating to the Agency, its 
activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment 
without specific prior approval of the 
Agency." Pet. 59a. The promise was in addition 
to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent undertaking 
"not to disclose any classified information 
relating to the Agency without proper 
.).1 
authorization." Id. 58a. ( !:..! The Government 
brought this suit to enforce Snepp's agreement. It 
sought a declaration that Snepp had breached the 
contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit 
future writings for prepublication review, and an 
order imposing a constructive trust for the 
Government's benefit on all profits that Snepp 
might earn from publishing the book in violation of 
~ 
his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. !:_l/[fn on / 
' 
$60, at time of suit] 
The District Court found that Snepp had 
"willfully, deliberately and surreptitously 
/ 17'1 
V 176, ~ (ED Va. 1978). 
breached his position of trust with the CIA and the 
1,_, I -.i I kTlJ i.,k.~tr-( ~...,..,;..~ 
1 ....._ _ 
2
_, " j 456 F. Supp. -a( 
c~~--~~ 
sc:-4 
[1968] secrecy agreement 
The court also found that 
3. 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into 
believing that he would submit the book for 
prepublication clearance. The District Court 
5--~ p, ~ ..... ~-'M') 
v~herefore enjoined L future breaches of 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust 
~- on Snepp's profits.~ 
had 
The Court of Appeals agreed that Snepp 
breached a valid contract. ~ [fn on 1st 
a&~> e'll·"l "'"ot'~ 
It poinet ly fl~ that Snepp' s failure to Amdnd] 
submit his manuscript for prepublication review had 
inflicted "irreparable harm" on intelligence 
tl'-"",r 
/ activities vital to L national security. 595 F. 2d 
9 2 6 , 9 3 5 ( CA4 1 9 7 9 ) . Thus, the court upheld the 
injunction against future violations of Snepp's 
prepublication obligation. The court, however, 
concluded that the record did not support 
imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion 
rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a 
First Amendment right to publish unclassified 
information and the Government's concession--for 
the purposes of this litigation--that Snepp's book 
div~~ classified intelligence. 
3 6 • l ~(1:-ffi on M,.;w:.ch.e.t..t.J,- as- a_ c .l_~s s i f • 
Id. at 935-
4. 
In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving 
the secrecy of classified material. Recognizing 
that the Government probably would not divulge 
classified information in order to prove that Snepp 
had breach his trust, the court suggested 
alternative remedies. First, the court thought 
that breach of contract entitled the Government to 
at least nominal damages. Furthermore, the court 
held, proof that the breach was tortious would 
allow the Government to recover punitive damages. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, 
dissenting from the refusal to find a constructive 
trust. In an opinion that I find persuasive, he 
saw no basis for separating Snepp's fiduciary 
obligation to protect classified intelligence from 
/ his obligation to submit all manuscripts for / 
prepublication review. He concluded that both 
/ obligations derive9 from the same trust 
relationship. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract~ it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the 
trust of the CIA." Id. at 938. Prepublication 
5. 
clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to 
Lc, +···\.; 
protect confidences associated with ~he s~eiar 
~elathmshiP. :- - Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman 
argued, were both a speculative and inappropriate 
remedy for Snepp's breach. I agree with Judge 
Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed 
with a constructive trust. 
r~ II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved 
an extremely high degree of trust. In the opening 
sentence of his secrecy agreement, Snepp explicitly 
recognized that he was entering a trust 
J r~ l relationship.w The trust agreement specifically 
imposed the obligation not to publish 
information relating to the Agency without 
submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated at 
trial that--after undertaking this obligation--he 
had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequent access to 
classified information, including information 
v 
6. 
regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
;at,, / 17~- ~y 
F. Supp. at x x. ' Snepp published his book t CIA 
on the basis of this background and 
exposure. He deliberately violated his obligation 
to submit all material for prepublication review. 
Thus, he exposed the secret information with which 
he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not 
depend upon whether his book actually contained 
classified information. The Government does not 
deny--as a general principle--Snepp's right to 
publish unclassified information. Nor does it 
contend--at this stage of the litigation--that 
Snepp's book contains classified material. The 
Government simply claims that in light of the 
special trust reposed in him, Snepp should have 
given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether 
the material he proposed to publish would 
compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts 
its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to 
prepublication review was a breach of his trust. 




{ .1 • ~ <:->. ... ;) 
lA""''" (t 
~ shows thati publication by a former intelligence 
agent of information relating to intelligence 
activities can be detrimental to our national 
interests. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, 
testified that Snepp's book and others like it have 
seriously imT?aired the effectiveness of American 
intelligence operations. "Over the last six to 
nine months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources 
discontinue work with us. We have had 
more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. 
We have had very strong complaints from a 
number of foreign intelligence services 
with whom we conduct 1 iaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue 
exchanging information with us, for fear 
it will not remain secret. I cannot 
estimate to you how many potential 
sources or liaison arrangements have 
never germinated because people were 
unwilling to enter into business with u~ ~ 
- . ~ 456 F. Supp. at ~-.- !(<f --<J;O .. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment 
about what information is harmful, the intelligence 
services of friendly nations and the foreign agents 
recruited by the CIA cannot be assured of the 
secrecy upon which their cooperation depends. In 
view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
recognized that Snepp's breach of his distinct 
obligation to submit his material--classified or 
not--for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
8. 
harmed the United States Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals 
denies the Government the most appropriate remedy 
for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. Indeed, as a 
practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security. No one disputes that 
the actual damages attributable to a publication 
such as Snepp's generally are unquantifiable. 
Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain 
to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable 
after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. 
Even if recovered, they may bear no relation to 
either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's 
unjust gain. 
In pursuit 
,..-c>. -·r ~ -t?.._, 
r-emedy the 
~.,_IP;-v-.­
GOVernment may lose the benefit of the ~~n~ it 
seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages 
may force the Government to disclose at trial some 
9. 
of the very secrets that Snepp promised to protect. 
At the least, the Government's need to delve into 
Snepp's knowledge, motivation, and representations 
..,....~-., 
~ to CIA officials ~41 open it to probing discovery 
into the Agency's confidential affairs. Rarely 
will the Government run this risk. In a letter 
introduced at Snepp' s trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal 
cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the 
revelation in open court of confirming or 
additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes 
prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government 
cannot secure its remedy without unacceptable 
danger, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, 
protects both the Government and the former agent 
from unwarranted risks. It is the natural and 
ordinary consequence of a breach of 
_!) 
trust. It 
deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief 
to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish 
with no fear of liability. Even if the agent 
1 0. 
publishes unreviewed material in violation of his 
fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is likely to be 
swift and sure, it will deter those who would place 
sensitive information at risk. As the remedy 
reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it 
cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary 
damages out of all proportion to his gain. The 
decision of the Court of Appeals deprives the 
Government of this equitable and effective means of 
protecting the secret intelligence so essential to 
our national security. I therefore would grant the 
petitions in this case in order to reinstate the 
full judgment of the District Court. 
CHAMBERS DRAFT~l0/23/79 
C, lfl~+r 
No. 78-1871: Snepp v. United States 
No. 79-265: United States v. Snepp 
cq:r MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissentin9eJ 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, 
seeks review of a judgment enforcing the secrecy 
agreement that he signed when he accepted 
employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) • In No. 79-265, the United States 
conditionally cross-petitions from a judgment 
refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed with 
a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions 
for certiorari in order to reimpose the 
constructive trust found by the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, 
Snepp published a book highly critical of certain 
CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published 
the account without submitting it to the Agency for 
prepublication review. At the time he accepted 
2 0 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he 
would "not . . publish • . any information or 
material relating to the Agency, its activities or 
intelligence activities generally, either during or 
after the term of [his] employment • without 
specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. 
The promise was in addition to, and in aid of, 
Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any . 
classified information relating to the Agency 
without proper authorization." Id .
1 
58a. .. !/ The 
Government brought this suit to enforce Snepp's 
agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp h.:td 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring 
Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication 
review, and an order imposing a constructive trust 
for the Government's benefit on all profits that 
Snepp might earn from publishing the book in 
violation of his fiduciary obligations to the 
Agency. '!:_/ 
The District Court found that Snepp had 
"willfully, deliberately and surreptitously 
breached his position of trust with the CIA and the 
3. 
[1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his book 
without submitting it to prepublication review. 
4 56 F • S u pp. 1 7 6 , 1 7 9 ( ED Va • 1 9 7 8 ) . The court 
also found that Snepp deliberately misled CIA 
officials into believing that he would submit the 
book for prepublication clearance. The District 
Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust 
on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the 
findings of the District Court and agreed that 
Snepp had breached a valid contract. il It also 
agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his 
manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital 
to our national security. 595 F.2d 926, 935 (CA4 
1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunction 
against future violations of Snepp's prepublication 
obligation. The court, however, concluded that the 
record did not support imposition of a constructive 
trust. The conclusion rested on the court's 
perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right 
to publish unclassified information and the 
4. 
Government's concession--for the purposes of this 
litigation--that Snepp's book divulged no 
classified intelligence. In 
other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving 
·the secrecy of classified material. It therefore 
limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
possibility of punitive damages if the government--
-; 
in a jury trial--could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, 
dissenting from the refusal to find a constructive 
trust. In an opinion that I find persuasive, he 
recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information 
and the other to submit all manuscripts for 
prepublication review. Both served the purpose of 
enabling the CIA to preserve necessary secrecy and 
discharge effectively the duties imposed upon it by 
law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations 
derived from the same trust relationship, and he 
saw no basis for finding that a trust existed as to 
one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy 
agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract~ it 
5. 
gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested 
in Snepp the trust of the CIA." _!i.1 at 938. 
Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's 
undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, 
were both a speculative and inappropriate remedy 
for Snepp' s breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman 
that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation and that 
the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a 
constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved 
a uniquely high degree of trust. In the opening 
sentence of his secrecy agreement, Snepp explicitly 
recognized that he was entering a trust 
relationship. 21 The trust agreement specifically 
imposed the obligation not to publish 
information relating to the Agency without 
submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated at 
trial that--after undertaking this obligation--he 
had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
6 0 
and that he had been granted 11 frequent access to 
classified information, including information 
regarding intelligence sources and methods. 11 456 
F. 178. ~I Snepp published his book 
about CIA activities on the basis of this 
background and exposure. He deliberately violated 
his obligation to submit all material for 
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret 
information with which he had been entrusted to the 
risk of disclosure. 
Whbther Snepp violated his trust does not 
depend upon whether his book actually contained 
classified information. The Government does not 
deny--as a general principle- - Snepp's right to 
publish unclassified information. Nor does it 
contend--at this stage of the litigation--that 
Snepp's book contains classified material. The 
Government simply claims that in light of the 
special trust reposed in him, Snepp should have 
given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether 
the material he proposed to publish would 
compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts 
7. 
its claim that Snepp•s failure to submit to 
prepublication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case 
shows that publication by a former intelligence 
agent of information relating to intelligence 
activities can be detrimental to our national 
interests. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, 
testified that Snepp•s book and others like it have 
seriously impaired the effectiveness of American 
intelligence operations. 11 0ver the last six to 
nine months, .. he said, 
//nwe have had a number of sources 
discontinue work with us. We have had 
more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. 
We have had very strong complaints from a 
number of foreign in tell iqence services 
with whom we conduct 1 iaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue 
exchanging information with us, for fear 
it will not remain secret. I cannot 
estimate to you how many potential 
sources or liaison arrangements have 
never germinated because people were 
unwilling to enter into business with 
us ... 456 F. Supp.
1 
at 179~80 • 
.1-
(/If former agents may rely on their own judgment 
about what information is harmful, the intelligence 
services of friendly nations and the foreign agents 
recruited by the CIA cannot be assured of the 
secrecy upon which their cooperation depends. 21 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, 
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
8. 
recognized that Snepp's breach of his distinct 
obligation to submit his material--classified or 
not--for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Government. 595 F.2d/ at 
9 3 5 ; 4 56 F • S u pp • I at 1 8 0 . This was no ordinary 
failure to comply with a contractual obligation. 
It was a deliberate breach of a very special trust 
relationship with our government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals 
denies the Government the most appropriate remedy 
for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. Indeed, as a 
practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security. No one disputes that 
the actual damages attributable to a publication 
such as Snepp's generally are unquantifiable. 
Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain 
to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable 
after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. 
Even if recovered, they may bear no relation to 
9. 
either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's 
unjust gain. 
If it were to pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals has left it, ~I the 
Government may lose the benefit of the bargain it 
seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages 
may force the Government to disclose some of the 
. very secrets that Snepp promised to protect. The 
trial of such a suit, before a jury if the 
defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's 
highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the 
Government run this risk. In a letter introduced 
at Snepp' s trial, former CIA Director Colby noted 
the analogous problem in criminal. cases. Existing 
law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open 
court of confirming or additional information of 
such a nature that the potential damage to the 
national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 
68a. When the Government cannot secure its remedy 
without unacceptable danger, it has no remedy at 
all. 
1 0. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, 
protects both the Government and the former agent 
from unwarranted risks. It is the natural and 
ordinary consequence of a breach of trust. ~/ It 
deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief 
to the dimensions of the wrong. If the aqent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish 
with no fear of liability. If the agent publishes 
unreviewed material in violation of his fiduciary 
obligation, the trust remedy simply requires him to 
disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. Since 
the remedy is likely to be swift and sure, it is 
likely 
1 
deter those who would place sensitive 
information at risk. As the remedy reaches only 
funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle 
the former agent with exemplary damages out of all 
proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court 
of Appeals deprives the Government of this 
equitable and effective means of protecting the 
secret intelligence so essential to our national 
security. I therefore would grant the petitions in 
this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
SNEPP: FOOTNOTES 
1. Upon the eve of his departure from the 
Agency in 1976, Snepp also executed a "termination 
secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed his 
obligation "never" to reveal "any classified 
information, or any information concerning 
intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ••• without the express written consent of 
the Director of Central Intelligence or his 
representative." Pet. 61a. 
f&#2. 
2. At the time of suit, Snepp already had 
received about $60,000 in advance payments. His 
contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 
(ED Va. 1978). 
3. The Court of Appeals and the District 
Court rejected each of Snepp's defenses to the 
enforcement of his contract. ' 595 F.2d 926, 931A34 




180"81. In his 
petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily on 
the claim that his secrecy agreement is 
unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected 
speech. 
As the Court of Appeals held, the claim 
is without merit. In Civil Service Comm'n v. 
Letter Carriers, 413 u.s. 548, 565 (1973), this 
Court explicitly recognized that the Government can 
impose reasonable restrictions on its employees' 
exercise of their First Amendment rights in order 
to preserve both governmental integrity and the 
appearance of integrity. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
c;;--
u.s. 1, 25-28 (1976); Cole v. Richardson, 405 u.s. 
676 (1972). The Government has a like interest in 
protecting both the secrecy of information harmful 
to our national security and the appearance of 
confidentiality so essential to the effective 




infra. Snepp's secrecy agreement is a 
reasonable means for protecting this vital 
interest. 
~~~4. 
4. The Government's concession 
distinguished this case from United States v. 
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
:;::::l_ 
1063 (1972), on which the Court of Appeals relied. 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA 
employee intended to violate an agreement aga..,.Q~8. 
publication of classified information. @J~ at .. 
1 31 3. The court therefore did not consider the 
appropriate remedy for the breach of an agreement 
to submit all material for prepublication review. 
By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of 
Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp' s 
breach and the violation at issue in Marchetti. 
5. The first sentence of the 1968 secrecy 
agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand 
that upon entering duty with the Central 
Intelligence Agency, I am undertaking a position of 
trust in that Agency of the Government~ . " 
Pet. 58 a. 
~Jj6. 
6. Quite apart from the plain language of 
the secrecy agreement, the nature of Snepp's duties 
and his conceded access to secret sources and 
materials could establish a trust relationship. 
See 595 F. 2d1 at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in c:-
part and dissenting in part). Few types of 
government employment involve a higher degree of 
trust than that reposed in a CIA employee with 
' I 
Snepp's duties. 
7. Every major nation in the world has a 
secret intelligence service. The CIA, whatever 
fairly may be said about some of its past 
activities, is an agency thought by every President 
since Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the 
security of the United States and--in a sense--the 
free world. It is impossible for a government 
wisely to make critical decisions about foreign 
policy and national defense without the benefit of 
dependable foreign intelligence. 
PAl 8. 
8. Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that 
even this remedy may be unavailable if the 
Government must bring suit in a state that allow 
punitive damages only upon proof of compensatory 
damages. Id. \ at 940. The Court of Appeals 
majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach 
of a secrecy agreement will support an exemplary 
award. 
9. See 595 F.2d 1 at 939 (Hoffman, ,J., --;L 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiotari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The / ~Q£~-,.._:2-.,..--, 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent/ 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information rela · g 
~the Agency without proper authorization." !d., 58a.1 The 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Government brought this suit to enforce Snepp's agreement. 
/ It sought a declaration that Snepp had breached the contract, 
I 
an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for 
prepublication review, and an order imposing a constructive 
trust for the Government's benefit on all profits that Snepp 
might earn from publishing the book in violation of his fidu-
ciary obligations to the Agency.2 
·The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
\rately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with @ 
the CIA and the [19681 secrecy agreement" by publishing his 1\ 
book without submitting it i;'prepu51ica 1011 review. 456 F. -frr"'_ 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. Th.e Dis- . 
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. · 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District / 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3/ 
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that. has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the 'eXJ1ress written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his reprrsentative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of su it, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher providE's for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relics primarily on the claim that his secrecy agreement is unen-
forceable as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
As the Court of Appeals held , the claim is without merit. In Civil 
Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973), this Court 
explicitly recognized that the Government ran impose reasonable restric-
. ns on its employees' rxerrise of their First Amendment rights in order 
reserve both governmrntal integrity and the appearance of integrity. 
See uckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976) ;j.poze v=:-R1chardson, 405 
---"""'"' u~ s. 676 19 ') h Government has a like inteJ1eSt in protecting both 
he· secrecy of information to our national security and the appear-
ance of confidentiality so essentia · to the effective operation of our foreign 
Lf ;:z.. '-f. u ~ s.. g' :z. ~) 
(iJ~e.t/ > :::T:, cc---c.~..rari'":J) j 
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. I d., at 
935- 936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious cor-n~d;..;;u;..;;c.-t.--::--~-/ 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissen · from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublica.tion review. Both 1!;; 
e;:mrpoee of enab~ the CIA tfPreservj~cessary ~ 
..,ecrecy and dischar~f~ffect)veJy the duties imposed upon it by 
law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived 
from the same trust relationship, and he saw no basis for 
finding that a trust existed as to one but not the other. "The 
_ _ 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; 
intelligence service. See p.~<fnfra. Snepp's secrecy agreement is a 
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest. 
4 The Government's concession di~tinf£:!ished this case from United States ~ 
v.'Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 130~cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972),(oR ;,}~~ ?..CA +)> 
, · There, the Government claimed that a former ~ 




4 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
it gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp 
the trust of the CIA." !d., at 938. Prepublication clearance 
was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences asso-
/ ciated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman 
argued, were both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for 
I 
Snepp's breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp 
breached a fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his 
~each are impressed with a constructive trust. · 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved high 
degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy agree-
ment, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a trust 
relationship.5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the 
obligation not to publish any information relating to the .__ __ 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information, including 
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.6 Sncpp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for 
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which ·he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure . 
. Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
5 The first Eentenoe of the 1968 secrecy agreement read: "I, Frank W. 
Snepp, III, understand that U!)On entering duty with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
Go'."ernment ... .'" Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the secrecy agreement, the 
nature of Snepp's duties and his conceded access to secret Rources and 
materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d., at 939 
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types of 
govermnent}employment invo[v,e a higher degree of trust than that reposed 
in a CIA et'iployee with Snepp's duties . 
.... 
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Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the \(J~~~~'7 
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
,_.gy_ a former intelligence agent of information relating to in tel-
l llgence activites can be detrimental to our national interests 
Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp s 
\ book and others like it have seriously impaired the effective-
ness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six 
to nine months," he said, 
~
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de- ~ 
pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, bot~ / .. · 
-7 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service. · se . · ~ 
~:yhatever fairly may be said about some of its pa ·t activities,J.is a~J.-- J7l~e.C/A 
encf'thought by every President sinl'e Franklin D. Roosevelt to be fes- L __ 
ntial to the security of the United States and-in a sense-the free 
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the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
~ nited States Government. 595 F. 2d, af-- --
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ent's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
· pursue the only remedy that the Court of 
Appeals has le t it,! the Govern:m~m~ay-l~ the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. ProofOf tne~ortwus conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a ~ 
·jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and it~ 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
about forrign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable 
foreign intelligence. 
8 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must br.ing suit in a Sta.te thal allovv. 1unitive 
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. !d., at 40. The 
Court of Appeals majority, how('ver, held a a matter of federal law ~ 
that the nominal damagrs recoverable for any breach of a secrecy agr~e-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937-
938. 
. ~ 
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In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the o Jier hand, protects both the;___,-------; 
overnment and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 1i£i'" kls ~t'!d'1 
is the natural and ·~Ul:~ consequence of a breach of trust.9 L _ 
It deals fairly with 5oth parties by conforming relief to the 
dimensions of the wrong. If the agent secures prepublication 
clearance, he can publish with no fear of liability. If the 
agent publishes unreviewed material in violation of his fidu-
ciary obligation, the trust remedy simply requires him to dis-
gorge the benefits of his faithlessness. Since the remedy is 
likely ~ swift and sure, it is · to 
place sensitive information at risK. c;'h;:;-;:;;;:;;:;:::;r,;-;~;r:;-;;-;;-:::;-:.:::;;,.~--:::--
only funds attributabTe to the breacli, 
former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to 
his gain. The decision of the Court of Appeals deprives the 
Government of this equitable and effective means of pro-
tecting the secret intelligence · to ~ national 
security. I therefore would grant t e pe Ition m this case 
and reinstate summarily the full judgment of the District 
Court. ~--
9 See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) . 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, ~' Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., 58a.1 The 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement ." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Government brought this suit to enforce Snepp's agreement. 
It sought a declaration that Snepp had breached the contract, 
an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for 
prepublication review, and an order imposing a constructive 
trust for the Government's benefit on all profits that Snepp 
might earn from publishing the book in violation of his fidu-
ciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the f1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it..te("prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the expre~s written con ent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snrpp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher providrs for royalties 
and other potential profits . 456 F. Snpp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Court of Apprals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcrment of his contract.. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp rdies primarily on the claim that his secrecy agreement is unen-
forceable as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
As the Court of Appeals held , the claim is without merit. In Civil 
Service Comm'n v. Lette1· Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973), this Court 
explicitly recognized that the Government ran impose rra::;onable restric-
tions on its employres' exercise of their First Amendment. rights in order 
to pre erve both governmental integrity and the appearance of intrgrity. 
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Cole v. R ichardson, 405 
U. S. 676 (1972) . The Govcrnmen1, has a like intei,cst in protecting both 
the secrecy of information harmful to our national security and the appear-
ance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 3 
It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. I d., at 
935-936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment-in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. ~ 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissen~ 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
served the purpoEe of enabling the CIA to preserve necessary 
secrecy and discharge effectively the duties imposed upon it by 
law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived 
from the same trust relationship, and he saw no basis for 
finding that a trust existed as to one but not the other. "The 
1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; 
/ 
intelligence service. See p. - x, infra. Snepp's secrecy agreement is a 
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest. 
4 The Government's concession di~tinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), on which 
the Court of Appeals relied. There, the Government claimed that a former 
CIA employee intended to violate an agreement against publication of 
classified information. Ibid., at 1313. The court therefore did not con-
sider the appropriate remedy for the breach of an agreement to submit all 
material for prepublication review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, 
the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach 
and the violation at issue in Marchetti. 
4 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
it gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp 
the trust of the CIA." I d., at 938. Prepublication clearance 
was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences asso-
ciated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman 
argued, were both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for 
Snepp's breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp 
breached a fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his 
breach are impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved a uniquely high 
degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy agree-
ment, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a trust 
relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the 
obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information, including 
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.0 Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately vfolated his obligation to submit all material for 
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny- as a general principle-
fi The first Eentence of the 1968 secrecy ngreement rend: "I, Frnnk W. 
Snepp, III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of tho 
GoVIernment . .. . " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from t1JC plain language of the secrecy agreement, the 
nature of Snepp's duties and his conceded access to secret sources and 
rn::~te ri als could establish a trust. relationship . See 595 F. 2d ., at 939 
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dis~enting in part). Few types of 
government employment involve a highc r degree of trust than that reposed 
in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publicatiol'l 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activites can be detrimental to our national interests. 
Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's 
book and others like it have seriously impaired the effective-
ness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six 
-to nine months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179- 180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
7 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service. The 
CIA, whatever fairly mny be said about some of its past activiti es, is an 
agency thought by every President sinPe Franklin D . Roosevelt to be es-
sential to the security of the United States and-in a sense-the free 
world. It is impossible for a government wisely to make critical decisions 
7 
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has inep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
parably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
If it were to pursue the only remedy that the Court of 
Appeals has left it,8 the Government may lose the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable 
foreign intrlligence. 
s Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy rna~ 5' 
available if the Government must bring suit in a Statr that allow.Jpunitive 
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. !d., at 940. The 
Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any b11each of a srcrery agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
938. 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 7 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable ~r. it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent,fJ:~Hfl ttnwa.rrantea risks. -It ;r-
is the natural and cwaiNfY!.Y consequence of a breach of trust.11 
It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the 
dimensions of the wrong. If the agent secures prepublication 
clearance, he can publish with no fear of liability. If the 
agent publishes unreviewed material in violation of his fidu-
ciary obligation, the trust remedy simply requires him to dis-
gorge the benefits of his faithlessness. Since the remedy is 
likely to be swift and sure, it is~ o e er t ose w o would 
place sensitive information at risk. As t 1e reme reac es 
only funds attributabTe to the breach, it cannot saddle the 
former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to 
his gain. The decision of the Court of Appeals deprives the 
Government of this equitable and effective means of pro-
tecting the secret intelligence -SO ess~ntial o ~ natwna 
security. I therefore would grant the petition in this case 
and reinstate summarily the full judgment of the District 
Court. 
9 See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
-----
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PBTITIONS FOR WHITt; OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78-1871. Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not . .. publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating ( 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d.,~~ 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a "tt>rmination secrecy agrt>ement." That rlocument reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any cla::;sified information, or any in-
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract. an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Suepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not be€n made public 
by CIA ... without the f'xprPs:; written con:;ent of the Director of Central' 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a.. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract. with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Co~1rt of Appeals and the Di:;trict Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses td the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp reliei:i primarily on the claim that. his :;ecrecy agreement is unen-
forceable as a prior
1 
restraint ou protected speech. 
As the Court of Appeals held, the claim is without merit. In Civil' 
Setvice Coinm'n v. Lette1· C'anie1·s, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973), this Court 
explicitly recognized that the Government can impo::>e rea::>onable restric-
tion::> on its !employees' exerci::>e of their First Amendment right;; in order 
+- to pre:;erve both governmental integrity and the a 1 earance of inte rit ;. 
I{ tf.l,. ~ ~ See Buckley v. Valeo 424 . 1 25-28 197 · reer v. Spack 424 U.S. 
~' 8<~~ (Pow•LL, J., "'"''""'U>o); Gok v. RUohocd,on, 405 U. S.. 
~~.~ ,I 
~-
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted ''irreparable harm" on 
intellige11ce activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926. 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged uo classified iutelligence. ld., at 
935-936.' In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obliga.tions derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
676 (1972). The Gov<'rnmf'nt has n like interest in protecting Loth the 
serrecy of information important to our national ;;rcurity and thr appear-
ance of confidentiality ;;o e:;;;ential to the effective operation of our foreign 
intelligrncr service. Ser p. 5, i11/ra. Snrpp'~ ;;rcrecy agrrrment is a 
remmnable meam; for protecting thi~ vital interest. 
4 The Governmf'nt's conce:;:sion di~tinguished thi;; ca,;e from Uuited States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1::!09 (CA4) , cert. denird, 409 U.S. 1063 (HJ72). 
Thrre, the Governmrnt claimed that a former CIA employer intrnded to 
violate his agreemrnt not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at 
131:3 . Marchetti tlwrrfore did not considf'r the appropriate rrmedy for 
the brrach of an agrerment to l'ubmit all material for prepublication 
rf'view. By relying ou Marchetti in thi:s cal:le, thr Court of Appt>ab ovfr-
looked the differeuce between Suepp's breach and the violation at i,;sue 
in Marchetti. 
4 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and in vested iu SHepp the trust of the 
CIA." I d., at 938. Pl'epuLlication clearance was part of 
Snepp 's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Puuitive <.lamages. Judge Hotfma.u argued. were 
both a speculative aud inappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman tha.t Snepp breache<.l a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after uudPrtaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information. including 
information regarding intelligence sources an<.! methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.0 Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for 
prepublication review. Thus. he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been eutrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained c~assified information. 
"The fir:>t ~cntrnoP of tlw l!J6R ~c·crrcy agn•rment I'Pad: "I. Frauk W. 
Snepp, Ill, uudpr,-taud that upon Pntrring duty with tht' CPutral Intt>lli-
g~>nce Agrucy, I am uudt'rtaking n pu~ition of tru~t in that Agency of the 
GoVJernment. ... " Pet. 58a. 
u Quite apart frcm t.lw plain languagt' of the :secrecy agreemc·nt, the 
1mtun~ of Snepp'~ duties and hi~ conreded arce~:; to ::;ecret. ::;uurcPs and 
m:.tterial::; could e~tahli:sh a tm:st rrlation~hip. SPe 595 F. ~d., at 939 
(Hoffmau, J., conrurring in part aiHl dis:s<•ntiug in part) . Few types of 
governmental l:'mploymmt involvt> a highrr degree of t ru:st than that 
repo~Sed in a CIA employee with Snepp's dutie:;. 
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"fhe Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former inte1ligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turuer, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about contiuuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct lia.ison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations a.nd the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
1 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence ~ervice. 
Whatever fairly may be said about some of its past activitie:;, the CIA is 
un agency thQught by every Pre:;ident ~ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be 
6 S~F.W v. r~TTED RTATF.S 
the District Court anu tlw C'ourt of Appt'ab rt'eognized that 
~n<'pp's bn>aeh of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
terial-elassifif•d or· not--for prepublication elearanct- has irrep-
arably harmed the rnited :-itates Goverllluent. .1H5 F. 2d, at 
035; 4.)() F. Supp .. at. 180. This was no ordiuary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. 1t was a deliiJ<'rate 
breach of a very spPcial trust rolatiouship with our 
Gover·nrucnt. 
III 
The dt•eision of the C'our·t of Appeals uenies the Govemment 
the wost appropriate remPdy for Surpp's acknowledgeu wrong. 
I nde(•d. as a pmctieal mattPr. the <lecisiott may well leave the 
Gowrnlllent with no reliable deterrent against similar 
brt>aclws of security. No Oil<' disput:Rs that tlw actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp 's generally 
ar·e unquautifiable. X ominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tiv<'. certain to detrr 110 one. The punitive damages recover-
abh• after a jury trial ar<' speculative ami unusual. Even if 
rrcovered. ·they may bt'ar no relation to either the Govern-
ment'1:! irreparablt' loss or S11epp's unjust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the only remeuy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to e11force. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclosf• some of the very secrets that 
Suepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
('~~ l' utial 1o tlw ~ermit~· of the l inited Rtal!·~ and-in a ~~·u~~~lh!' fn·c 
world. H i~ impo~:;ibh~ for a govf'l'lllllPilt wi~el~· lo mak!' !'ritiral d1·cision:s 
t1boul fon·ign puli1·~· all!l national drfrn:-o~• wi1hout lh1• ],euPfit. of d!•pt•udable 
for~>ign inll'lligeHr<•. ~f'!' getwrally T. Powers, The ::\fan Who K1·pt the 
~('('1'!' 1,; (197!)). 
b .Tudg!' Hoffmnn'>< di,.:.~pnt ~ug;ge~l,.; that l'V('ll tlu:< n·nwd~· mar IJf• llll-
:wailahh· if the Govf'rnment mu,.;t bring :<nit in a Slat!' that allow~ punitive 
rhunngp;; on!~· upon proof of compen:;atory damage:;. . at 1c 
Court. of .\Jll*:il" majorit~·. huw(·v<•r, hPld a~< n malt!•r of jt'drml law 
!lull 1ht- :uomiuul dnmag;t' :< n•!'O\'t•rnbl(' for an,\· lJI•P:I!'h of a :<PI'I'!'t'.\. agn•t•-
nwut will ~upport an exPmplary nward. Sl'e id ., at D:1ti, aud 11. 10, 9a7-
9~8. 
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jmy if the defcnda.nt so elPct.o;;, would subject the CIA ami itl:l 
officials to probing discovery in to tlw Agency's highly cou-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the GoverllllWllt ruu this risk. 
T n a ](~tter introduced at RuPpp's trial. former CIA DirPctor 
Colby 11otcd tlw analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, lw stated, "requires the revelatiou in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a. nature that the 
potential damage to the natioual security precludes prosecu-
tiou." PPt. 68a. Wlwn the Government eannot secure its 
rernedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust. 011 the other hand, protects both the 
Govf'rnment and the forlller· agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remetly is the natur·al a11d customary consequence of a 
breach of trust. 11 Tt deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secur£>s prepublication clearance, he can publish with uo fear· 
of liability. If the agent publishes umeviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary obligation. the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the beHefits of his faithlessness. 
Sine<> the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
renwdy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
aU proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives thl' Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligeuce that may COil-
~ tri~te to national security. I therefore would graut the peti-
'-/~in this case aud reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of thr District Court. 
-o-8-ec-· ~39 (ltoffu>ru> , J ., ""'nning in P"'l >nd dt~entin~ 
Ul -pttrt)~at ! 
lfp/ss 10/31/79 Snepp (Rider A, p. 2) 
signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit 
i 
any proposed publication for prior review. claim 
that he executed this aqreement under duress. 
vo/..,_... ,/ 1 
Indeed,;£ 
l 2 
heL reaffirmed his obligation ~t t.l'le tim&- he 
plo~m~f Moreover, the ease:..:;!" this Court) 
make clear that the government - even in the absence of an 
:::::: 
express agreement - could have imposed reasonable 
restrictions o~~ exercise ~ : qency employees' 
Amendment rights in order to protect substantial governmen tal 
interests. eivil · Service ~ eomm' 
413 U.S. 548, ~l973)~kiey - v; · Valeo, 424 U.S. l, 25-28 
ieL CiL (" T-
(1976); Greer ~ v; ~ spock, 424 u.s. 828 (197 6) ~ (Powell, J., 
concurrin~;a£ 844 8~ Cole · v; · Richardson; 405 u.s. 676 
(1972). 
1fp/ss 10/31/79 Snepp (Rider A, p. 2) 
When Snepp accepted emnlovment with the CIA, h~ voluntarilv 
siqned the aqreement that expresslv ohliqated him to submit 
any proposed oublication for prior reviP.w. He does not claim 
that he executed this aqreement under duress. Indeed, he 
voluntarily reaffirmed his obliqation when he left the 
Aq ncy. MorPover, this Court's cases make cle~r that the 
GovernmPnt - even in the absPnce of an exnress aqreement -
could have imposed reasonahle restrictions on Aaencv 
employees' exercise of their First Amendment riq ts in order 
to protect substantial qovernment interests. Civil Service 
Comm' v. Letter Carriers, 413 u.s. 548, 56~ (1973); see 
Buckley v• Va1eo, 424 u.s. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer · v. Soock, 
424 u.~. 82A (1Q76); ..!:2.· at 844-848 (Powell, J., concurrinq); 
Cole v. ~ichardson; 405 u.s. 676 (1972). 
new fn 8: Since concurrent findings of fact by t 
Court and the Court of Appeals establish that Snepp's 
the most restrictive part of his agreement has caused r 
irreparable injury, we are unpersuaded by~ MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' 
claim that the trust agreement was unreasonably broad. Post, at 
4. Indeed, the analogy between Snepp's contract and an employee's 
covenant not to compete is unenlightening. The analogy simply 
points out that certain unreasonably restrictive contracts are 
against public policy. But MR. JUSTICE STEVENS offers nothing to 
suggest why Snepp's agreement was an unreasonable restriction on 
any of Snepp's rights. Cf. note 3, supra. Nor does MR. JUSTICE 
STEVENS show why this agreement, the breach of which has caused 
irreparable injury to our national interests, is contrary to 
public policy. 
SNEPP: INSERT A?? 
'---------------~~ 
on p5, 1st full '' before las 
Had Snepp misled the CIA into believing he would 
honor his agreement, e Government could have secured an 
7 
injunction that to submit his material for 
prepublication rev United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 
CA4), cert. deni d, 409 u.s. 1063 (1972). Thus, neither ••. 
"""'/. ,.~~ 
~A 
on page 6, as last ~~ in Part I I: j 
SNEPP: INSERT • c..-
Snepp's conduct was no ordinary failur~:o comply with a 
contractual obligation. It was a deliberate bre ch of a very 
special trust relationship with our Government. The contract in 
which Snepp agreed to undertake his "position o trust," supra, at 
4 and n.5, was designed to protect some of the ost sensitive 
information in our society from inadvertent dis losure. It also 
was designed to protect the appearance of invio able 
confidentiality upon which the success of intel igence operations 
so vitally depends. Snepp specifically promise not to publish 
any material related to his employment without iftSnr~q that 
publication did not compromise these goals. His obligations to 
avoid the risk of inadvertent disclosure and to preserve t~e _ 
appearance of confidentiality were ~~r~~~~~~-&e 
his obligation not to divulge the confidential inlOrrnation which 
those conditions allow his employer to obtain. fn 9 Snepp's 
breach of this fiduciary obligation entitles the Government to an 
adequate, equitable remedy. 
J'l'~ 9: O.U.I? BRO[pP.r~ J;;'E~ conceeds that, even in the absence of a 
written contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to 
protect confidential information obtained during the course of his 
employment. Post, at 3. He also conceeds that all personal 
pr~fits gained from the exploitation of such information are 
impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the employer. 
Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think, the common law would 
n:'Ottreat information as "confidential" unless it were 
"classified." See, e.g., post, at 3. We should have thought that 
the common law obligation was considerably more expansive. See, 
e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency§§ 396(c), 400 and Comment c, 
~and Comments b, d (1958); V Scott on Trusts§ 505 (1967). But 
since this case involves a specific written contract, we have no 
occasion to linger over that question. 
~- j 
~ rv P ' : 
" 
" /:/V '9, 
~~t-o~,_ 
~ i'4ri-J.LL 
" ·. v.'. 
/t ... ~t<-- 9 ~ 
-~-o;~~ 
9~ 
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1st DRAFT Reciroulatad: ____________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
FRANK W. SNEPP, III v. UNITED STATES and 
UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRI'fS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October-, 1979 c_ 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. ~~d..A4Lfl. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. S pp, III, seeks review of a /, ~AV~ i .• u_ 
judgment enforcing the~· reementJ hat he signed when \ ~ / · ~-~) 
he accepted employment with tlie Centrailntelhgence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published ,...... .... c..__ 
a book highly eritical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the GIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
~_,=~~reement promising that he would 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities ' or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in additiou to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departurr from the Agrncy in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed' 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any clas~ified information, or any in~ 
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the coJJtract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 17(), 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp dE>liberatRly misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication cleat·ance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
ecrecy: greement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
pr s. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 
form;1tion <'Oncerning intelligence or CIA tlmt has not been made public 
hy CIA ... without the t>xpre~~; written con~ent of the Director of Central 
IntelligPncc or hi~ n·presentativc." Pet. 61a. 
~At the 1 ime of Ruit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-
vance pa~·ments. His contract with hiH publisher provides for royalties 
and oOwr pot.-ntial profi1..;. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). __.---
3 The Court of Appral:-; and the Di,;trict. Court rejeeted each of Snepp's ~ 
dl•frnHrN 1 o thr enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 45G F. Supp., at 180-181. In hi::; petition lor certiorari, 
Snepp rrlil',; primaril~r on the claim that hisCecr~tgreement is unen-
forceaule as a prior rr,;traint on protected spee~ 
AN thr Court of Appr:ll~ hrld, thr claim i~ without mrri1. Whrn Snrpp 
acerptrd emplo~·mrnt with 111P CIA, hr vohmt;\rily ~ignrd the agr<-'rment 
that cxprr~~~~· obligntPd him 1o ~ubmit an); propo::;Pd publication for prior 
review. HP dorN not. claim f hat hr exreuted thi~ agrePmen! undrr chrrpss. 
Indeed , he yo]untaril~· reaffirmed hi:; obligation wlwn he left the Agency. 
Morrover, this Comt 'N cn~r~ makP elrar that. thr Govcrnment-(•vrn in the 
ab::;cncc of an CXJJre~:;; agrcemeut-could have impo:;cd rra~ouablc re,:tric--· 
··~ 
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the ·court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. ld., at 
935-936.~ In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment-in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
tions on AgmH'? employN•s' exereioe of their First Amendment rights in ~ 
order to protect substantial govt'rnment. interests. Civil Service Comrn'J;/ ,-
v. Letter Can"ie1·s, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valry,~4 {f) 
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Gree1· "· S7wck, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id,Cat 844- / ' ( ~ 
848 (PowF:LrJ, .J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U ... S. 67() (1972) . 
...... 
The Govermnent has a sub~t..mtial interest in protec;ting both the sec:'recy 
o informatiOn to our national Re<'mit~· nnd trC appeanm<'e of eonfi-
dentiality so ep ,..ent.ial to tho effective op 1011 of om foreign intelligence 
service. See p. 5, infra.. ncpp '~ scc rec · llgreement i8 a reaf'onableJneans 
for prot!.'f'ting this vital inter!.'s . I' t__ 
4 The Government.':; eoncession di~tinguished this case from United States 
v. Mm·chetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreement not to publi~h any classified information. Ibid., at 
1313. Marchetti therefore · did not consider the appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to ~ubmit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying ou Marchetti in this case, the Court of App!.'als over-
lookro thfl difference between Sn!.'pp's breach ~:~,nd the violation at if'sue 
· in Marchetti. 
4 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
aided the CIA ill preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the ctuties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluued that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to o11e but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was par·t of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were 
both a speculative . and inappropriate remedy for Rnepp's ft 
breach. I agree with Juuge Hoffman that Snepp breached a , ·-r~ 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. L fi--
ll / 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an xtremeJ 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence o~f~ 
agreement~ Snepp explicitly recognized that he w~~ 
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information. including 
information regarding intelligence sources anu methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.n Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this backgrouuu and exposure. He ..--~" 'c.;;:_-­
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material-for 
" The fir~t ~c·u1etH'Ie of the 1968 ~tgreement, read: "I, Frank W. 
SnPpp, III, unclPrstand that upon ·entenng duty with thP Central Intelli-
grnce AgPtlC)', I am undprtaking a po:;ition of tru:;t in that Agency of the 
Guw·rnnwnt . .. . " Prt. 58a . __.-
n Quite apart from tho plain languagp of the ~-agre;ment, the 
nature of Snopp':; dutie::; and hi:; conceded aeee::;::; o :;ecret ::;ources and 
materials could e::;tablish a tru:;t relation~:>hip. See 595 F. 2d., at. 939 
(Hoffman, .J., concurring in part and dis"entiug in part). Few types of 
government A I emplo.nnent involve a higher degree of tru::;t than that 
repo~ed in a CIA employee with Sncpp's duties. 
,. 
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it conteud-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp' book 
contains classified material. The Government sim claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him nepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determi 1e whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. ·We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us:" 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the secrecy upou which their cooperation de-
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publicatiou such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The puuitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear uo relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
7 Every major nation in the world has a st>cret intt>lligence st>rvice. 
Whatevt>r fairly may bt> ;;aid about :;omc of its past activitit>8, the CIA is 
an agt>ncy thought b~· evt>ry Prt>~idt>nt ~ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be 
e~sPutial to the scrurity of the United State:; and-in a :;en:;e-the free 
world. It i;; impo:;::;ible for n government wi:;ely to make critical decisionl:l 
about fort>ign policy and national defen::~e without the Lenefit of dependable 
foreign intelligence. See generaHy T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
Srrrcts ( 1979). 
8 .Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government mu:;t bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damagl's on!~· UJlOil proof of comp(•n:<atory dmnagt>:<. 595 F . 2d., at 940. 
The Court of AppPal:< majority, however, held al:l a matter of fedetal law 
that. the nominal dmnages recoverable for any breach of a :>ecrecy agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
93& 
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flecessary to sustain an· award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant RO elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery iuto the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 0:) 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu- __... t:: J_. 
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its ;f\.~& V'-
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. \/;. ..,_ J-- ~ ,..,.. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both thy'" ...... 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted rmks. _,..,.. 
This remedy is the natural and customary cons~u nee of a 
breach of trust.0 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the w~. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, hy.-ean publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent pu J.isnes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary igation, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgor e the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligence that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would gra.nt the peti-
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
'0 See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., ronrurring in part and di~~ent i ng in part.). 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRI'fS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari jn order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization.' ' ld., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in~ 
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
.erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8 
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA .•• without the expre:ss written con~Sent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or hi;,~ representative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At. the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with hii! publisher provides for royalties 
and other pot~ntial profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Comt of Appt'nl:s and the Di8trict Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defense:; to the t.>nforcement of his contract. 595 F. "2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In hi:s petition for certiorari, 
Snepp reli(•s primarily on the claim that his secrecy agreement is unen-
forr(;ll.tule as a prior re~;traint on protected speech. 
As the Comt of Appeal~ held, the claim is without merit. When Snepp 
accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agreement 
that. expressly obligiited him to submit. any proposed publication for prior 
review. He doe8 not claim that he executed this agreement under duress. 
Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed hi:s obligation when he left. the Agency. 
Moreover, thi"' Court';; ca'*"l make clear that t.he Govemment-even in the 
absence of ~w expre88 agreement- could have imposed reMonable restric--
·. 
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979) . Thus, the court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. Id., at 
935-936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment-in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
tions on Agency employees' exercise of their l<~irst Amendment rights in 
order to protect substnntial government interests. Civil Service Co-mm'n 
v. Letter Carrie1·s, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo , 424 
U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); id .. at 844-
848 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Cole v. Richal'dson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972) . 
The Government has a substantial interest in protecting both the secrecy 
of information to our national seeurity and the appearance of confi-
dentiality so enssential to t.hc effective opemtion of our foreign intelligence 
service. See p. 5, infra. Snepp':; secrecy agreement is a reasonable means 
for prot<'cting this vital interest. 
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 ·F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at 
1313 . Marchetti therefore· did not consider the appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over· 
looked the difference between Snepp's brea,ch and the violation at issue 
' in Marchetti. 
4 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were 
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship. fi The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information, including 
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for 
" The fir::;t srntenoe of the 1968 secrecy agreement read : "I, Frank W. 
Snepp, III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, I am undertaking a po::;ition of tru~t in that Agency of the 
· Government ... . " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the secrecy agreement, the 
nature of Snepp'~ duties and hi::; conceded acces~ to ~ecret sources and 
material~ could establi::;h a tru~t relationship. See 595 F. 2d., at 939 
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and di&;enting in part) . Few types of 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified infonnation. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Govennnent's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure td submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. ·We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us:" 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
· information is· ha.rmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
-be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STAT.E3 
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust ·relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
7 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service. 
What,ever fairly ma.y be said about some of its past activities, the CIA is 
an agency thought by every President since Franklin D . Roosevelt to be 
e~:;sential to the security of the United States and-in a ~en~:;e-the free 
world. It is impo~:Jsible for a government wisely to make critical decisions 
about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable 
foreign intelligence. See generally T . Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
Secrets (1979). 
8 Judge· Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may he un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
dnmage:s only upon proof of eompPnsatory damages. 595 F . 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majority , however, held a;s a. matter of federal la,w 
that the nominal damages recovernble for any breach of a secrecy agree• 
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
~38.. 
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~ec~ssary to sustain an· award of punitive damages may force 
,the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.9 It deals fairly with · both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligence that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti-
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
'o See id,, at 939 (Hoffman, J ,, ronrurring in part and di::;senting in part.): 
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In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of l!._ _ c::::z,..c...c. 
judgment enforcing iRe ~ene:;:\agreement that he s1gned when 
he accepted employme11t with"the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) . In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly ()ritical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed rf._ seere~ agreement promising that he would -""/4"' 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment . .. with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Ageucy without proper authorization." !d. , at 58a/ 
1 Upon the eve of his departurP from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a " termination secrecy agreement." Thai document reaffirmed' 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any clas:sified information, or auy i/ 
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that SHepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp dPliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
~gr~ agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's ...-v 
profits. <1 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid coHtract.8 ~ 
formation concerning intelligenre or CIA that has not been made public 
hy CJA ... without the ·express written con~ent of the Director of Central 
Intelligenco or hi~ repre:>Pntativc." Pet. fila. 
~At the I ime of ~nit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ud-
vuncP payments. His contrart with hi:; publisher provide::; for royalties 
and other pot••ntial profit.~. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The C'ourt of Appeal~ and the Di;,;trict Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defrnHf>s to the <·nforeement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) : 456 F. Supp., at 180--lRl. In hi~:> petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relir,.; primarily on the claim that his ~agreement is unen- ~ 
forct•ablP as a prior re:<traint on protected speech. \1 
As t hr Court of AJlJlPal,; lwld, thr claim i~ without mPrit. Wlwn Snepp 
accrpled rmplo~·mpnt with the C'IA, he voluntarily ~igned the agn·rment 
that. cxprr;;,.;[~· obligat{'(l him to ~ubmit. any propo~ed publieati011 for prior 
revirw. Hr dor,.; not claim that hr exPcutrd thi::~ agrePlllPilt under clmPss . 
Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed hi,.: obligation wh('ll ll(' l<'ft the Agrncy . 
1\foreovcr, thi,; Court ',.: ensp,.: mak<' elPar that the Governmeut-Pven in t·hc 
ab::;cncc of an cxpreo;::; agreenwnt-eoulcl have impo::;c<lrra~o!lable rc,.;tric--
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus. the ,court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. !d., at ~ ~ 
935-936.1 In other words, the court thought that Sne~~- .JL .1:. ·~ IJ.~ 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the,.....,,~ of=r~~,.~ 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nommal -
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation , dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information aud the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Bot~ 
tions on A~trtH')' rmplo~·c•t·s' exrrri~r of tht•ir Fir~t Anwndment right>< in
order to protrrt ~ubstantial gowrnmrnt interests. Civil Service Cvmrn'n 
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (197a); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 25-28 (197£)); Greer'"· Spack, 424 U.S. H28 (1H76); icl .. at 844-
84 (PowELL, .T., coneurring); Cole v. Richardso11, 405 Tl. S. 6i(i (1972). 
Thr GoYrrnment has a Rub~tantial interel't in protrcting both thr ~rerpcy 
of informatiOn o our national set•mit)· and thP appc•an111C'e of C'onfi-
dentiality ~0 ('l'~ent.ial to tlw ptf(•f'tivr operation of Ullr forPign intdligPnce r I 
service. s:r p. ~~ il~fra... 8uf pp'*ee~ ngreenwntli~ a rra~o!lHble mean~ /1-..e_ -ft.:,.f" S.....a.,<~f:? 
ior protPrtmg thrs vtbd mtPrest . /... s:;r<t..-..e.c/. 
4 The Govcrnment.'s rmH'f'~>sion di~tinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government rlaimed that a former CIA employee intruded to 
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at 
1313. Marchetti therefore · did not consider the appropriate remedy for 
the brPaeh of an a11:rrement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in thi,; case, tlw Court of Appeal~; over-
lookf'd the difference between Snepp's brench and the violation at iRsue ~ 
· in Marchetti. / 
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aided the CTA in preserving necessary and discharging 
effectively the dutif's imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to one but not the other. ~e 1968 seer~ agree-
ment,~ wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Sncpp the trust of the 
CIA." !d., at 938. Prepublication cleara11ce wa..<; part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were 
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a 
fie! uciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
__ /..-----~ high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of ·liis~er~ ofl-e- CZj.,_oa- -e...-..7-
~tSnepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a ft..'a.+- l-.e.- !9it;r--..~) 
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation- he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified info9rration. including 
information r·egarding intelligence sourc~,s and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178." Snepp publish his book about CIA 
J 
activities on the basis of this b ground and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his oblig ion to submit all material for 
5 The fir;:;t ~Pntenec of tlw 196~  agrl'l'lllPut read: "I, Frank W. 
SnPpp, III, under;:;tand that 11pon PntPmJg duty with the Cl'ntral Intelli-
gl'nC\l Agetlry, I am tmdertakiug a po:;itiou of tru:;t in that Agency of the 
C:ov,pmml'nt .. .. " Pet. 5Ra. 
0 Quite apart from t.ht• plaiu lang;nage of lhe ~ agn'l'meut, the 
nature of Snepp':,; dutif•::; ami hi:; ('Onceded a('ce:;:; to .~ o:oun·p~ and 
material:; eould c:;tabli:;h a tru::;t rPlation::;hip. S(•e 5951.7. 2df, at 939 
~Hoffman, J., coucurring in part and di:;:;enting in part). Few types of 
govPrnmcntal emplo~·ment involve a higher degrl'e of tnt~t than that 
n·po~ed in a CIA employee with Sncpp':; duties. 
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the~ informa- c..lez!>-5i/}~ 
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
~Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
~at in light of the special trust reposed in himjSnepp should · Q_.,._+ ~';l.:f 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust . 
. - The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will Bot remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potentia.} sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
· F. Supp., at 179-180. v 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
·be assured of the Sf'crecy upon which their cooperation de-
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
Snepp's breach of his Elis6it~fpbligation to sUbmit his ma-
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
lii 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Iudeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Govermnent with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unqua11tifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certaiu to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
meut's irreparable loss or Snepp's uujust gain. , 
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the ~ 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of~ 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
1 Every major nation in the world has r.J ~ intelligence sf'rvice. - ...... ;--::r-
Whatever fairly ma~· bf' ;;aid about ::;ome of it,: past activities, the CIA is . V 
an agencr thought b~· every PreRident "iuce Franklin D. Roosevelt to be 
css!'utial to the Rccurity of the United State:i and-ill a ;;en~e-tlw free 
world. It i;; impo;;;;ible for a government wi~ely to make critical decision::; 
ahout foreign poliey and national defen~ without the benefit of dcpPnclable 
for<'ign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
Sr•rrrts ( 19i9) . 
8 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even thi~ remedy ma~r be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows puuitive 
dnrnagP~:~ only upon proof of compen~atory damagf'~. 595 F . 2d., at 9-!0. 
The Court. of Appeab majority , however, held aH a matter of fedl'ral law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of tL agree-
ment will support an exemplary award . See icl., at 036, and n. 10, 937-
938. 
'. 
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1-1ecrssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very ~ that c""'""'/?t!J~12.-$ 
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.u It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
ViOlation of his fiduciarykbligation, the trust remedy simply 4.--.:D. ~---4- ac..-4..-:a t 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting ifte se~ intelligence that may con- --1/ 
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti- (J 
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. ~ 
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR 'rHE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
No:;. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly ·critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to 1 and in aiel of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departurr from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a. "termination serrec~' agrrement." That document reaffirmed' 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
• 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the coutract., an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit. future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing t.he book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Rupp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8 
formation concerning intelligeiwe or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the {'Xpre~;; written consent of the Director of Central 
Iutelligf'IH'P or hii'( rPpre::;entativc." Pet. 61a. 
~At. the time of Ruit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-
vnnee pa.~·mpnts. His contract. with hiH publi~her provide~ for royalties 
and othrr pot.,ntial profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The Court of Apprali'( and the Di,;trict. Court rejerted each of Snepp's 
defPnsPH to thr, ~·nforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979): 456 F. Supp., at 18(}-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Rrl('pp reliPs primaril~' on the claim that his secrecy agreement. is unen-
forn•able as a prior re;;traint on protected speech. 
As the Court of Appeal:< lwld, thr claim i;; without mNit. Whrn SrH'PP 
ac<·rpted rmplo~·ment with the CIA, he voluntaril~· ~igned thr agrermrnt 
that rxprr~~~~· obligatPd him to :-;ulJmit. auy propo~ed pul>lieatiou for prior 
rcviP\\'. He doe:-; not. claim that hr rxrcutrd thi~ agrrPmenl undPr dmess. 
IndPrd , he voluntarily reaffirmed hi;; obligation wh£•n hP left the Agrncy. 
J\forpovPr, thi~ C'ourt'~ ra~r~ make <'IPar that the Govemme11t-even in the 
ab;;encc of au expre~,; :tgrrenwnt-rould have impo;;cd rca:<onablc re~tric"-
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. !d., at 
935-936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by qesignation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
tions on AgrtH')' rmplO)'f'(•s' exerc·ioe of their Fir~t Amendment rights in 
order to protret ;;ub;;tantial government. interest~. Ci1•il Service Cumrn'n 
v. Letter CcuTie1'S, 41:3 U. S. 548, 5G5 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 25-28 (197(i); Greer, .. :S7Jod·, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); id .. at R44-
848 (PowELr,, .J., concurring); Cole v. Ri1·hardson, 405 t r. S. 6io (1972). 
Tlw Govrrnment has a f<Ub~hllltial interest in protrcting both the seerrcy 
of informa ton to our national Rec·nrit)' and the appParance of C'Onfi-
dentiality l:!O el:'~ential to tlw rffl'rtivr OJWration of unr foreign intrlligence 
service. Srr p. 5, infra.. Snrpp':; l:!enecy agreement i~ a rea~nable mf'an:; 
for protPrting this vital interest. 
4 The Gowrnmeut.'::; ronce~sion di~tiugubhed this ca:se from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreemrnt not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at 
1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remed)· for 
the brearh of an a~reement to submit all matrrial for prrpubliration 
review. By n•lying on Marchetti in this casr, the Court of Appeal:; over-
looked the difference between Snepp's bre:wh and the violation at iRsue 
· in Marchetti. 
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aided the CIA i11 preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it. gave life t.o a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." I d., at 938. Prepublication clearance "·as par·t of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were 
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Rnepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship.5 The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any infonnatiou relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information. including 
information r·egarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.n Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for 
G The fir::;t ~C'n1enec of the 196R ~Pcrecy agreenwn1 read: "I, Frank W. 
SnC'pp, III, und<>rstand that upon <t·ntt->ring duty with thE' Central lntelli-
g(•nce A~!.'IH:y , I am uuuertuking tt po::;ition of tru~t in 1 hut Agency of the 
Gov~Prnmpnt. . . . " PPt. 58a. 
"Quite upar1 from the plain languag(• of the ::;ecrec~· agrerment, the 
nature of SnC'pp'::; dutie::; and hi::; eonceded aeee::;::; to ~ecret ::;ource~ ami 
material,; could Cl:ltablil:lh a trul:lt n'lationl:lhip. S(->e 595 F . 2d. , at 939 
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dis::;enting in part). Few types of 
govPnmwntnl ('mplo~·ment involvC' a higher degrE>e of truRt than that 
repo~ed in a CIA employee with Snepp's dutie:O. 
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prepublication review. Thus. he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the lit-igation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admira.l Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. ·We have hao 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179- 180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publicatio11 such as Snepp's generally 
are unquautifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no o11e. The pu11itive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
meut's irreparable loss or Snepp's uujust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
1 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service. 
Whatever fairly ma~· be said about some of its past activitie~, the CIA is 
an agency thought b~· every President ::;ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be 
essential to the security of the tTnited State::; and-in a seu;:;e---the free 
world. It i:; impos:>ible for a government wit>ely to make critical decisions 
about foreign policy and national defenl:iC without the benefit of dependable 
foreign intelligence. Sec generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
Secrets ( 1979) . 
8 .Tudg(~ Hoffman's dissent suggests that even thi8 remedy may be un-
available if the Government mu~t bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damag<'~ ouly upon proof of f'Oill]H'II>'atory damage:-<. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court. of AppPal" majority, howewr, held a~ a. matter of fnletal law 
that the nominal damage:; recoverable for any breach of a :;ecrecy agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937-
93& 
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flec<>ssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated. "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the natio11al security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.u It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary obliga.tion, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligence that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti-
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
0 See id., at 939 (Hoffman, .J ., ronrurring in part and di ::<~enting in part) . 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-205. Decided October -, 1979 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employme11t with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted em.ployment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not .. . publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term o{ [his] employment . . . with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to , and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization ." /d. , at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departurr from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a " termination secrery agrerment." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any c l a10~ified infonnation, or any in-
.. 
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Thus, Rnepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearancE>. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the colltract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prt>publication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Rupp. 176. 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8 
formation ronrerning intelligerwe or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... witho11t the •expre~:; written consent of the Director of Central 
Jutelli~euro or· hi~ repre,-entativc." Pet. fila. 
~At the time of ~11it, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-
vanrfl paynwnts. Hi~ <'ontract. with hi:; publi::lhrr provide:; for royalties 
and otlwr pot{•ntial profitl:i. 456 F . S11pp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The C'o11rt of Apprab and the Di:;trict Court rejected each of Snepp's 
dt•fpnsrs to thr t•nforcemeut of his co11tract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) : 45U F. Supp., at 180--181. Iu hi::; petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relic•,.; prima ril.v on the rlaim that his ~ecrecy agreement is unen-
furr·eHbl<• as a prior rr~traint on protected speech. 
A~ iiH• C'omt of Appt•~tb hrld, thr claim i;; without merit. Whrn Snt'PP 
art·epted rmplo~·ment with the CIA, he ,·ohrntaril~· ~ignrd the agreement 
that, exprr,;~]~· obli!l;att•d him to "ubmit any prupo~t'd publieation for prior 
rC\·i<'W. Hf• do<',.; not daim that hr <'Xecuted thi~ agn•rmPnt undPr clurrss. 
IndPed , lw yo]untaril~· rPaffirmed hi,; obligation wht•n he ld't the Agency. 
1\for<'over, thi ~ Court',; <':t~P~ makP elrar that tlw Government-<·vl•n in the 
ab::;cnce of an cxpre~:; agreemenl-eoulcl have impo;-;<'d rea:;onablc re::<t. ric"-·· 
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. /d., at 
935-936.~ In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
tions on Agrnry rmplo~·(•ps' exerei~c of their Fir:;t Amendml•nt rights in 
ordPr to prot.rrt ;,;ubstantial govrrnmrnt. intNests. Civil Service Co-mm'n 
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer ,., Spock, .t2-1 TJ. S. 828 (Hl7(i); id .. at 844-
848 (PowgLr,, .J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 67() (1972) . 
Thr Govrmment has u sub~tuntial intrrest in protpcting both the ~ccrecy 
of information to our national seeurit~· nnd the appearance of confi-
deutiality :-;o e~~;.;ent.ial to tlw effertive operation of our forrign intdligrnce 
service. Sre p. 5, infra. Snepp'~ secrecy agreement i:> a reasonable metms 
for protrrting this vital intf'n•st. 
4 The Government.':; roncrssion di:;tinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the GoYernment claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreement not to publish any cla~sified information. Ibid., at 
1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remedy for 
the breach of 1111 agreement to submit all material for prepubliration 
review. By rel~·ing on Marchetti in thi~:~ rase, the Court of Appeals over-
looked 1 he cliff ere nee bet ween Sm·pp 's brench and the violation n t.. i.~sue 
· in Marchetti. 
>, 
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aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to Olle but not the othC'r. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued. were 
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that--after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information. including 
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.11 Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background ami exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for 
c The fir::;t ~rnt<>nee of the 196R ~ecrecy agrcenwnt, read: "I, Frank W. 
Rnrpp, III, understand that upon <'ntering duty with tht• Central Intelli-
gence AgeiH·~·. I am undertakiug a po:;ition of tru::;t in that Agency of the 
Gowrnment. . . . " Prt . 58a. 
6 Quite apart, from t.he plain language of the ::;ecrecy agrerment, the 
nature of Sncpp';; dutie:,; and hiti conceded a<·ce~ti to Hecret :,;ource~ unu 
materials eould e:;tabli:;h a trutit I'Piatiou~hip . See 595 F. 2d., at 939 
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and di~:;enting in part) . Few type;.: of 
govrrnmental employment involvr a higher degree of trust than that 
repo;;;ed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified infonnation. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us. " 456 
F. Supp., at 179- 180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
6 SNEPP u. UNITED STATES 
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
lllCleed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nomi11al damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
7 Evrry major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service. 
Whatever fairly ma~· be said about ~ome of it~ past activitieti, the CIA is 
an agenc~' thought b~· evPry Pretiident ~ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be 
e~~t'ntial to the security of the Unitt•d State~ and-in a ~entie--tlw free 
world. It i~ impo:s~ible for a government witiely to make critical decisions 
about foreign policy and national defen1le without the benefit of dependable 
foreign intelligence. See generaHy T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
Secrets (1979). 
8 .Tnclge Hoffman's di&;ent suggests that even thi;o remedy may be un-
available if the Government must hring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damag(·~ on!~· upon proof of t•ompt·ll~atory damag<>~. 5D5 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of AppPab majority, however, held a:; a matter of fedeml law 
that, the nominal dmnages recoverable for any breach of a tiecrecy agree-
ment will support :m exemplary award. See id., at D36, and n . 10, 967-
93& 
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J:Jec('ssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
Snepp promisE>d to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or aclditional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A co11structive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.0 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligence that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti-
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
0 See id., at. !)39 (Hoffman, J. , ronrurring in part and di~~rrtting in part.). 
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Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MH. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78- 1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not . . . publish .. . any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment . . . with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." /d., 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his depar ture from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executPd a " terminat-ion ,;ecrecy agrPement ." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in- / 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
011 all profits that Suepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District ~ 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8·~ 
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the <f'xpr!'~H written con~ent of the Director of Central' 
Intelligence or his repre~entativc." Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-· 
vance payments. His contract. with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Cot1rt of Appeals and the Di~trict Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses td the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primaril~· on the claim that. his ~ecrecy agreement is unen----forceuble as a prior restraint ou protected speech. ~ 
As the Court of Appeals held, the claim is without merit ).fllCiVil' 
IWW!l':-'f';"'m'J'Z'm'l.n-rr-.Drttf!f'l"'iiT.l'T:;;;r;;--,t1"it--'l"r:"1=t--54?rlffi:'l'l"litT!rt':"Ttti' s Court -----
lfp/ss 10/31/79 Snepp (Rider A, p. 2) 
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily 
signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit 
any proposed publication for prior review. He does not claim 
that he executed this agreement under duress. Indeed, he 
voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when he left the 
Agency. Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that the 
/' 
/ 
Government - even in the absence of an express agreement -
/ 
could have imposed reasonable restric~ ions on Agency 
employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in order 
to protect substantial government interests. eivil - Service 
eomm 1~v; - Letter - earriers, 413 u.s. 548, 565 (1973); see 
Buckley - v; -Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25-28 (1976); Sreer · v: - Spock, 
424 u.s. 828 (1976); id.)at 844-848 (Powell, J., concurring); 
eole - v; · Richardson; 405 U.S. 676 (1972). 
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It l:Llso agreed that S11epp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm " on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926. 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunc-
tion against future violatious of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support impositio11 of a constructive trust. The conclu-
siou rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged 110 classified iutelligeuce. Id., at 
935-936.'1 lu other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
erumeut--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a coustructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distiuct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the othe; / 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both/ 
aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust ~ ~ 
~76 ""t¥.3T9+. The Clovrrnnwnt has n ~· intere~t in protecting both the 
secrecy of information important to our national :security and the appear-
ance of confidentiality so es~ntial to the effective operation of our foreign . + 
intclligrnrc service. See p. 5, infm. Snepp'::; ,;ecrecy agreement is a g I ~ 1J 
reasonable means for protecting thi,; vital interest. ~ 
4 The Governmrnt 's conce,;sion di~tinguishecl this cwse from United States 
Y. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4) , cert. clt>niPd, 409 lT. S. 1063 (1972). 
Tht>re, the Government claimed that a former CIA employt>r intPnded to 
violate hi::: agreemPnt not to publi~h any classified information . Ibid., at 
131:3 . Marchetti thrrl'forr did not ronsic!Pr the appropriate remedy for 
the hn•urh of a11 agrPement to ~ubmit all material for prepublication 
revirw. By relying on Marchetti in thi,; ca~e, the Court of Appeal;; ove/-
lookecl the difference between Suepp's breach and the violation at i~~uc 
in Marchetti. 
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existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. PrepuLlication clearance was part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffma.u argued, were 
both a speculative aud iuappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Suepp breached a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agreement. Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish a'ny information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after uudertakiug this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information, including 
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.n Snepp published his book about CIY 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material fo 
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually coutained classified iuformation. 
" The fir~t :::cn(~;>ll0t' of the l!:J6S l:it•cr~;>cy agrremPut read: "l, Frank W. 
Snepp, lll, undPr~hllld that upon rnteriug duty with thP Central lntt'lli-
grnce AgPucy, I am unut:>rtakiug a po~ition of tru::lt in that Agency of the 
GoVlernment .... " Pet . 58a. 
0 Quite upnrt frcm thr plaiu language of the secrecy agreement , the 
uature of Snepp'i:i dutie::l ami hi~ conceded aeceso> to o>ecret sourCC'l:i and 
m~ttPrials could cl:itahlil:ih a tnt::lL relaticnship. See 595 F. 2u ., at 939 
(Hotfmau, J., t·on<'UITing in part Hucl dis::lenting in part). Few types of 
govPrnmenta) eiTII1ioyment involve a higiwr degrPe of trul:i t than that 
reposed iu a CIA employee with Snepp'l:i dutie:s. 
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"fhe Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilli11g to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreigu agents recruited by the CIA canno~ 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, bot 
7 Every major nation in the world has a ::;ecret intelligence service. 
Whatever fairly may be said about some of it:s past activitie::;, the CIA i:s 
nn agency thought by every Preiiident since Fra.nklin D. Roosevelt to be 
6 SNEP:P v. tTXITED RTATF.S 
the District Court atH.l tht> Court of Appeal!:! recoguizeu that 
• 'ncpp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
ter'ial-classifh•u or not---for prf'publication clearanct> ha::; irrep-
arably hamwd tlw rniteu ~tates GovertliUf'llt. .~95 .F. 2d, at 
935; 456 .F. Supp .. at 180. This was no ordiuary failure to 
com ply with a contractual obljgation. It. was a delilwrate 
breach of a very sp<-·cial trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriatP remeuy for Snepp's acknowledgeu wroug. 
fudel'd. as a practieal matu~r. thP decisiou may well leave the 
Gowrument with no reliable deterrent against similar 
brraclws of security. No ollP disputes that tlw actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to cleter no onP. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial ar<• speculative and unusual. Eveu if 
recovered. -they may bear 110 relation to either the Govern-
meut's irrPparable loss or Snepp 's unjust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the ouly remedy that the/ 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargaiu it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain au award of punitive damages may force 
the Government t,() disclosf• some of the very secrets that 
Suepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
p;;~Pnlial 1o tiH' ;;prmit~· of the llnitPd Shtl!·~ and-in a ~l'n::-t~tlw frpe 
world. It j,.. impos:;ible l'or a goverunlt:'nt, wi~cly 1o make <"l'itiral dt·cisions 
nl.>oul for£>igu poli!'y a)](l national drfense without !lw benPfit. of d(•pPudable 
fnrc•ign intrlligt•nrc· . Rrl' gPIWrally T. PowPrs, Til(' Man Who K('pt the 
RPrrr1~ (19i9). 
~ .Tudgr Hoffman'" di"'~Pnt sugge~1" that even !hi~ rt·mNiy mar be un-
:wailahiP if the Governmeut must bring ;;.uit in a Statr that allow:; mnitive sas F:lJ. 
rlamage,; onl~· upon proof of compenoa tory damage::;. ., n I 940. The I 
Comt of Aj>pealto: majorit~·, hoW('V!'l', liPid u::; n ma1!l'r of frdrml law 
tlwf 1he llOOlUY.d damage~ l'!'!'OV('fiiUir for an~- bi•raeh of a ~Pf'l'!'l'Y agyt't'-. 
mcut will support nn exrmplary award . Sec id., at 936, allll 11. 10, 937-
938. 
,. t 
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Jury .if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Govemment run this risk. 
In a lettf'r introduced at S11epp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby uotf'd the aualogous problem in criminal cases. :Exist-
ing law. he stated, "requires the revelation in opeu court of 
confirmiug or additional information of such a nature that the 
pott-n tial clamag(~ to the national security prec] udes prosecu-
tiou." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at ali. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natutal and customary consequence of a 
brPach of trust. 9 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secun's prepublication clearance, he cau publish with no fear" 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary obligation. the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And siuce the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the brea.ch, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
ali proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Governmeut of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret iutelligellCe that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would rant the Jeti-
tion in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
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FRANK W. SNEPP, III v. UNITED STATES and 
UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) . In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term o{ [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." ld.1 at 58a.
1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "a ny classified infonnation, or any in-
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
.erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
SnPpp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8 
iormu.tion concerning intelligence or CIA tllat has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the expre:;s written con~;ent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or hi~ representative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At. the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. Hi~; contract with hi;; publi:;her provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, · 179 (ED Va. 1978) . 
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp•s 
defenses to the !'nforcement of his contract. 595 F . "2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp rt>li<•s primarily on the claim that his secrecy agreement is unen-
forreaule as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
A;; thE' Court of Appeul,; held, the claim i~; without merit. When Snepp 
aceepted employment. with the CIA, he voluntaril~· J,; igned the agrwment 
that. expressly obligHted him to J,;Ubmit. any proposed publication for prior 
review. He does not claim that he executed this agreE-ment under duress. 
Indero, lte voluntarily reaffirmed hilS obligation when he left. the Agency. 
Moreover, this Court';; ca!*'8 make clear that t.he Government-even in the 
ab8ence of an E'Xpi'Cti$ agreE-ment-could have imposed rE-asonable rcstric--
r 
! 
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a. constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. ld., at 
935-936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
tions on Agency employees' exercitle of their Fir;;t Amendment rights in 
order to protect substantial government interests. Civil Service Camm'n 
v. Lette1· Cm'l'iers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976) ; Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id .. at 844-
848 (PowELL, .J., concurring); Cole v. Richa~·dson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972). 
The Government has a substantial interest in protecting both the secrecy 
of information to our national secmit~· and the appearance of confi-
dentiality so eassenHal to t.hc effective operation of our foreign intelligence 
service. See p. 5, infra. Snepp'~> secrecy agreement is a reasonable means 
for prot('cting this vital interest. 
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 ·F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at 
1313. Marchetti therefore· did not consider the appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
looked the difference between Snepp's brettch and the violation at issue 
· in Marchetti. 
4 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were 
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship.5 The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information, including 
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for 
G The fir:;t srntenoo of the 1968 secrecy agreement read: "I, Fnmk W. 
Snepp, III, understand that upon €ntering duty with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, I am undertaking a. po:;ition of tru::;t in that Agency of the 
Government .... " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart, from the plain language of the llecrecy agreement, the 
nature of Snepp':; duties and his conceded a.cces:; to :;ecret sources and 
material::; could establi:!h a tru::;t relationship. See 595 F. 2d., at 939 
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and disoonting in part). Few types of 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified infonnation. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure tdsubmit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. · We have ha<l 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us:" 456 
F . Supp., at 179-180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
· information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
-be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
terial-classified or notr-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
7 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service. 
Whatever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA is 
an agency thought by every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt to be 
essential to the security of the United States and-in a sense-the free 
world. It is irnpotSsible for a government witSely to make critical decisions 
about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable 
foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
Secrets (1979). 
8 Judge· Hoffman's dissent suggests th!lt even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
dnmage;,; only upon proof of eompen;,;atory damages. 595 F . 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majority , however, held a;; a matter of jede1'allaw 
that the nominal ili1mages recoverable for any breach of a secrecy agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id ., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
g'J& 
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~ec~ssary to sustain an· award of punitive damages may force 
.the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
'Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.9 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligence that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti-
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
to See id ., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., roncurring in part and dis~enting in part); 
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In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of ~ _ ~ 
judgment enforcing \.he ~ePee~agreement that he Signed when 
he accepted employmellt with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed aJ.. seeFe~ agreement promising that he would -""/4' 
"not . .. publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of. Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.1 /' 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a "termination secreey agrerment." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any clas~ified information, or any i/ 
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the co11tract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Suepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Rupp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
·'i@QrQ~ agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's --1/ 
profits. <1 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District __..---
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8,....,--
formation concerning intelligenre or CIA that has not been made public 
hy Cl A ... without the 'l':'xpre~s written con~ent of the Director of Central 
Jntellil{t'IH'<) or hi~ rt'pre~entativc." Pet. 61a.. 
~At. the time of ~nit, Snepp already had receiveu about. $60,000 in ad-
vnnrP paymmts. His contract. with hi;; publi~her provides for royalties 
:mel other pot~·ntial profits. 456 F . Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va.. 1978). 
3 'l'lie Court of Appenb and the Di;;trict Conrt rejretcd rach of Sncpp's 
clefrnsr;; to the <·nforeement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979): 456 F. Supp., at 180--181. In his petition for certiomri, 
Sm•pp rrli<·:; primarily on the claim that his ~ agreement is unen- ~ 
forre;tulr a~ a prior re~tmint on protrctecl speech. \1 
As t hr Court of App(•:tl,; lwld, the claim i~ without merit'. When Snepp 
fH'erptrd rmplo~·rnf'nt with the CIA, he voluntarily :,;ignPd the agrf'rment 
that. cxpres~l~' oLiigated him to submit. any propo:;Pd publieatio11 for prior 
rcvirw. H(' dor,; not claim that h(' exE'cutE'd thi:; agrerm<'nt undPr duress. 
Indeed, he Yoluntaril~· !'<'affirmed hi~ obligation whrn he Jt.ft. the Agency. 
1\forco\'rr, thio Comt ',.; cmw~ makP elrar that the Governmeut-(•ven in the 
ab:;cncc of au cxpre;;~ agreement-could have irnpo:;ed reasonable mstric--
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus. the court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. ld., at -:;:;:::,; ~ 
935-936.1 In other words, the court thought that Sne1fl ~· JL . 1:;, ·~ /J.~ 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the ,..,.~ of~-~~ 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nommal -
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information aud the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Bot~ 
tiom; on A!J;rnr~· emplo~·rp~' exerri~e of their Fir~t Amendmt•nt right s in~
order to ]Jrutrrt ,.;ubstantial gowrnmrnt intt'rests. Civil Service Cvmrn'n 
v. Letta Carriers, -l13 U. S. 548, 565 (1970); se<> Buckley v. Valeo , 424 
U.S. 1, 25-28 (197()); Greer Y. l::ipock, -l2-l U.S. 828 (1H76); id .. at 844-
848 (PowELL, .J., concurring); ColeY. Richardson, -l05 11. S. 67ii (1972). 
Thr Go\'!'rmneut ha~ a sub~tantial inter£>f't in prot£>ctiug both the ~errPcy 
of informatiOn o our national SP<'mit~· and thr app(•aranec of confi-
dentiality ~0 r~:~"ent .ial to tlw PH'Prtive opemtion of 0111' forPign intPiligPnee r I 
servic('. S~r p. ~~ i1~fra .. Sncpp'*eeJ~ agreenwntli~ :l rea~onablt' lllf'an~ 1/...L -fl,:J.:f S.,..a.,4f7 
lor prot<>Ptmg tlus v1tal mt<•rest. /... 6 ,,1
....,e_4 
4 The Government-'s ronce:;sion di~tinguishecl this ca:;e from United States 
v. Man·hetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), eert. denied, 409 U . S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government elaimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agrrement not to publi::;h any classified information. Ibid ., at 
1313. Marchett i therefore · did not eonsicler the appropriate remedy for 
the brPaeh of 311 agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
rPview. By rPlying on Marchetti in thi::; rase, the Court of Appeab over-
looked the difference between Snepp '. breach and the violation at issue ~ 
· in Marchetti. / 
'. 
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aideu the CIA in preserving necessary..ge.er-e-tw-. 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived fr·om the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to one but not the other. ..KThc 1968 seer~ agree-
ment,~ wrote, "was no ordinar·y contract; it ga.ve life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearailce was part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were 
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Rnepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
. ~ 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
//----~ - high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of 'Ais~er~ ·fl..e.. z;zjvQP ·e....-..T 
~JSnepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a ft....~r t...e... !9'<;""~) 
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that--after undPrtaking this obligation-he. had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified infoyrtation. including 
information regarding intelligence source and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.11 Snepp publish his book about CIA 
J 
activities on the basis of this b ground and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his oblig ion to submit all material for 
" The fir::;t ~rntenoo of the 196R ~ agreemrnt read: "I, Frank W. ~ 
Rnc•pJ), III, under:;tand that 11p011 Pnterlllg d11ty with thE' Central Intelli-
geuce Agem,,·, I am mH1ertakiug a po::;ition of tru~t in that Agency of the 
Guw•rnment .. .. " PPt. 58a. 
0 Quite apart from th1· plaiu languagr of the ~ agreement, the 
nature of Suepp'::; dutie::; and hio; !'OllcPded a1•ce~o; to .~ ~our<'e~ am! 
lllat~·rials COUld CtitabJio;h H tru"t. reJatiou"hip. S~·e 5951". 2df, at 939 
fHoffrnau, J., eoucurring in part and diso;entiug in part). Few types of 
goven1mcntal emplo~·ment involv~' a higher degree of tm::;t than that 
n·poHed in a CIA employee with Sncpp's duties. 
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the~ informa- c..le2-s.:;~=!)_ 
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
_..Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information . Nor does 
it contend- at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
"that in light of the special trust reposed in himjSnepp should ~..,.,.+ -IL. ";;J_t-
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
-- The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will uot remain secret. I 
caunot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179- 180. v 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign ageuts recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the st>crecy upon which their cooperation de-
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recogniL~ed that 
Snepp's breach of his elis~i~fphligation to~ sUbmit his ma-
terial-classified or not--for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
iii 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Imleed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no. reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. .-
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the ~ 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of~ 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
7 Ewry major nation in the world has aJ. ~ intelligence st>rvice. - ""1--::Y' 
Whatever fairly ma~· be ~aid about i'iome of it~ 11ast activities, the CIA is . V 
an ngmc~· thought b~· every President ~ince Franklin D . Roosevelt to be 
cssputial to the ~ccurity of the United State~ and-in a ~en~e-the free 
world. It i;; impo~;;ible for a government wi~ely to make critical decisionl::i 
about foreign policy and national defen::lC without the benefit of dcpPndable 
fon•ign intelligence. Sec generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
SPrrets (19i9). 
8 .Tud11:<~ Hoffman's dissent suggests that even tlli~ remedy tna~r be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damagPi:i ouly upon proof of eomp<·n~atory damage:<. 595 F . 2d., at 9-!0. 
The Court of Appeal" majority, however, held m; a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any bl'each of a. agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
938. 
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Bec<>ssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very ~ that cO"'--PdJe-..-c...t2.-$ 
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.9 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
ViOlation of his fiduciary kbligation, the trust remedy simply '3. .......J2 a._.._-f-ac.-4.. -:;;. / 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the se~ intelligence that may con- .-j./ 
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti- (J 
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment ~ 
of the District Court. ~ 
0 See id., at 9:~9 (Hofftn<tn, .J. , ronrurring in part and di~~enting in part.) : 
d.l 
\ ., 
Mr. Justice Stl:lwart 
~JT • Juet"\.r;o i'Jh1'l:e 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRI'fS 01<' CER'l'IORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR 'fHE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
No~. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MR . .JusTICl!l PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
1 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departurr from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a. "termination sccrec~' agrrement." That document reaffirmed' 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in~ 
• 
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulgE> classified information 
ami not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Rupp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Suepp had breached a valid contract.3 
formation concerning intelligenc•e or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the expr<>,;;; written con;;ent of the Director of Central 
Tntelligc-•nrc· or hii< repre:>entativc." Pet. fila. 
~At. the time of Ruit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-
vllncc• paynwnts. His contract. with his publi,;her provide::; for royalties 
and other pot<"ntial profit.-;. 456 F. Snpp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The Court of Appra],. and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
dt·fl'nl:lP~ to the ('llforcement of his contract.. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979): 456 F. Supp., at. 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snt•pp rrlif'>l primaril~r on the claim thut his secrecy agreement. is unen-
fore~·<~hh• as a prior rr~t raint on protected speech. 
A,; thr Court of Appra],; lwld, thr claim is without mrrit . Whrn Snrpp 
arc·r])ted rmplo~·ment with the CIA, he voluntaril~ · signed the agn-·rmrnt 
that CXJH'C';;~]~ · obli!l;atPd him to submit. any propo;;rd publicatiou for prior 
revirw. Hr dor;.; not. claim that hP exrcuted this agrePment under dnres~ . 
Indred , he voluntaril~· n•aflirmPd hi~ obligation when hr left the Agency. 
Moreover, thi:: Court '~ ca~e~ make- elear that the Govcmmellt-rven in the 
ab:scncc of au cxprc:s::; agreenwnt-eould have impol:led rea:;onable re"'tri<-"-
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus. the court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. !d., at 
935-936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
tions on Agenrr emplo~·rt·s' exerri~e of their Fir,;t Amendment rights in 
order to ]Jrol.ert substantial gowrnmrnt. interests. Civil Service Comrn'n 
v. Letter Carriers, 41:3 U. S. 548, 565 (197:3); sf'e Buckley v. Valeo , 424 
U.S. 1, 25-28 (19i(i); Greer"· SJJock, 424 U.S. 828 (Hli6); id .. at 844-
848 (PowELL, .J., concurring); Cole v. Rit·hardson, 40!) F. S. 6ifl (1972). 
ThP Govrrnment has a. f'ub;;htntial interrst in protrcting both the l'ierrrcy 
of informa JOn to our national l'ii'!'Hrit~· 11nd thr HJl]Wilr<lllCf' of eonfi-
dentiality so f'~~~ential to tlw rfft·rtivr oprration of om forrign intrlligPilCC 
servicr. RN• p. 5, infra.. Snrpp'~ :scereey agreement i» a rra;>onable mran:; 
for protPPting this vital interest. 
4 The Gowrnmcnt.'::; ronce:;sion di:stingui,;hed this ca;,;e from United States 
v. Marchetti, 46() F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) . 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA pmployee intended to 
violate his agrt-emPnt not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at 
1313. Marchetti therefore · did not considPr thp appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agrt-ement to :;ubmit all matPrial for prt-publiration 
review. By relying on Marchetti in thi:,; case, thp Court of Appeals over-
lookl'd thP difference between Snepp's brencl1 and the violation at i~sue 
· in Marchetti. 
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aided the CIA i11 preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Pu11itive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were 
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Rnepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Rnepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship.5 The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information. including 
information regarding i11telligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Bupp., at 178." Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for 
" The fir::;t ~l'utenoo of the 1968 ~ecrPcy agrcenH'nt, read: " I , Frank W. 
Sn<:'pp, III, tmd!'f:>tand that upon ·<·ntering duty with the Central Intelli-
gPnce A~ency , I am undertakiug a po::;ition of tru:st in that Agency of the 
Gow·mmrnt. .. . " Pet. 58a. 
11 Quite apart from tho plain languag(' of the ::;eerecy agrerment, the 
nature of Sncpp'~ dutie::; and hi:; eoncrded tH•re::;::; to ::;ecret :sources ami 
material,; could cstabli::;h a tru::;t relation~hip. See 595 F . 2d., at. 939 
(Hoffmnn, J ., eoncurring in part nne! di:;::;enting in rntrt) . Few types of 
government a! employment involve a higher degree of tru::;t than that 
rcpo,;ed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 5 
prepublication review. Thus. he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. ·We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179- 180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
' ' 
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pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
terial-classified or uot--for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
93.3; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Iudeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
hreaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no 011e. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Suepp's unjust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
7 Every major nation in the world has a SPcret intPlligmce sPrvice. 
Whatever fairly may bP said about some of its past nctivitiPs, the CIA is 
an ngPncy thought b~· cvPry Pm;ident ~ince Franklin D. HoosevPlt to be 
p;,;8ential to the Sl'curity of the United State~ and-in a sen~e--the free 
world. It is impos~ible for a government wi:;ely to make critical decisions 
about forPign policy and national defent~c without the bPnefit of depPndable 
foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
Secrets (1979) . 
8 .Tm.lge Hoffman's dissent suggPsts that. even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government mu;,;t bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
th1111agP~ only upon proof of <·omp<·n~atory damage~. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of App<'al~ majorit~·, howevc•r, held a;; a matter of federal law 
that the nominal dnmages recoverable for any breach of a ~Pcrecy agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
93& 
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J.J.ecPssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at S11epp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.0 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligence that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti-
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
9 See id ., at 939 (Hoffman, .J., ronrurring in part and di~~rnting in part.). 
• l, ~ • 
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
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In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term ot [his] employment .. . with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executed a "termination F:ecref'y agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any clasRified infonnation, or any in-
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish a.ny information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Sncpp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the colltract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prE'publication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Rupp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp df'libPrately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid co11tract.8 
formation eonrerning intelligen<'e or CIA tlmt has not been made public 
by CIA ... without. the expre;;:,; written consent of the Director of Central 
Jntellig!'IH'!' or· hi~ rrpre~entativc." Pet. fila. 
~At. the ( ime of ~nit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-
vmwo pn.ynwnts. Hi~ !'ontract. with his publi;;her provide::; for royalties 
and otlwr pot~'ntial profit.~. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The Court of Appeal>< and the Di;;trict Comt rejected each of Snepp's 
cJ!'fpn:,;r>; to thr (•nforcemeut of his coutract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979): 45() F. Supp., at 180-lRl. In his petition for certiorari, 
Sm•pp reliP:> primaril,v on the rlaim that his ~ecrecy agreement is unen-
forf'ealllP ail a prior rrstraint on protected speech. 
A~ ilw Court of Ap]WaJ.-; held, ilw claim i;.; without merit. Wlwn Snrpp 
ae<·t•ptrd rmplo.nnrnt with the CIA, he \·oluntaril~· ~igned the agr<·rrnPnt. 
thai expr('s~J~· obligatPd him to ;.;uLmii any propo~ed publication for prior 
rcvirw. H<· dm•,; not claim thai hr rxecuted thi~ agrN'IIlPIIt under duress. 
Ill(ked, he Yolnntarily n'affirmrd hi,; obligation when he ldt tlw Agency. 
Morrovcr, thi::: Court '~ ea;.;c·~ make e!Par that thP GoverruneHt-Pven in the 
ab;:;cncc of :111 expre~~ agreement-eould have impo~rd n·a~onab](' ro><tric"--
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 :F. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. !d., at 
935-936.~ In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernment--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation , dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct 
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other 
to subrnit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both 
tions on Agrnr~· rmtllo~·(•ps' eXrr(·i~e of their Fin;t Anwndmrnt rights in 
order to protret :;ubstantial gowrnmrnt interests. Civil Service Comrn'n 
v. Lt•tter Carrie1·s, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (19i3) ; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 25-28 (l9i6) ; Greer, .. Spack, ~24 TJ. S. 828 (Hl76); id .. at 844-
848 (Powf:LL, ,J., coneurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 6iH (1972) . 
Thr Gowrnmcnt has a sub~tantial intrre~t in protrcting both the ~ccrrcy 
of information to our national ~el'urit~· and the appearance of eonfi-
denli:tlity so r~~~ent .ial to tlw dfPetive operation of our forPign intelligenee 
servicr. See p. 5, infra. Snepp's sc('recy agreement i;; a reasonable means 
for protecting this vital interest. 
4 The Gov(•rmnent.'~:~ concesHion di,;tinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Gon'rnment claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate hi~ agreement not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at 
1313. Marchetti therefore · did not consider the appropriate remedy for 
the hrearh of an agreement to ~:;ubmit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in thi::: C"ase, the Court of Appeals over-
looked 1hP difference between Sm·pp's hrencl1 a.nd the violation at i"~ue 
in M archt:tti. 
·' 
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aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively tlw duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concludf'd that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust 
existed as to o11e but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiduciary relationship and invested in Sncpp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect co11fidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued. were 
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a 
fi<.l uciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high df'gree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agrE>ement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship.r. The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
grallted "frequent access to classified information. including 
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.11 Snepp published his book about CIA 
activities on the basis of this background aud exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for 
:; The fir::;t ~rn1Pnoo of thP 196R ~Pe!'('CY agreenwnt, read: "I, Frank W. 
8nPpp, III, understand that upon •entering duty with th~· Central Intelli-
gence Ageney, I am undertaking a position of tru;;t in that Agency of the 
Gowrnment . .. . " Prt. 5Ra. 
6 Quite apart from the plain languagr of the Hecrecy agrerment , the 
nature of Sucpp':; dutirs and hi::; l'Onceded al'cess to ;;ecret ~;ourcPH and 
materials eould establish a trust rrlation::;hip. See 595 F. 2d. , at. 939 
(Hoffman, J., concurring iu part and di8~entiug in part). Few types of 
governmental employment involvr H higher degree of trust than lhat 
repo~ecl in a CIA employee with Sncpp's duties. 
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admira.l Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us;" 456 
F. Supp., at 179- 180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly 
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that 
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his ma-
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to 
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate 
brE:>ach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Government. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Goverument with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nomillal damages are a hollow alterna-
tivE>, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recoverf'd, they may bear uo relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's uujust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
7 Evrry major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service. 
Whatever fairly ma~· be said about some of it« past activitie~, the CIA is 
an agrncy thought b~· every Pre~ident ;;iuce Franklin D. Roospvelt to be 
e~;sential to the security of the United State::; and-in a ~en.~e-tlw free 
world. It i;, impo::;~ible for a government wi::;ely to make critical decisionl:i 
ahout foreign policy and national defen~ without the benefit of dependable 
foreign intrlligcnee. Sec generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the 
SPrrets (1979). 
8 .Tudg(' Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must briug suit in a State that allows puuitive 
damagP~ onl~· upon proof of eomp(·u;;atory dmnage,.;. 5l:J5 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majorit~·. however, held aH n matter of fedl!ral law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of n :secrecy agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at \:!06, and n. 10, 907-
93&. 
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J.Jecessary to sustain an· award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or arlditional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.9 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligence that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti-
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
0 Seo id., at. 939 (Hoffll1an, .T., ronrurriug in part and cli~;;:rnting in pilrt.) . 
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
In No. 78- 1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when 
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). In No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed 
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for 
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by 
the District Court. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Viet-
nam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to 
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would 
"not . . . publish .. . any information or material relating to 
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, 
either during or after the term of [his] employment . .. with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent 
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization ." !d., 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his depar ture from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
executfd a " terminat ion ,;ecrecy agrfement ." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in- / 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on a11 profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligatious to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The Dis-
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's 
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's· 
profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District ~ 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8·~ 
---
lfp/ss 10/31/79 Snepp (Rider A, p. 2) 
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily 
signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit 
any proposed publication for prior review. He does not claim 
that he executed this agreement under duress. Indeed, he 
voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when he left the 
Agency. Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that the 
Government - even in the absence of an express agreement -
could have imposed reasonable restrictions on Aqency 
employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in order 
to protect substantial government interests. eivi1 ~ service 
eomm'~v. - Letter ~ earriers, 413 u.s. 548, 565 (1973); see 
Bcck1ey · v; ~ valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 25-28 (1976); 6reer · v; · Spock, 
424 U.S. 828 (1976); id.)at 844-848 (Powell, J., concurring); 
eole - v; · Richardson; 405 U.S. 676 (1972). 
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It a,lso agreed that S11epp's failure to submit his manuscript 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on 
intelligeuce activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 
2d 926. 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunc-
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support impositio11 of a constructive trust. The couclu-
sioll rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's co11cession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged 110 classified intelligence. !d., at 
935-936.'1 Iu other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligatiou extended only to preserving the secrecy of 
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal 
clamages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Gov-
ernmeut--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to fiud a constructive trust. Iu an opinion that I find 
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two disti11ct 
obligations, oue to protect classified information and the othe~ / 
to sub111it all manuscripts for prepublicatiou review. Both/ 
aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging 
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoff-
man concluded that both obligations derived from the same 
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust ~ ~ 
~. The Governnwnt has a ~ intere:;t in prot<'cting Loth the 
secrecy of information important to our national security and the appear-
auce of !'onfideutiality so e:s:;eutial to the effective operation of our foreign 
4 
. .,.... 
intclligPnrr service. See p. 5, infra. Suepp':s "ecrecy agreement is a Sf Ill Cf" I' 
rea:sonnble mean:; for protecting thi:s vi1al intere:;t. -,;:;-
4 The Government's conce:;:;ion di~tinguit~hed thi:; ca:;e from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1:309 (CA-!), cert. dt>nird, 409 F. S. 1063 (l!J72). 
There, the Governmen1 claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate hi~ agrt>ement no1 to pnbli:;h any classified information. Ibid., at 
131:3. Marchetti 1hrn·fore did not rousidrr the appropria1l' remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to ~ubmit all material for prepublication 
n•view. By rel~· ing on Man·hetti in thi~ ca:;e, the Court of AppPal~ ove/-
]ooked tlw difference between Suepp's breach <tnd the violation at i:-;sue 
in Marchetti. 
t' 
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existed as to one but uot the other. "The 1968 secrecy agree-
ment," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a 
fiuuciary relationship anu investeu in Snepp the trust of the 
CIA." ld., at 938. PrepuLlication clearance was part of 
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with 
his trust. Punitive uamages. Judge Hoffma.u argued. were 
both a speculative aud iuappropriate remedy for Snepp's 
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breacheu a 
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are 
impressed with a constructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved au extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy 
agreement. Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a 
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed 
the obligati011 not to publish any information relating to the 
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated 
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been 
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been 
granted "frequent access to classified information, including 
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456 
F. Supp., at 178.0 Snepp published his book about cry 
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He 
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material fo 
prepublication review. Thus. he exposed the secret informa-
tion with which he had been eutrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually coutained c~assified iuformation. 
" The fir~t :::cult>UC+' of the HI6H ~ecrt>cy agn.>t>ntent rPad: "l, Frank W. 
SnPpp, III, undrr:;taud that upou rntt>riug duty with thr Central lntPlli-
grnce AgPncy, I am unuPrtaking a JlOHition of tru.,;t in that Agency of the 
GoV~ernmeut .... " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart frcm thP plaiu languagP of the st>crecy agreement , the 
natur<:> of Snepp's dutie.,; and hi,; conceded acce:>:> to .,;ecret .,;ourcc·~ untl 
lll ctterials could c~tablish a tnt~(. relationship. St•e 595 F. 2d. , at 939 
(HotTman, J., <'OIH'UITing in part and dis,;enting in part). Few types of 
govrrnmrntal employmrnt involve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed iu a CIA employee with Snepp's dutie::;. 
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"l"he Government tloes not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contentl-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposetl in him, Snepp should 
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the 
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified 
information or sources. Neither of the Government's conces-
sions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to pre-
publication review was a breach of his trust. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication 
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intel-
ligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Di-
rector of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like 
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct lia.ison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilliug to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180. 
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what 
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly ~ 
nat!ons and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA canno~ 
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, bot 
7 .Every major nation in the world has a :;ecret intelligence service. 
Whatever fairly may be said about l:iOme of it::; past activitiel:l, the CIA i::; 
nn agency thought by every Preiiident ~ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be 
6 S ~EPP v. tT~TTRD STATF.S 
the Distt·ict Court all(] tht> Court of Appeals recognized that 
Rnepp's breach of his distinct obligatio11 to submit his ma-
terial-classifit•d or not--for prepublication elearanct> has irrep-
arably harnwd the rnited ~tates Govemment. .!)95 F. 2d, at 
933; 436 F. Rupp .. at 180. This was no ordiuary failure to 
comply with a contractual obljgation. It. was a delilwrate 
breach of a very special trust relationship with our 
Go vemmen t. 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals cJenies the Goverument 
the wost appropriatl:' remecJy for Snepp's acknowledgecJ wroug. 
TndeecJ. as a practieal matter. tl11:' decision may well leave the 
Gov<•rnment with no reliable deterrent against similar 
brl:'aclws of security. No Ollf> disputes that thf> actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are uuquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to <leter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial ar<' speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered. -they may bear 110 relation to either the Govern-
meut's ir-rf>parable loss or Snepp 's unjust gain. 
The Government cannot pursue the o11ly remedy that the/ 
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the beHefit of 
the bargaiu it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious concJuct 
necessary to sustain au award of punitive damages may force 
the Government to disclosf• some of the very secrets that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
P>'~Pntial to tlw ~Prnrit~· of th<• 1Tnitecl Stalt·::: !lllu-in a ~r·n,.t~tlw frpc 
world. It i:o< impo:;:;ible for a goverument wi,;cly to make t'ritiral dt•cisions 
nboul for£"ign polit·y and national drfrn>*' without tlw lJeHt>fit. of d<'llt'lldable 
forf'ign iHtrlligt'llrf'. Ree griwrally T . PowPr~, Thr Man Who Kt•pt the 
Rt>rrt>t:-< (1979). 
~ .Judge Hoffman',:: di"-~f'ut ~llgl!;l':-<t~ that even thi:< rt·nwdy ma~· be un-
availahiP if the Govrrnmt'Ht must bring suit in a Statf' t IJHt allow~ mnitive Sa 5 F :1.J. 
rlamagp:; onl~r upon ru·oof of compen~atory damages. ., at 940. The I 
Court. or Appeal..: majorit~·, hOW('V('I', held liS n lllH1tl'r of /l'rlt:'l'lll Jaw 
flwt tlu• DOOliJ.I",d damage::: n•<•ovc·r11blt> for an~· b[l(•aeh of a. :-:N·rPt·~· agYt't'-
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Jury if the defendant so elects, would subjeet the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fid<>ntial affairs. Rarely will the Govemment run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at S11epp's trial. former CIA Director 
Colby 11oted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
coufirmiug or additional information of such a. uature that the 
potPntial damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tiOlJ." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at ali. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust. 0 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublicatiou clearance, he ca11 publish with no fear· 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violatiou of his fiduciary obligation. the trust remedy simply 
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. 
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those 
whQ would place sensitive information at risk. And siuce the 
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the brea.ch, it can-
not saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of 
ail proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effec-
tive means of protecting the secret intelligence that may con-
tribute to national security. I therefore would rant the Jeti-
tion in this case aucl reiustate sumrnarily the full judgment 
of the District Court. 
0~Sre ~~""'""'• at 939 (Hoffman , l., ClijllCIIIrting in ])aJ:t and cli~::;enting:; 
lll Jlli:U't) •. 
.• 
~u:punu <!faurl ttf flrt 'Jlfui:ttb ~bdt.tt 
~ulfingtcn. ~. Q}. 2Ubi~.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE W•c J. BRENNAN, JR. January 4, 1980 
' . 
RE: Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265 Snepp v. United States 
Dear John: 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have 
prepared in the above. 
Sincerely, 
I~ 
Mr. Justice Stevens 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 8 January 1980 
From: Gregory May 
Re: Snepp 
This is iust to identify the revisions in this 
opinion. I have not yet renumbered the footnotes because I 
wanted to await your review. 
Paqe 1: 
Your rider added three ideas: (a) that Snepp's 
agreement was a condition of his employment, (b) that the 
condition was imposed because Snepp would be exposed to 
classified information, (c) that the preclearance aqreement was 
part of the same agreement that prevented disclosure of 
classified information. Your rider also transposed the order of 
the obl ig at ions. 
My revision left the obligations in the oriqinal 
order. Since the case is concerned with the preclearance 




rather than appearing to be a mere appendage of the obligation 
to protect classified information. I then added language to 
/ 
bring out two of your basic points: (a) that the preclearance 
v 
I 
obligation was a condition of Snepp's employment, (b) that the 
preclearance obligation was an integral part of the agreement to 
protect classified information. The first paragraph of Part II 
already contains an explicit discussion of the third point: 
Snepp's exposure to classified information. That discussion has 
more force there, I think, because Part II can suggest the 
element of CIA reliance that makes enforcement of the agreement 
even fairer. 
Page 2: 
I did not change the first sentence on this page for 
two reasons. First, the suggestion that the preclearance 
agreement was for "surveillance" of a citizen has the same tone 
/ as the references to "secrecy" that bothered Mr. Justice Stewart. Second, the sentence as it was emphasizes the oari ty 
of Snepp's two obligations. Preclearance indeed was designed to 
support the more basic obligation, but at least at first it 
seems better to emphasize that both obl ig at ions were of equal 
dignity. There are passages later in the opinion that bring out 
the reason for preclearance. 
3. 
Page 5: 
My changes in your insert for pages 5-6 are simply 
stylistic. The new insert is identified for the printer as 
Insert A. 
The revision of your footnote about the dissent's 
treatment of Admiral Turner's testimony appears as new footnote 
8 on this page. It is marked for the printer as Insert B. The 
only non-stylistic change is the omission of the last sentence 
in the first paragraph, the first sentence in the second 
paragraph, and the citation to Near - v; - Nebraska, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931). Near and the arguments associated with its rather -
strict standard against prior restraints stood at the center of 
the controversy that divided the Court so deeply in The · Fentaqon 
Fapers · · ease, 403 u.s. 713 ( 1971). Any invocation of those 
arguments in this context is likely to lead some Justices to 
believe that the case should be set down for argument. And 
those arguments are not necessary so long as the Court can rely 
on a written contractual agreement. 
Page 6: 
Your footnote about the dissent's departure from the 
record in this case appears as new footnote 9 on this page. It 
is marked for the printer as Insert c. 
4. 
Page 7: 
I have added my footnote about Mr. Just ice Stevens' 
concessions to old footnote 9 on this paqe. It is marked for 
the printer as Insert D. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ttpr.cuu C!t'ou:rt ~tf tift 'Jtlttittb .§taite 
1l7atllfbtgtott, gl. cq. 20'biJI-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 10, 1980 
Re: Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265 - Snepp y, u.s, 
Dear John: 
Please join me in your dissenting op~nion, 
S;i.ncere1y, 
T,M. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
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Jnauary 11, 1980 
78-1871 Snepp v. United States 
Dear Potter: 
Here is a second draft of the Per Curiam in the 
above case. I would appreciate your takinq a look at it 
before I circulate it. 
Mv Primary purpose is to emphasize that the 
aqreement to oreclear is essential to protect the aqreement 
not to publish classifi~d information. 
In footnotes, I have undertaken specificallY to 
reply to John. It seemed to me that some of his statements 
were quite vulnerable. Do you think my replies are too 
sharp? 
I would appreciate vour views. 
Sincerely, 







Mr. Justice Stewart called today at noon to respond to 
your note about the redraft in Snepp. He said that he did not 
think the replies to JPS's dissent too sharP and that he would not 
suggest you change them. 
He did, however, have one suggestion about note 8 on 
page 6. He cannot accept the sentence that says "We have held 
consistently that the Government can restrict its employees' 
exercise of their First Amendment rights in order to protect 
substantial government interests." He thinks that tantamount to 
saying that the Government can violate the Constitution. Instead, 
he would say something like "We have held consistently that the 
Government can, in·order·to·protect·sabstantial·qovernment 
interests; ·restrict· its· employees· in·a_ctivi_ties·that·might· in 
other·contexts·be·protected·by·the·First·Amendment." 
I think that Mr. Justice Stewart's suqqestion is 
acceptable, but I note that language almost identical to that he 
finds offensive here appears in note 3, page 3, lines 6 through 9. 
Greg 
,. ~ 
Supreme Court of the United States 
~ S, Memorandum J/1'1/Ka 
-------------~--------, 19 _______ _ 
1~-
~ /) /vv /LA- ~-~ ~ 
it..,._./ ,~;._ V'v'- f ut. ,, ·'7 ~ 
/~f-.u 
. 
r ..- ~ t '~ 
v:_:_ffl • Jv- 12L f, iLt_ 
I 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
----------------------------------- __ , 19--------








1/17/80 Rider A; - fn;; - 8 - (Snepp' ~
In questioning the force of Admiral~ LO 
testimony, Mr. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion would 
place the blame for the concern of foreign intelligence 
services not on the desired hazards of allowing an aqent like 
Snepp to publish whatever and whenever he pleases, but upon a 
perceived failure of the CIA to classify what "should have 
been classified or of the foreign government's disagreement 
with our government's classification policy". ~' at 6-7. 
Apart from the fact that Mr. Justice Stevens' views in this 
respect find no support in the record, they reflect - we 
think - a misappreciation of concern reflected by Admiral 
Turner's testimony. If in fact information is not properly 
classifiable or is in the public domain neither the CIA nor 
foreign agencies would be concerned. The problem is one of 
making sure in - advance, and by proper procedures, that only 
information not detrimental to national interests is 
published. Without a dependable preclearance procedure no 
intelligence agency or responsible government official could 
be assured that an employee privy to sensitive information 
might not conclude on his own - innocently or otherwise -
that it should be disclosed to the world. 
The dissent finds an "implication in the Court's 




employees' publications. The obligation undertaken by Snepp 
is no more than a preclearance procedure subject to judicial 
review. If, in this case for example, Snepp had lived up to 
his obligation and he and the Agency had failed to aqree, it 
would have been incumbent upon the latter - if deemed 
necessary - to seek injunctive relief aqainst publication. 
~,-· 
Mr. Justice, 
I have reexamined the passages on page 5 that Mr. 
Justice Stevens seems to be miscontruing. I also have asked Ellen 
to read them. We both agree that the~quite clearly express the 
view that you intend them to express and that they do not say what 
Mr. Justice Stevens thinks they say. And neither of us can think 
of a rewording that could make the point more clearly. So, 
despite my earlier inclination to do a partial redraft, I have 
come to the conclusion that there is nothing more for us to say. 
Greg 
January 18, 1980 
_...-., 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 78-265 
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No. 78-1871: Snepp v. u.s. 
Mr. Justice, 
I have marked a number of changes in the draft per 
curiam. Some were made necessary by changes in Mr. Justice 
Stevens' language. See per curiam, at 6-7, n.8. Others simply 
clarify language and punctuation. Now that Brown v. Glines has 
been announced, I think that we should cite it in footnote 3, 
where we discuss the Government's right to place restrictions upon 
its employees. There is some language about prior approval in 
Glines, at 8-9 & n.13, that seems relevant and that meets Mr. 
Justice Stevens' argument that no prior case has upheld prior 







ann 79-265 ~nepp 
In vour ahsenc~, I have h~~ nv cl~r ~eliv~r 
clerk my fourth draft of the PC in this case. 
The only chang s , other than a~dinq a reference 
n. 3, are ch nqes in n. 8 (np . 6, 7) that e m 
in liqht of your most recent chanqes. 
I have not circulated bv fourth draft because, in 
the inte~est ~f having this case ready by the February 1S 
Conference, I would like to ma e sure that you ann I have 
comnleted our resp ctive writinq . If you wish to make anv 
additional chanqes, and would let me see thP.m, I could then 
deci e whether my fourth draft is r ady for circulation. 
Absent anv chanqes by you, I ill circulate mv fourth draft 
in it pr sent form . 
I do hope vou and 1aryan found the same we ther in 
that Jo and I left there . W~ were proud to have vou 
Rich~ond . You were a biq hit with my bar. 
~ --·~---------




~v-t- ;,"ff'r r A,., fr-
Vf~c~ v~ r;f'h- ~// ~~-ut.;;(t 
g-~ rPu-~tJ/ Mr, .;, Jf -s 
tf-h'-1: ~.-¢' /"kkr ::~7'- 4 
/I"1A-Y ~1~~4-cr /.WPt/t-<4'~ -1<2- Vt.""' 








&r--6y ~s J?..~ 
b./ #-/f -~ r- I p 
cJ.~~~ 
~ r---=--~~ 
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" c··w, £~·~ 
Gentlemen: 
In the event you missed it, I enclose a copy of the 
Star's editorial on the Court's Per Curiam in this case. 
At least one newspaper person has reao and 
understood the opinion. The news stories, typically, iqnored ~ 
the fact that we were doinq nothing more than applyinq a ,p 
contractual obligation that created a trust. Not even the 
Star mentioned that both the DC and CA4 aqreeo that Snepp's 
violation of his contract had caused irreparable harm to our 
country. 
Little wonder that the public remains confused. 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Sincerely, 
"~''' Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/sA 
ifp/ss 2/25/80 
MEMO TO FILE 
United States v. Snepp 
Some of the press stories and commentary suggest 
that the Court's opinion Snepp was motivated by publication 
of The Brethren and a desire of the Court to create a 
precedent that would enable it to prevent "leaks". This 
speculation is wholly groundless. Indeed, any careful lawyer 
who reads the opinion would recognize that - despite the 
breast beating by some ACLU lawyers - the case focuses on the 
CIA and the necessity of such an organization to maintain 
secrecy and the appearance of its ability to do this. 
A similar situation could exist with respect to 
highly sensitive national security matters known only at the 
highest levels of government in the White House, National 
Security Council, State and Defense Departments. Even none 
of these requires quite the same necessity for the appearance 
of an ability to protect secrecy, as does the CIA. 
In any event, my file totally refutes the press 
implications and speculations. Snepp was discussed first at 
a Court Confernce on October 5, 1979, at which time I 
expressed the views that later were incorporated into my 
opinion. My opinion was first circulated, as a first draft 
of dissent, on November 16, 1979 - two weeks before the 
2. 
Woodward book was published. There is no relationship in 
fact or in principle - except in the minds of some newsmen -
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MEMO TO FILE 
United States v. Snepp 
Some of the press stories and commentary suggest iii' 
that the Court's opinion Snepp was motivated by publication 
of The Brethren and a desire of the Court to create a ' 
precedent that would enable it to prevent "leaks". 
speculation is wholly qroundless. Indeed, any careful lawyer 
who reads the opinion would recoqnize that - ~espite the 
breast beating by some ACLU lawyers - the case focuses on the 
CIA and the necessity of such an organization to maintain 
secrecy and the appearance of its ability to do this. 
A similar situation could exist with respect to 
highly sensitive national security matters known only at the 
highest levels of government in the White House, National 
Security Council, State and Defense Departments. Even none 
of these requires quite the same necessity for the appearance 
of an ability to protect secrecy, as does the CIA. 
In any event, my file totally refutes the press 
implications and speculations. Snepp was discussed first at 
a Court Confernce on October 5, 1979, at which time 
expressed the views that later were incorporated into my 
opinion. My opinion was first circulated, as a first 
' of dissent, on November 16, 1979 - two weeks before the 
.. ~ 
2. 
~,. ·~; ~' ;~ .fl 
,,,, ~·' 
Woodward book was published. There is no relationship in 
fact or in principle except in the minds of some newsmen 
between the Snepp opinion and The Brethren. 




The attachen article on C~4's decisions in Rnepp and 
Marchetti iust appeareo at 14 Harv. CP-CL L. Rev. 655. It 
predictably takes a view at odds with this Court's decision in 
~~' but it miqht be a worthv addition to vour file since it 
lavs out the relevant 1st ~mendment case law that miqht have to be 









d Mr. Justice M~rshall 
L~ . ujz- . .Jj-~ L14f~ ~Mr. Ju3t1Cle BlMkmU.n 
tJ., -- - , .A~~~ ~at-tee Powell 
~ fs ~ ~ J '----~u~·ttce RebnQ'lliSt 
~ J-o ~f- Justice Stevena 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~le.ted: JAN 3 '80 
,oJ H<L- ~r- ~-~- ~.J~ 
~r ReOircuial ad: __________ _ 
th-9~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~ ~ FRANK W. SNEPP, III v. UNITED STATES and 
 ~ UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
/1 ) -~ JA~N PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
(_' /'~ • - . . , COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
~~ '-'t-) 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided January -, 1980 
R. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement 
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency 
any information he intended to publish about it for prepubli-
cation review.1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the 
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor 
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classi-
~~~d, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the 
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926, 
~r 4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 
_ 1 _ . 2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), eert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
~~ ,tt.--l.f[_ In this case Snepp a~nittedly breached his duty to submit 
-  L--1,.....;' the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for 
c...c.- / , prepublication review. However, the Government has con-
~ .~ ~ ceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic rna-
.c-- · 
teriaJ.2 Thus, by definition, the interest in _co~fidentiality1 
hat Snepp's contract was designed to protecthas not bee~ 
e:t:r ~ ~ 1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made 
the same commitment. 
""'.4-~·~ 
rtu..~ . 
~ : 2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that 
~ " ... Decent Interval contains classified information or any information 
""; l...LJ,/ P I .. _ 9'!lc.erning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA," 
Ci::)p ) -, ~vernment stated that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintiff does 
~ liO contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession, 
~ i;he district judge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts 
v' r::i"\ , l . q-F?S ~ermine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that 
H\..V~~ the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral 
_..,._.~  ~tansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu, 
~ .. S...u...}' 5' ~he CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153. ,, 
v (!i>. )'-f ... ~k~~At.Q/1 Jlf, ~
/~ ".!...~ ,_ ~ s• I 
1~ 
Y \.L.I P-1•4-··T~-, ~. ' / 
~ ,r .. ~~~~ ~~;.r- ~"(~~h.../~ 
(b. fJS .. Y~-s ~ ~ ~ ,1c, 4.:.,... ~~~.4e.~ \'- f I (~ 
. . . ~
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Gov-
ernment unprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a 
constructiv~ trust over th e profitSderivcd by Snepp from tlw 
sale of the book. Because that remedy is not authorized by 
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for 
the Court to dispose of this novel issue summarily on the 
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, 1 re-
spectfully dissent. 
I 
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported 1 
b',· statute. by the contract, or by thr common lfLw. Although 
Congress has enacted a number of criminal statutes punishing 
tlw unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified 
information/ it h::s not seen fit to authorize the constructi\'f' 
trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor docs either of the 
contracts Snepp signerl with the agency provide' for any such 
remed"· in the event of a breach. 4 The Comt's per curiam 
opinion suggests that its res11lt is supported hy a common-law 
blend of the la'v of trusts and the law of contracts. But neither 
of these branches of tlw common law supports the impo~ition 
of a constructive trust nnder the circumstances of this case. 
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a set-
tlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for 
~ RrE', e. g .. 18 U. S. C. §70S, which impo~rs a prison trrm of 10 years 
:md a ~10.000 fino for knowi11gl~· nnd willfully publishing rNtain typrs of 
cln~sified information; 18 U. S. C. § 704, which makes it a niminnl offE'nRe 
puni"hnble by life in pri~on to commun iratr national clrfrn~r informntion 
to a foreign government; ::mel 5 U. R. C. § 312, which withdraw8 thr 
right to government retirempnt hrnrfit~ from a per:.;on ronvirtrct of Yiolat-
ing these statutE's. Sec al~o Exrr. Ordrr No . 1206.5, .50 U. S. C. § 401, 
\\"hirh provides admini~tm tiw cnnct ion~, including cli~chnrgr, ilg:l in~t rm-
plo~·ce;;; 'vho publish classfied informntion. 
1 In both hiR original employment ngrcrmrnt and thr trrmination ngrrf'-
mrnt. SnPpp arknowlrclged t hr criminnl prn~1li ies th::~t might nti nrh to nn)· 
p11hlicntion of cla~Rified information. In hi~ rmplo)'mcnt ngrrE'ment he 
nl~o agreed that a brcnch of the agrremrnt would be cause for termina-
tion of his employmE'nt. No othrr remeclirs were mcntionrd in either 
[ll!l'E'rment. 
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the use and be11efit of dC'sig nntc>d l)('neficinries. Rather, it is 
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses 
fiduciary obligations arisi11g out of his d~t of lo alty to his 
1e o hose obligations, long recognized by the 
en in the absence of a written employment 
agre 1 , is the duty to protect confidential or "classified" 
~ · 10 mation. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the com- l 
~ mon law would support the implication of a constructiw trust 
, ,~ +' ~ npon the benefits derived from his misuse of conficlrntial 
v( information. 5 
But Snepp did not breach his ch1ty to pt'otect confLdC'ntial 
'nfonnation. Rather, he breached a contmctual duty, im-
~ ... ~ )osed in 'd of thr b si Jt ilo maintain conficlentialit;t"o 
~,- obtain prepublication clearance. In or er to justify the im-
~ JAV-: position of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to 
.f,..vf· V · equate this contractual duty with f\nepp's duty not to dis-
, .A.~... /P closr, labeling them both as "fiduciary." T find nothing in). 
rv-- tJ:! the common law to sup])Ort such an approach. 5 
~
~.' Employment agreemrn s o en contain covenants clcsignC'd 
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies 
"-ith his duty not to disclose or mism:e confidential informa-
 ;,u..; tion. OnP of the most common is a covrnant not to rom-
~ AJ.-/~ l~ c
1 
011trary to the majority's UpprO'dch:::OiifiiiTs Casf.""'tl"7e 
~~ AAV'f./ courfs 1ave not construed such covenants broadly simply 
~-r L.o • ])('canse they support a hnsic flrlueinr~· duty: nor havr the? 
{!;--
1 
... .tfr granted sweeping remedies to cnforcr them. On the contrar.v, 
.... A --t""~ because such cov0nnnts arr agr0cments in rPstraint of an in-
1/ \ ~,.... cliviclual's freedom of trade. tlwy are pnforceable only if thry 
~~~can survive scrutiny under thr "~" That rule. 
5 , ee, e. g., Spe1'ry Ranrl C'nrp. "· A-T-0. Inr. , 447 F. 2cl 13~7, 1302 
(Ci\.1. Hl7l), cert. drnircl, 40.'i P. S. 1017 (Virgini[L law); TlapPk v. 
C'hPvron Oil Co, 407 F. 2d 1120 (C.1\~ 19f\O) (ArkanKas bw); Structnntl 
1mics Resea1'ch Corp. v. Rnginel'l'i11g Merhanirs Research Corp .. .JOl 
' Rupp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mirh. 1!175) (Mirhignn law) ; Reslnlement 
econd) of Agency§ 396 (c) (195~) ("Unlr~s otherwi.<e ngrrrd, aftrr lhr 
minntion of the ngrnc~· the agent: ... (r) h ~l~ n duty to nrcount for 
p~~~:~ade by tho ~a le or u~r of trndr ~rrre1~ :1nd other ronfidrnlial 
inf t 'on, whrthrr or not in rompelition with thr principal. ... "). 
~ akl~ok 
~J..v...,.f ~ 1-a 
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origiu ally laid clo·wn in the seminal cnse of Mitchel v. R ey-
nolds, 1 P. Wms. 181. 24 Enp;. Rep. 347 (171l ), requires tllnt 
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimatn 
interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidenti-
ality), that the employer's interest not be outweip;hed by the 
public intercst,0 anrl that the covenant not be of any longrr 
duration or wider georaphical scope than necessary to protect 
t h c em p 1 oyer's in tercst. 7 
The enforceability of Rnepp's eontractual agreement to snh-
mit to prepublication review is doubtful when the rule of 
reason is applied to it. The interest t a t c breement 
m1s deSigned to protect-the confidentiality of classified in-
for c tio11-has not bef'n offcnclerl. by wh~t Rncpp did: the 
a •. - ..... :1- [l;rf'emcnt i=  intere~ in the nnrestrictecl 
rli.ssemma 10n o unc assi cd i.nforma ion; ancl the commit-
ment was of indefinite dmation and scope-a factor that 
""on]d make most similar covenants unenforceRble.R This \ J-o 
~~ 
,... n \H the Court. held in Herbert Morris. Ltd. Y. Sa:t'l'iby. 1 App. C'nl'. r r HlHll 6(( . 704, the cmplovcr'R intcre~t in prot crt ing j r:~de RC'C'l'CtR dorR 
~'.. . ~ n0t. 0\lhYC'. igh the public intrrrst in krrping the cmplo~·ee in thC' w0rkforre: 
LM...- ~ · · " ... IA]n rmployer rnnlnot] preYent his cmplo~·ee from n:.;ing the 
~ Rkill and knowlrdgC' in his trnde or JlrofeR~ion whi<'b he ha~ lenrnt 
~--~ in the rourBc of hi~ cmplo~·mcnt h~· mean~ of directions or in~trurtionR 
~-0 . fi'Om the employer. That. informntion nne! th:~t aclditimwl skill he i~ 
rnt itlecl to usc for thr bC'ncfi t of himsrl f and 1 he bcnefi t of 1 he pu bl ir 
who gain the ndyantagc of his haYing hnd snrh ndmirnblP in~truetion. ~ The rase in which the Court interfrrr~ for the pmpo~c. of protection i~ 
~ whrrc u~c is mnclc. not of the ~kill whirh the mnn m:1v h~':(' nrqnir<'d, 
, .-~J / lmt of thr scCrE'ts of the trade or profe~,·ion whi r· h he had nn right to 
v~- rrYC'nl to an~· one rlsc .... " 
~ 
7 Rce, e. g .. Brigos v. R. R . Donne/ley <e· Sons Co .. 580 F. 2d 39,41 (CAl 
I f
07R) (Illinois law); AmNican Ifot Rod Assn., lnr. \'.Carrier, 500 F. 2cl 
2()\), 1277 (CA4 Hl74) (North Cnrolin:1 law); Alston Studios, Inc. v. 
~ lo11d V. Gicss <t· Associates, 4~t; F. 2d 270, 282 (CA4 1974) (Viru;inin 
law); Mixing Equipment Co. \'. Philadrlphia. Gear, Inc, 43t) F. 2cl 130R, 
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law); liVater Servi('('S, Inc. v. Tesco Chemi-
cals, Inc .. 410 F. 2cl 163, 167 (Cl\5 1069) (Georgia law); Rr,;tatrment 
(Second) of Contracts § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 12, Mnrrh 1977). 
8 Rec, e. g., Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Giess &: A8sociates, 402 
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combination of factors might " ·ell porsuade a common lnw 
court to hold the covrnant unenforceable in equity. 
But even if the Court were correct n9..,a matter of CQlll.IJ,l.Oll )_., 
~thaTSTiepp's duty to~ jwcp'Uhlicati~ rev~,. was a 
fiduciary duty, the constructive tmRt rr>medy im )Osecl hr>rc 
ployer's confidential 1nfonnation for his own personal profit, ~ 
would not be apprOJ~riaJ:.e. hen an employee uses hi~ em-} 
a constructive trust over those proftts is obviously an appro- ._-- _ 
priate remedy because the profitR arc the direct result of 
the breach. But Rnepp aclmi Ltcclly did not usc confidcn t ia 1 
information in his book; ll £!' were the p!:_2fits fron 1 his _hook I ~ ? 
in any sense a product of his fnilm·e to sub1nit the book for 
pr~; b JH·~;v,·. '?or ~ ,.;71 if RnC'pp had submitt('d 
the book- to th e agency for ]Wopublication review, the Gov-
ernment's censorship authority would ~urely have been limited 
to tho excision of classified matcrinl. In this case, then. it J 4 v-v-'t 
would have heen ... obligcd to clear tho book for publication in ~ 
preci8oly the same form as it 1101v stands.0 Thus. Snepp has LA. ~ ~ 
not p1inrd anv pronts ns a result of h" brf'nrh; the Govern- ~ 
ment, ratl10r than Snrpp. \Yill hr un.iP"il\' cnrirhecl if 1w i~ ~ ~ 
re 'J.H!rocl . to .rli.s~orgr , profits attrilll'tnh1c cntirclv to his own }.,., '" / 
1 Llr>p.:1tlmn.t0 ad1\1ty.~ ~~
with no geographical limi t:1t ion): Amrricrtn !lot Rod Asw., Inc. 1·. Cnr-
rin, 500 F. 2d 1269, 1279 (CA4 Hl7 q (holding vrid unrler l'\orth Caro-
lina law a coYenant with no durntional or r.:rogrnpl,ir:1l limitntion): E. TJ. 
CnnwPll <t· r'n. "· Gutberlet. 429 F. 2cl 5~7, 52~ ((' \4 1970) (holding yoid 
nndcr Mnr~·lancl lnw a eown~mt with no dnr:lf ionn l or grographirnl 
limibtion). 
ti 
9 Tf he had i'ubmit led thr hook to thr ngenr~· nnd thr ngene~· had rr-
m"d to ron~rnt to thr puhlirntion of crrtnin mnlrri:-~1 in it, Snrpp could 
:1rr ob!ninNl jndirinl reYirw to drtrrminr whrth"r tlw :-~gene~· m1s ror-
rrt. in ron~idrring the mttcrial rh~~ifird. Sec United States v. Marchetti, 
Gfl F. 2d 1309. 1317 (CA4 1972), rrrt. dcnird, 409 U. S. 1063. 
10 A~ thr Coml of .-\p]lr·,l~ hrld, to the r~trnt tl:nt thr C10vernmrnt ~"rk~ 
to punish Sncpp for brr:1rhing hi~ ohligntion to ~nbm it thr mnm 1~<·ript 
for prrpnh1ir"1t ion review or to dt·t "I' other" from rngaging in ~imi l:tr 
brcnrhps, punitiYr dnm~1r.:r;; nrr clrnrl~· :1 more npproprinte rcmed~· thnn n 
con~tructive tn18t, " ... ~inrr a ron"trurtivc tn1"t drpend~ on thr con-
cept of unjust enrichment rather than dcterrenrC' nnd puni~hmrnt. Sec 
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Although recognizing that Sncpp dicl not divulge any con-
fidential information in his book, tlw Court nevertheless states ------that the Go\·ernment has been harmed by its publication. It 
Jnakcs this factual determination on 1c asis of testimony 
by the Director of the CIA. Admiral Stansfield Turner, stat-
ing that Snepp's book and others like it have jeopardized the 
CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence services by mak-
ing them unsure of the agency's ability to maintain confi-
dentiahty. Admiral Turner's truncated testimony docs not 
<'Xplain whether these unidentified "other" books actually 
contained classified information (unlikr Snepp's) or whether 
for! ign age!1~ics fear the publication of unclassified in-
formation which Sncpp nml othrr CIJ\ emplovcrs have a 
First Amendment right to disscminatc.11 If th<' fornwr is 
true, I fail to see how Snepp's hook. which does not reveal 
confidencrs. has exacerbated the problem. And if the latter ( 
is true, th<'n thr reluctance of foreign governments to work 
with~1r ~ovcrmncnt must be accepted as a1: incvitablr hy-
n. Dohhs, T.;n,· of Rrmcdi('' s 8.D ;If 201i and § 4.:) at 2·H1 (Hl7.'3) ." lin!i 
F. 2d. nt !107. 
11 Thr Di~trirt . .Tud!!r Fu~t n inrd t hr Gon•rnmf'nt's ob.irrt ion~ to qur::;-
tions conrrrning thr idrntit~· of other ngrnts who harl. puhliRhrd thr nnnn-
thorizrd works to which /\rlmiral Tmnrr rrferrrd. Tr. 1.'3fi. Howrnr, 
Admiral Turnrr did tr~tif~· th·1t thr l1nrmful matrrinb involwd "rplri-
muih· t hP aprrnmnrr in thr Pnit cd RtatrR mPdin of idrnt ifirat ion of 
~curers nnd methods of rollrrting intrlligrnrr .... " Tr. 14.'3. This t~·pr 
of information is CC'ftainl~, ronficlrnti:tl nml is sprcifirall~- tlir t?P<' of in-
formation thnt Sncpp has maintninrd hr did not rc,·rnl in Df'Crnt Intaun1. 
Rrr, e. g., Snepp's Dcrrmhrr 7, 1!l77 intrr\'irw on the Tomorrow show, 
in "·birh he >=tntcd: " ... I hrt\'C madr t1 ver~' dcterminrcl ·rfl'ort not to 
rxposp ROUI'CCS or mrthod~ .... " C:oYrrnment ';; nrqnests for Admissions, 
nrcord Itrm 1!l. 
Snrpp';; attorneys wrrr nl~o forf'rlosrd from a~king Admiral TurnN 
whethN p~rtirnlnr foreign ~ourrrs lwd stopped cooprrating with United 
Rtatrs' aulhoritirs ns n dirert rrsult of thr pnblir:ltion of De,·rnt lnten,a1. 
Tr. 13R. Tim~, it. iR unrlear whrthrr or why forri11:n so11rrr::: m~1,. hnw 
rradrd nnfnvornbly to its puhlirntion. IIowe\W, Willinm F.. Colby. the 
CTA'~ former Director, did indicate in hi~ tr:::timony thnt forrign nntions 
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product of the exerc r of First Amendment rights by gov- ,..., ._ ... ~ 
el·~es. II ~
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on 
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari i.s 
.iust as unprecedented as its clis])Ositi.on of the merits. 
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth 
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunc-
tion requiring him to ~mbmit all future manuscripts for pre-
rmblication review and remanded for a determination of 
whether punitive damages -vvere appropriate' for his hilme to 
snbmit D ecent l11terval to the agency prior to its publication. 
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a cross-
petition for certiorari; the Govrrnment specifically stated. 
ho\\·ever, that it was cross-prtiti.oning only to bring the <'ntirc 
co :;-~ befor~ the Court in the r·:ent that the Court should clPcick 
to grant s~wpp'r.: petition. The Govcrnnwnt rxp1ained thnt 
"[h lrcause the contract rcnwdy provided b:v the court of ap-
ncals appears to be suffirirni in this rase to protect the Agcnc:v's 
intNest, the governmrnt has nnt independc11tly ~ought rcvirw in 
thi" Co11rt." In its ronclndinr: ]lara.gmph tlw GovernPl"nt 
stated that "filf this Court gmnts fRnepp'sl ... petition for a 
writ of crrtiorari in No. 7'R-1R71. it '+onld nlso !?;rant thi~ cross-
1)('-fition. Jf tlw petition in ::\l"o. 7R-1871 iR denied. this p<'t i-
tion -::hould D1so be denied.'' Petition. nt G. 
Given the Government's position. it would be highly inap-
propriate, and perhaps even beyond this Conrt's jnrisdiction. 
to !:!rant the Government's pet1tion while dcnyinf!: Rnrpp's.' 2 
Yet that is in essence what has been done. The majority 
obYious]y does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this 
Court's consideration , for they nre dismissed in :1 footnote ns 
manifestly "without merit." Ante. at 2. n. 0. Tt is clear that 
12 I have been unable to cli~con-r nny preYious cnFe in whirh thr Court 
hn,.; acted as it docs toda)', rcarhing; thr merits of a conditionnl cro~s­
prtit ion despite its belie-f t hn t the petit ion dors not merit g;r:111t ing 
ccrt iorari. 
•. 
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Rnepp'o; 11etition WOlllcl not have been granted on its own 
merits. 
The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this 
Court should not rearh out to decide a question not necessarily 
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact I 
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive 
dnmage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests. the 
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the 
grounrls (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not 
provide tho Government with a "reliable df'ierrent agn.iust 
similar breaches of security," ante, at 6, and (b) that it mi.g:ht 
reqnire thf' Government to reveal confidential information 
in comt. that the Government might forgo d11mages rather 
than make such disclosures, and that the Govcrnmer'\t might 
thus be left with "no remedy at a11," ante, n,t 7. It scc1ns 
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon citl,er 
ground by the Govenl_E!~nt's acquiescence in the 1nni.tiw 
damage remedy. Moreover, the second rationale 1 ~ is entirely - --speculative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wro11g. 
The Court states that: 
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an 
award of punitive damages might force the Government 
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised 
to protect." 
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government 
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving 
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to 
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepubli-
cation review and thRt the Government relied on these mis-
representations to its detriment. I fail to sec how such a 
showinp; vvould require> the CovC'rmncnt to reveal any con-
fidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery 
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 7. 
''~·which, it should be noted, doe~ not apprar anywhere in the Govern-
ment's 5-page cross-petition. 
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III 
Tloe lminhibited rharartcr of todn.y's exercise in lamnnking 
is highlighted by the Court's cJjsrcp;n.rd of tm) ycncrnhlc 
principle.,: th2t favor a 1norr consc•n·atiw approach to this _...., 
C,:JSe. 
First. for cc>nturies the English-·spc~king judiciary refused 
to grant equitable relief unless thr plaintiff could show thnt 
his rrmcd~· at la.w was innclrcpwte. 'Yithout waiting for flll 
o 1portmnty to apprm:.:r t 1r ac c•qWH'f of thr pvnitivc dmn:w:rs 
r0mc>dy in this Cfl-'"C, thr Cnurt h:~s .imnprd to thr ro,lclnsion 
that cqnihhl" relief is nccr~"ary. 
fk•conrl. n nd of ;Yrcntf'r importnncr . t.1r Conrt Sf'rmP. nnn\1 nrr 
of th0 fart t.h'lt its dr11stic nrw rt•nwcly l1a:- been fashio'1rrl to 
0nforrP a epnciPs of prior rcstrnint on a citi't,rn's ri12·ht to 
criticizr his I!Overnmrnt." Inherent in this prior rrstraint is 
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its autl•ority 
to delay tlw publication of a critical work or to persuade an 
a.nthor to modify the eonte11ts of his work bryond the clc-
m::mds of serrecy. The character of tlw covenant as a prior 
rrstrnint 011 frr(' speech c::nrrlY impose•<: an ec::prci::::llv hcnyy 
burclcn on the censor to .i u::;tify thr remedy it seeks. It 
would take more than the Court has written to pcrsur1dc me 
that that burden has been met. 
I rC"'JY'ctfu llv dir.:s01l t. 
1 1 The mrrr f<tri that thr ngrncy hns i hr authority to rrYirw ihr I rxl I 
of a rriiirnl hook in ~enrrh of r!aR~ifird information brforp it is publi~hrd 
is bound to haw an inhibiting rffrrt on the :-~uthor's writing. :.1orroYrr. 
th right t.o drlay publication until thr rrvirw iR completed is it.self a form 
of prior re~traint. that would not be tolernicd in other context:::. Src. 
e. a .. New York 'l'imes Co. v. United Slates, 403 U. S. 71~; Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart. 427 U. S .. 5~0. 
lfp/ss 1/7/80 
Both the District Court and Court of 
Appeals found that publication by a former 
intelligence agent of unreviewed material relating 
to intelligence activities can be detrimental to 
vital national interests even if the information is 
unclassified. If a former agent may rely on his 
own judgment as to what information may be 
detrimental, classified information could be 
revealed by him without the opportunity of the CIA 
- with its broader understanding of what may in 
fact expose secrets or sources - to prevent 
publication. Sources relied upon include the 
foreign intelligence services of friendly nations 
as well as secret agents, often operating in 
foreign countries. The continuing availability of 
these sources would be jeopardized if the CIA could 
not, by the preclearance process prevent 
' 
compromising them and even endangering the safety 
of agents. 
Admiral Turner, director of the CIA 
testified without contradiction ••• 
lfpjss 1/7/80 
As Snepp would have access to highly sensitive 
information, the Agency required as a precondition 
to his employment in 1968 that he execute an 
agreement "not to disclose any classified 
information relating to the Aqency without proper 
~~JLd.d:r? 
authorization." Pet. 58a. ~the same agreement 
1 
Snepp promised not to publish "any information or 
material relating to the Agency its activities or 
intelligence activities generally, either during or 
after the term of [hisl employment> without 
specific prior approval of the Agency." Id., at 
59a. 
lfp/ss 1/7/80 :Footnote ~ J:?~ ; ··tSnepEl 
Despite express findinqs to the contrary 
by the courts below, Mr. Justice Stevens - at the 
outset of his dissent - states that "the interest 
t 
a....v 
~ confidentiality that Snepp's contract was 
" 
designed to protect have not been compromised". 
~' 1. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at 
odds with the record in this case, the dissent 
bifurcates the secrecy agreement of September 16, 
1968, and treats the two interdependent provisions 
thereof as if they were separate and unrelated 
obliqations. Mr. Justice Stevens suqqests that 
~"{~ 
the preclearanceAaqreement is unenforceable under 
common law principles, and analoqizes Snepp's 
undertaking to a "covenant not to compete". He then ' 
argues that it would not survive under the "rule of 
reason". One hardly would have thouqht that an 
analogy drawn from the private world of business 
has the slighest relationship to an express 
agreement entered into pursuant to the National 
Security Act by the Director of the CIA for the 
purpose of "protectinq intelligence sources and 
methods from unauthorized disclosure". 50 u.s.c. 
§403(d)(3). 
lfp/ss 1/7/80 
Greq: Add a footnote along the following lines: 
~/ In belittlinq Admiral Turner's 
testimony, the dissent by Mr. Justice Stevens 
states that if our country loses the cooperation of 
foreiqn intelligenc~ervices this "must be 
accepted as an inevitable byproduct of the exercise 
of First Amendment rights by qovernment employees". 
~' 6, 7. We would not have thouqht that a CIA 
agent with access to sensitive intelliqence 
information can be viewed as just another 
"government employee". Indeed, it is more than a 
little surprising that one would suggest seriously 
that the government of the United States is 
helpless, by virtue of the First Amendment, to 
prevent the disclosure of information vital to the 
security of our country and hence, perhaps, to the 
preservation of all freedoms. 
Nothinq in the decisions of this Court, 
zealous as we have been to protect First Amendment 
rights, justifies the dissent's position. See n. 
3, snpra, and cases cited therein. See also, Mears 
v: - Minnesota, u.s. (19::). In any event 
2. 
~ 
the dissent's argument is irrelevant ~ this case. 
Here we have an express undertaking by Snepp, 
voluntarily assumed as a precondition to being 
employed by the CIA, pursuant to which he agreed to 
the preclearance procedure. 
~ 
lfp/ss 1/9/80 ~evision·of·Proposed · In~ert~B ----
In deprecatinq Admiral Turner's 
testimony, the dissent states that damaqe to our 
nation's ability to cooperate with foreiqn 
intelliqence services "must be accepted as an 
inevitable byproduct of the exercise of First 
Amendment rights by qovernment employees". Fost, 
6, 7. This statement that the government is 
helpless to protect sources of intelliqence 
information that may be vital to the preservation 
of national security or the conduct of foreiqn 
affairs finds no support either in reason or in the 
decisions of this Court. See cases cited, note 3, 
sopra. One would have thought that these 
precedents apply with special force to the Central 
Intelligence Agency and its responsibility to 
protect sensitive intelliqence and sources. In any 
event, the dissent's statement is scarcely relevant 
in liqht of the express obliqation that Snepp 
voluntarily undertook as a condition of his 
employment with the CIA. 
lfp/ss l/9/80 
In deprecating Admiral Turner's 
testimony, the dissent states that damage to our 
nation's ability to cooperate with foreign 
intelligence services "must be accepted as an 
inevitable byproduct of the exercise of First 
Amendment rights by government employees". ~, 
6, 7. This statement that the government is 
helpless to protect sources of intelligence 
information that may be vital to the preservation 
of national security or the conduct of foreign 
affairs finds no support either in reason or in the 
decisions of this Court. See cases cited, note 3, 
~ 
snpra. One would have thought that these 
-'\ 
precedents apply with special force to the Central 
Intelligence Agency and its responsibility to 
protect sensitive intelligence and sources. In any 
event, the dissent's statement is scarcely relevant 
in liqht of the express obliqation that Snepp 
voluntarily undertook as a condition of his 
employment with the CIA. 
l-10-80 
FRANK W. SNEPP, III v. UNITED STATES and 
UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATEIJ 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
PER CURIAM. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). He contends that imnitive damages are an inappro-
priate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublica.tion review. In 
No. 79- 265, the United States conclitionaliy cross:-petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the j udg-
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certaii1 CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish ... any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its Activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his l employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the , Agency without proper authorization." ld., at 58a.i 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge cl<Msified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [ 1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication cleara11ce. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp 's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation conrerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the ,express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepl? already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and othrr potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp'g-
drfenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F . 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F . Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable' 
as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When Suepp accepted employment with tlw CIA, he voluntarily signed 
the agrecm<'Jlt that expre:;::;ly obligated him to :;ubmit any proposed publi-
t•a1ion for vrior review. He doe~ not claim that he executed this agree-· 
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936.4 In other words, 
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. 
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
ment under duress. Indeed, he voluntaril~r reaffirmed his obligation when 
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's 
agre!'mrn1 is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's 
statutory mandate to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorizrd disclosme," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932. 
Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that the Government-even in the 
absence of an express agreement-could have imposed reasonable restric-
tions on Agency employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in 
order to protect substantial gov!'rnment interests. Civil Service Comm'n 
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973) ; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id., at 844-
848 (PowELL, J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972). 
Thr Government has a compelling interest ir• protecting both the secrecy 
of information important to our national security and the appearance of 
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intel-
ligence service. See p. 5, infra. The agreement that Snepp signed is a 
rem;onable means for protecting this vital interest. 
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United StateB 
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreement not to publbh an~· classified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1313. Marchetti therefore did not con,.:idN the appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue 
in Marchetti. 
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial- could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were boh a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con-
structive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship.5 The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance. 
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obliga-
tion- he had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified 
information , including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
Ill , understand that UJ1on entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agrncy, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
CoVlernment. . . . , Pet . 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
Snepp'~ duties and his conceded nccess to confidential sources and ma-
terial;; could rstablish a trust relationship. See 595 F . 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man , .T., concnrring in part and dissrnt.ing in part). Few types of 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that. 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Shepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intellige11ce agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources. the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire. What-
cvrr fairly rna~· be :;aid about ::;ome of its past activitie::;, the CIA (or it:! 
predcces~or the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since 
Franklin D . Roo, evelt to be e::;sential to the ;;erurity of the United States 
and-in a sense-the free world. It i~ impossible for a government wi;;ely 
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defr>nse with-
out. tlw benefit. of dependable foreip:n intelligencr . Sre generally T. Powers, 
The Man Who Kept th(' S<'crets (1979}. 
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security of information that might compromise them and 
evell endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operatious. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
8 In deprrcnting Admiral Turnrr's iestimony, Mn. Jus•rrcE S•rEVENs' 
di:;Henting opinion declares that damage to our Nation'i:l ability to cooperatr 
with forrign intelligence servires "mnf;t b, accepted as an inevitable 
byproduct of the exercise of First Amendment rights by govemment 
employees.'' Post, at 6-7. This notion tlwt the Government is helpless 
to protE-ct Hoorces o·f intelligence which may br vital to the preservation 
of national security and the conduct of foreign nffairs finds no support 
either in rrason or in the decii:lions of thi~:J Court.. We have held con-
si:;tentl~· that the Government can rrst rirt its employees' exercise of their 
Fir~t Amendment rights in order to protect substantial government inter-
<'sts. See ra~e;; cited, at n. 3, supra. Onr should have thought that those 
prrerdent~ applied with i:iperial forcr to a CIA agPnt who had access to 
Ren:;itiw intrlligence. In any !:'vent, thp d],;:;ent 's statPment is scarcely 
relevant in light of thr exprl.'~,; obligation that Snepp voluntarily tmdertook 
as~~~ cbnditioll of his employment with the CIA. 
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.0 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
0 Although hoth the District Court and thr Court of Apprals expn·~sly 
found othrrwi::;e, :\IR . .Tus'l'ICE STEVENs say:-< that "the intrrrst in l'on-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract wnl' de~igned to protect has not been 
eompromisrd." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on tlw basi~ of a premi::w wholly nt 
oddi:i with thr rrcord, the dissent bifmcate$ Surpp's 1968 agreement And 
treatH its interdeprndent provisionH as if they imposed unrelated obliga-
tions. MR. JusTICE S'!'EVENS then analogize~ Snepp's prepublication revif'w 
agrf'ement with the Government to n privatr employee's covrnant not to 
compete with hi rmployer. A bod~· of private law intended to preserve 
eomprtition, howrver, simp!~· ha:> no bearing on a contract made by the 
Director of thP CIA in conformity with his statutory obligatiou to 
"proterrtJ intdligence sources and mf'thodH f10m unauthorized disclosure." 
50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 
10 .Tudgr Hoffman'~ di~sent suggel:lt:'< that fvrn this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
938. 
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a. 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would thf' Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing. law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risk!l, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust. 11 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we rein-
state the full judgment of the District Court. 
11 SrE' id., at 939 (Hoffman, .J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . 
1\TR .. lt'::>'l'IV~' .. TE\'ENH ('OnC'rdl':< that, ('V<'ll in thr ab8ence of n writtrn 
contract , an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3. 
He also eoncrdes that all pert;anal profit;; gainrd from the exploitation of 
such information are impressed with a con~tructive tru:;t in favor of the 
crr'lployet . 11ost , at 5, In this rase, he ~eems to think that the common 
... 
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law would not treat information as " confidential" unles~ it were "classified." 
Sec, e. g., post. at 3. We havr thought that the cornmon-IHw obligation 
wa>i con~iderably more expansive. Srr, e. g .. Hr:;tatement (Srcond) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comment:; b, d (1958); 
V Scott on Trusts § 505 ( 1967). But since this ca::;e involvrs R written 
contract ~Jwcificnlly designed to prevent thr disclo:;ure of confidrutial 
information, we have no occasion to lingrr over that question. Therr i~ 
no nerd to invoke common-law principles in order to impose a con:-;tructive 
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tn No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment en~orc·6g an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted emp,l yment with the. ?enttal lntelligence. Agency 
(CIA). He ·ohtends that iJumtive damages are an mappro-
priate reme~y for the breach of his promise to submit ali 
writings about the Agency for prepubiication review. In 
No. 79- 265, the tJ nited States conditionaliy cross,. petitions 
from a judginent refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg-
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certai!1 CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, h-e-wev8l', Snepp had 
executed an agreem~n~promising - that--he would "not ... 
\ publish ... any information or material relating to the 
) 
" Agency, its hctivites or inteiligence activ1tes generally, either · 
during or after the term of [his] employment ... with- ,.,-T~ 
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. q'i(e 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the . Agency without proper authorization." ld., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of: his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the express written consent of the Director of Central 
IntelligPnce or his representative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp'S' 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable-
as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When Snepp accepted employment with thr CIA, he voluntarily signed 
the ngrN'ment that exprl":;;;ly obligated him to submit any propot;l"d publi-
c~tion fur vrior review. He doe; not claim that he executed fhis agree-· 
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
''irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
11ational security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936.4 In other words, 
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. 
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
mrnt undrr duress. Indred, hr voluntarily reaffirmrd his obligation when 
he left thr Agenc~·· We agrl:'e with the Court of Appeals that Snl:'pp's 
agrrrment is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Dirl:'ctor's 
statutory mandate to "protrcft] intf'iligl:'nce sources and methods from 
1111authorized disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § 40:3 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932. 
Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that the Government-even in the 
absence of an express agreemPnt-could havP imposed reasonable restric-
tions on Agency employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in 
order to protect substantial government interests. Civil Service Comm'n 
v. Lette1· Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); .Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); id., at 844-
848 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972). 
The Government has a compelling interest ir' protPcting both the secrl:'cy 
of information important to our national srcurity and the appearance of 
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intel-
ligence service. See p. 5, infra. 'The agrl:'ement that Snepp signed is a 
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest. 
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimrd that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agrrement. not to publi:<h an~· classified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1318. Marchetti therefore did not considrr the appropriatl:' remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
looked the difference between Snepp's brea.ch and the violation at issue 
in Marchetti. 
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial- could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote . "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." !d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were b<J:. a speculative -+-
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con-
structive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship.5 The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance. 
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obliga-
tion- he had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified 
information , including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. HP deliberately and surreptitously 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
5 Tho first ~entence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in tha.t Agency of the 
Go\llernment ... _,, Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature or 
Snepp's dtlties and his conceded access to confidential sources and ma-
terials could Pstablish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types or 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that. 
reposed in a ClA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified informa.tion with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources. the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire. What-
cvrr fairly may be said about f:ome of it8 past activities, the CIA (or its 
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the serurity of the United States 
and-in a sense-the free world. It is impossible for a. government wisely 
to make critical deci~ions about foreign policy and national defPn~e with-
out the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, 
The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979). 
,• 
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security of information that might compromise them and 
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us tbat they are very 
nervous about continuing work with· us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you bow many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
8 In let)l'f'8atiRg AdmirHI Turnrr's testimony, MR. JuSTICE STEVENS' 
di~~enting opinion declares that damagr to our Nation's ability to cooperate 
with forrign intelligence services "mn;;t bP accepted as an inrvitable 
byJH'odnct of thr exercisr of Fin;t Amrndment rights by government 
employres." Post, Ht 6-7. This notion that the Government is helple::;s 
to protect sources of intelligencr which m!ly br vital to the prrserva t ion 
of nl\tional security and tbr conduct of foreign affairs finds no support 
uiflw.t:.. in ~(·nsen er in the deci::;ions of this Court. We have hdd con-
~istrntl:v that the Governmrnt cll!l rr ·t tirt its employees' exercise of their 
Firo;t Amendment rights in order to protect substantial government inter-
ests. See <'a.se::; cited, at n. 3, supra. Onr ;fuould have thought that tho::;e 
prrcf'clrnt:-; applird with i:lpecial forcr to a CIA agrnt who had acres:-; to 
AensitivP intrllig('nce. In any ev('nt, t h(' diss<:'nt's stat('ment is scarcely 
rclrvant in light of the rxpr<'ss obligation that Snrpp voluntarily und<:'rtook 
UH ~~ <'blldition of his employmrnt with the CIA. 
7~t, 
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the Uuited States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.0 · 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
0 Although both the District Court and thr Court of Ap]wals expre:ssly 
found otherwi~(', ::VTR . .JusncE STEVENs saY~ that "the interest in con-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract waR de:signed to protect has not bePn 
compromi::wd ." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on tlw ba:;i:; of a premil:W wholly at 
odds with the record, the dissent bifnrcate;; SnPpp's 1968 agreement :md 
treats its interdependent provision~ as if they imJlO::>ed unrelated obliga-
tions. MR . .JusTICE S·rEVENS then analogizet:: Snepp's prepublication revi""w 
agreement with the Goverpment to a private employee's covenant not to 
compete with his employE'!'.,\ A bod~· of private law intended to pre:::erve 
competition, however, simp!~· has no bearing on a contract made by the 
Director of t h(' CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to 
" proter[t] intelligence sources and methodR from unauthorized disclosure." 
50 U . S. C . § 403 (d) (3). 
10 .Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
dama~res only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937-
938. 
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a. 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. ·Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable riskfl, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust. 11 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
' ____=se a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and ~{P@ii-
~ =::..:: the full judgment of the District Court. ...f ... , 
. 
tL See id .. at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and di~senting in part). 
1\fR . .Tu::;Trcf: , n:vENH conerdf>,.: that, t>vrn in thr abo;ence of a written 
contract, an rmployee ha:.; a fiduci~try obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the courtlP of bis Pmployment. Post, at 3. 
ftp al~o roncrdes that all pPrso nal profit:.; gai!H'd from the exploitation of 
tluch info'rmation are imprPs ·ed with n con~tructive trust in favor of the 
employer. Por>t, at 5, In thiR raHe, he sPems to think that the common 
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law would not treat information a~ "ronfidPntial" unle:;s it were "classified." 
:SN·, e. g., post. nt 3. We hav<' thou~ht that thP eommon-law obligation 
was considNably more expansive. Set', e. g .. Rrstatement (SPrond) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Commrnt c, 404 and Comment:; b, d (1958); 
V Scott on Trusts § 505 (1967). But since this casP involves n written 
contract :;ppcificnlty designed to prevPnt thP disclosure of confidential 
information, we have no occasion to lin~<>r over that quPstion. There i:; 
no nePd to invoke common-law prinripl<>s in order to impose a com;tructive 
trust on Snepp':; profits. 
To: The Crdd' Jc1stice 
Mr. Jw:;t1ce Brannan 
Mr. Just1ne Stewart 
Mr. JusttcH l!l'hite 
Mr. Juetic€ .Wraha.ll 
Mr. Justice Blaokmun 
Mr. Justjce R!')hnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevena 
)IJ 
From: Mr. Justice Powell 
..le!C'DRAFT 
Circulated: 2 7 NOV 1979 
FRANK W. SNEPP, III v. UNITED STATES and 
UNITED STATES v. FRANK W SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Dec1ded Oct.ober -, 1979 
PER C'VRIAM . 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
ce )ted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
. ~-l--(i;C'::::I:"';'A"7)-. 1 In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally 
cross-petitions from a Judgment refusing to find that profits 
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreeme.!tare impressed 
w1th a constructive trust. We grant the petitions for cer-
tiorari in order to J:4iin~pose t,he ~H&truGtlVIS- tl/lst found b~ 
th~~ t... ~ 
I 
.::::,~..-4C!.G; 
}'-"' ci.J ........ ~ .,c..,.""" 
,_n_,-& L-... lodft... 
,<'~ $ k. 
~!:£'_(:! 
Based on his ex.J2_eriences as a CIA agent Snepp published 
G ook highly g~iga~ certam CIA activities in South Viet- La=ho....,f I n. Snepp ptiblishect the account without submitting it to e Agency for prepublication review. AHhe/tm.e he~ ~~.... ~~employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had c :./.1 
executed an agreement promising that he would "not . . . f....rs 
publish .. any Information or material relating to the 
Agency, 1ts acti vites or intelligence activites generally, either 
dunng or after the tf'rm of [his J employmf'n t with-
out specific pnor approval ~h,e Agency.'' Pet. 59a. The J~·....,f~...-c;>/ 
mise was IR tuldi~Ot+-*A.all~ m ~~d ~ Snepp's concurrent r+ "f 
rtaking "not to disclose any classified informatiOn relating ...__-~----l 
1e Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a,1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also__.,--
executed a "termination serrecy agreement." Tha1 document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any class1fied ml'ormntwn, or any in-
;;z....re,.. ~ ;V\~r'~~·,.i 7/ 
~~~~e. -h:> sc.-c..~._;.f all 
/ t<''-' 1:-,/t~ ~,4~ ..-.z..vl ~ .J. 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge clasS'ified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings _for prepublica-tion review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 'The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officia1s into believing that he 
w uld submit the book for prepublication clearance./Th_e_,D~is-----, 
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches fJ Snepp's 
agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA . .. without the •express written consent of the Director of Centraf 
Intelligence or hi. representative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978) . 
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, ,.., 
Sm·pp relies primarily on the claim that hi;; agreement is unenforceable: 
~ts a prior rrst.raint on Jlrotected speech. 
AS"1:he Gouf't ef Aprleals hffi:l, tl+e·elzcim i~ wit-hot~.Ji> When Snepp h' 
acrepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed th · :r'grcement 11 
that expressly obligated him to submit any propo~ed pub atwn for pnor 
review. He does not claim that he executed thi~ agrr nent under duress. 
r----------~~n_dced, he voluntarily reaffirmed hiH obligation when he left. the Agency. 
Moreover, thi;; Court 's cases make clear that the Government- even in the> 
absence of an express agreement-could have imposed reasonable re~1ric"-
!lons on Agency employee~§' exercbe of their FirHt Amendment rights 111' r---------------
F; .... att-,, -! L..e. c.~or-t t:k fe-~ ......... ;I.Ae..,{;l.. a~ a ~f{:..+ +t..2:f ro'""·&/,r..m . f.;~ 
P ( ·l t.. ~ ~ h. -a-~ "'c..;:;CA-Ge..,Q., <~·he U-ir·-...a... Sr.:trl . .s 
..___t_~~'"'_re-y!~.,(e,l I ..._ ~~ /t.'1's . ... ~-, ;;t . .f _1_9"1>_ . ______ _. 
1/Je... ~,.,.e.e. v.A.f-i- -t-Le- C..-...-f- .::r( /1-~f#._.,(s. ~;;;rf- S-e.t<7;<7!s 
-:;;!' rtl! --. f ; ~ ..-:;t"' ·~ ,l; £L, CJ.;<'~'".,</ ,...;/!3. fla_"' IJ...?<e- .rc.i :!JQ. o-f ~ C; A 
l)i.re-e-...fr:,-,-'._; .sfa.f-,..ftr..r':1 ,__...~e()..i!1.-fe_ -f7> '"",..,.....,-cftJ.c.IJ) ,'., f-e./f,· "'j --~ So-o-<orc..e.S 
-a..-.61. ~ 71--t:rt::f)t; ./)r- "! .,._.,t-..it. -.ri"if:.t: (") cf4$&../4S-f."'v-e_ - S?> u # ~ - a. .. 
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~.also~;re!f- that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript .,...S_p_e._(;:._,jt2--=c...~:l-1<-L-_--, 
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on m -r 
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F . a,.,..-.,.. . .....,.a..J:J. -lt...e.. 
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979) . Thus, the ·court upheld the injunc- .jl.,..,tfl-;-·~ 
tion against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obli-
gation. The court, however, concluded that the record did 
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclu-
sion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First 
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the 
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigation-
that Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. l d., at 
935-936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's 
fiduciary obligation extended only to---Preserving the confi-
dentiality of classified material. /lf"'therefore limited recovery 
to nominal damages and to thefPossibility of punitive damages 
if the Government-in a jury trial-could prove tortious 
cond 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. He- recognized that-Snep)? 
had assumed two distinct obligations, one to protect classifie~ 
iffie.rma.ti{}n and th other to- submit all manuscripts for pr~ 
,.,.--""\,P_u_b_l_ica._. t_ion rev.ie,.w.. Both a.idect the- CIAilL preserving nece~ 
order to J1rot.ect. substantial government. interests. Civil Service Comm'n 
v. Letter Ca1Tier8, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973) ; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976) ; Gree1· v. Spoc/,;, 424 U. S. 828 (1976) ; id., at. 844-
848 (PowELL, .L, concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U. S. 676 (1972) . 
Thr Govrrnmen1 bas a iuhst~~ interest in protecting both the secrecy 
of informatiOn important to our national secur1ty and the appearance of 
eonfidentia.lit.y so es~ential to the pffecttve o]wrat.ion of our foreign intel-
ligellco service. Sec p. 5, infm. The agreement that SncrJP signed is a 
rea8onable me:m~ for protrcting this vital intere::lt . 
4 The Government's conces8ion distinguished this case from United StateS' 
v. Ma1·chett1 , 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972) . 
There, the Government cln.nned that a former CIA employee intended tn 
violate bis agrrement tlot to puhli~l1 any cla~8ified informatwn . 460 F. 2d, 
nt 1:3la. Ma.rchett·t thPrefore did not consid(•J' the appropriatr rrmcdy fol' 
the breach of a11 agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review . By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-






SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
saq~ --COnfide.u.tialitjl-.and discharging effectively the dut~ 
imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that bo}f 
obligations derived from the same- trust relationship, and ~ 
saw no basi,s fer finding that a trust-existed as to one but ll]2! 
the-other;;~ The 1968 agreement, he wrote, "was no ordinary 
contract; it gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested 
in Snepp the trust of the CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication 
clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confi-
dences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge 
Hoffman argued, were both a speculative andUnappropriate 
remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with Judge Hoffman 
~
that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation and that the pro-
ceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust. - II · 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship.5 The trust agTeement specifi-
cally Imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance. 
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obliga-
tion-he had been "assigned to various positiO\lS of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequeut access to classified 
information, including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.r. Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
~ound and exposure. He deliberatelyjviolated his obliga- a,...J 5 ..... ..-.,..e.J4-h·fcws£, 
·~· l: . 
5 Tho first; sentenee of the 1968 agreement read : " I, Frank W. Snepp, 
Ill, understand that upon rntering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position o! tru~t 111 that Agency of the 
GoV'ernment .... " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
Snepp's dutie:;; and his conccoded acce~s to confidential sources and ma-
terials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, J ., eoncurring in part and di:::sentmg in part) . Few types or 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
'· I' 
-tion to submit all material for prepublic · ion review. Thus, 
he exposed the classified information with which he had been 
entrusted to the risk of disclosure. - Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Goverument's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust . 
.........--The undisputed evidence in this ease sho-ws-t.S.art-publicati~ 
T by a former intelligence agent-Of-in.for.matiGn relating to int~ 
li.ge.n.ce activitiss-ean.. be detrimental to our national inter~ 
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, ~ 
rec~r- G£-the. CIA, testifie~ that Snepp's book and others hke 
it have seriously impai!ied the effectiveness of American intel-
ligence operations. "Over the last· six to nine months," he 
said, 
"we have had a mimber of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formatiOn with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwi!Hng -to enter into business with us. " 456' 
F . Supp., at 179- lSO.'o/ 
~neF-agents· ma.y rely o:n their own ,iudgmeHt-about wha~ 
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INSERT A 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to 
vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment 
about what information is detrimental, he may reveal information 
that the CIA--with its broader understanding of what may expose 
classified information and confidential sources--could have 
identified as harmful. In addition to receiving intelligence from 
domestically based or controlled sources, the CIA obtains 
information from the intelligence services of friendly nations 7 
and from agents operating in foreign countries. The continued 
availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's 
ability to guarantee the fs ecurity of information that might 
compromise them and even endanger the personal safety of foreign 
agents. 
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA 
agent's violation of his obligation to submit writings about the 
Agency for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to 
perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction 
NO. 78-1871: SNEPP V. U.S. 
INSERT B 
~ In deprecating Admiral Turner's testimony, MR. 
JUSTICE STEVENS' dissenting opinion declares that damage to our 
Nation's ability to cooperate with foreign intelligence services 
"must be accepted as an inevitable byproduct of the exercise of 
First Amendment rights by government employees." Post, at 6-7. 
This notion that the Government is helpless to protect sources of 
intelligence which may be vital to the preservation of national 
security and the conduct of foreign affairs finds no support 
either in reason or in the decisions of this Court. We have held 
consistently that the Government can restrict its employees' 
exercise of their First Amendment rights in order to protect 
substantial government interests. See cases cited
1
at n~ 3, 
@ 
supra. One should have thought that those precedents applied with 
special force to a CIA agent who had access to sensitive 
intelligence. In any event, the dissent's statement is scarcely 
' . 
\ . . 
relevant in light of the express obligation that Snepp voluntarily 
undertook as a condition of his employment with the CIA. 
; 
J 
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~nd the. foreign agents r-ecruited by the CIA cann~ 
~-0-f th8-~Ct:ecy'-Upo.n.-whi.ch-their -cooperation ~ 
~ In view of this and other evidence in the record, botli 
the District Gourt and the Court. of Appeals recognized that 
Si1epp'syt6"ach of his oxplicit obligation to submit his ma-
. terial-jClassified or not-for prepublication clearance has irrep-
arably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180~1'his was 110 or~r~ t;p 
~~gntr.a.Gtual .obligation. ·rt- -was a- deliberate-
hreMh of ..a.. very special trust relationship with ou 
G&v 1ment 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication sucb as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. 1.'he punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government could not pursue th<' only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it..q without losing the benefit of 
...-...... 7 Evrry major nation in thr world has an iutPiligmce Rervtcr What-
( 
cvPr fairly may lw ~aid about ~:>omP of tt>< JlH>-f artiv1tir", the CIAJ2s 
an agency thought by every Pre:;idE'nt since Fra.nklm D . Roosrvelt to oe 
\ 
t'SSentml to. the sert~rity or tlw United Sta!es and-m a ":~se-the. ~ree 
world. It Ji:! Impos::nblr for a government wisely to make cntJcal deciSions 
about foreign polic) and na'tiona1 defent~e without the benefit of dependable 
forr1gn intelligence. Sec generally T . Power::;, The Man Who Kept the 
~ (1979) 
fO/ '.Judge Hoffman'H dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
/ available If the Government must bring suit in a State that allows pumtive 
damages only upon proof of eompPn:::atory damage:::. 595 F . 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Apprals majority, however, hrld HS a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trwst agree-
c~ ;~ 
~ c. .. s#"'t) 
+~ t>SS) 
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INSERT C 
\){ Although both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals expressly found otherwise, MR. JUSTICE STEVENS says that 
"the interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract was 
designed to protect has not been compromised." Post, at 1-2. 
Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at odds with the record, 
the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and treats its 
interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated 
obligations: MR. JUSTICE STEVENS then analogizes Snepp's 
prepublication review agreement with the Government to a private 
employee's covenant not to compete with his employer. A body of 
private law intended to preserve competition, however, simply has 
no bearing on a contract made by the Director of the CIA in 
conformity with his statutory obligation to "protec[t] 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." 
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the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduc~ 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences tha . 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant ~o elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust~ It deals fairly with both parties by con- \!Y 
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refusecvl . to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we rein-
state the full judgment of the District Court. 
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937~-
938. /J' ,-M! See id., at 039 (I-Ioffwan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part , 
"/ _.. ]:. 'V'S -.,.,f- p 
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1( ~/ MR. JUSTICE STEVENS conceeds that, even in the absence 
of a written contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to 
protect confidential information obtained during the course of his 
employment. Post, at 3. He also conceeds that all personal 
profits gained from the exploitation of such information are 
impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the employer. 
Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common law 
would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were 
"classified." See, e.g., post, at 3. We have thought that the 
common law obligation was considerably more expansive. See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Agency§~ 396(c), 400 and Comment c, 404 
and Comments b, d (1958); V Scott on Trusts§ 505 (1967). But 
since this case involves a written contract specifically designed 
to prevent the disclosure of confidential information, we have no 
occasion to linger over that question. There is no need to invoke 
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In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement 
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency 
any information he intended to publish about it for prepubli-
cation review.1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the 
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor 
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classi-
fied, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the 
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926, 
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972) , cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit 
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for 
prepublication review. However, the Government has con-
ceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic ma-
teriaP Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality 
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made 
the same commitment. 
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that 
" ... Decent Intel'val contains classified information or any information 
concPrning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA," 
the Government stuted that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintiff does 
not so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession, 
the district judge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts 
to determine whether Decent Intel'val in fact contains information that 
Lhe Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral 
Stun!lfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu, 
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153. 
__ .. 
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that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been 
compromised. Nevertheless. the Court today grants the Gov-
ermnent unprecedented a11d drastic relief in the form of a 
eonstructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the 
sale of the book. Because that remedy is not authorized by 
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for 
the Court to dispose of this novel issue summarily on the 
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I re-
spectfully dissent. 
1 
The rule of law the Court. announces today is not supported 
by statute, by the coutract, or by the common law. Although 
Cougress has enacted a number of criminal statutes punishing 
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified 
inforn1ation,3 it has not see11 fit to authorize the constructive 
trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor does either of the 
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such 
remedy in the event of a breach.4 The Court's per curiam 
opiuion suggests that its result is supported by a common-law 
blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts. But lleither 
of these branches of the common law supports the imposition 
of a constructive trust under the circumstances of this case. 
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a set-
tlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for 
8 See, e. (!., 18 U. S. C. § 798, whieh imposes a prison term of 10 years 
and a $10,000 fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certain types of 
cla&;ified information; 18 U. S. C. § 794, which makes it a criminal offense 
punishable b~· life in prison to communicate national defense information 
to a foreign government; and 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdmws the 
right to govemment retirement be11efits from a pcrl:ion eonvicted of violat-
ing these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401, 
which provide:; aclministrativ£' ::<unctions, including discharge, against em-
ployees who publish clal:!Sfied information. 
4 In both his original employment agreement and the termination agree-
ment Snepp acknowledged the criminal penalties that might attach to any 
publication of clas::;ified information. In his employment agreement he-
also agreed that <L breach of the agreement would be cau~:~e for termina-
tion of his employment. No other remedie:; were mentioned in either 
agreemeut. 
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the use alHl benefit of designated be11eficiaries. Rather, iL is 
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses 
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his 
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the 
common law even in the absence of a writteu employmeut 
agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified" 
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the com-
mon law would support the implicatiou of a constructive trust 
upon the beuefits derived from his misuse of confidential 
information. 5 
But Snepp did not bre~:~:ch his duty to protect confidential 
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, im-
posed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to 
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the im-
position of a constructive trust. the majority attempts to 
equate this coutractual duty with Snepp's duty not to dis-
dose, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in 
the common law to support such an approach. 
Employment agreements often contain covenants designed 
to ensure in various ways that au employee fully complies 
with his duty 11ot to disclose or misuse confidential informa-
tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to com-
pete. Contrary to the majority's approach in this case. the 
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply 
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they 
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary, 
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an in-
dividual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable ouly if they 
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." That rule, 
5 See, e. g., Sperry Rand Corp. 1'. A- 1'-0, Inc. , 447 F. 2d 1387, 1392 
(CA4 1971), cert .. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia la.w) ; 1'lapek v. 
r'hfvron Oil r'o .. 407 F . 2d 1129 (CA~ 1969) (ArktUl;;a:; law) ; Strurturul 
DJI'namil's R fsearch Corp. v. Engiueel'ing Merhanics Research Corp., 401 
F. Supp. 110'2, ll:lO (ED Mich. 1975) (),Iichignn law); Restntemeut 
(Sf>rOHd) of Agency§ ;{96 (e) (1951-1) ("lJnle~;; otherwise agreed, aft<'r the 
termination of the agency the agPnt: ... (e) ha;; n duty tQ account. for 
proti.t s madCI by the ~ale or U>'( \ of trade 1<Pcret~< and otht>r ronfidt>ntial 
information, whether or 110t iu c·om}wtition with the principal. • , ."), 
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originally laid do\\11 in the seminal case of M·itchel v. Rey-
nolds, 1 P. Wms. 181. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), requires that 
the covcnaut Le reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate 
interest of the employer (such as an interest iu confidenti-
ality), that the em player's interest not be outweighed by the 
public interest,6 and that the covenant not be of any longer 
rluration or wider georaphical scope than necessary to protect 
the employer's interest.7 
The enforceability of Rnepp's contractual agreement to sub-
mit to prepublication review is doubtful when the rule of 
reason is applied to it. The interest that the agreement 
was desiglled to protect-the confidentiality of classified in-
formation- has not been offended by what Rnepp did; the 
agreement is contrary to the public interest in the unrestricted 
dissen1ination of unclassified information; and the commit-
ment was of indefiuitf' duration and scope--a factor that 
would make most similar covenants unenforceable.8 This 
0 A,; thr rourt hrld in Herbert Morns, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. Cas./ 
rJ916) fi8b, 704, thr employrr':-; inti'J'P:;t in protecting tmdr ~!'('l'Ct~ does 
11o!, out wei!,(h the public in!NP~t in kreping thP em11loyee in t h<' workforce: 
" ... IA]u Pmplo~·<·r l'anj"notl llfl'Vl'llt. his t>mployPf' from using the 
~>kill u,nd knowledgr in hiR tradr or proff'~sion which hr has Je,~rnt 
in tlw l"our::;r of hi1-1 rmplo~·mrnt by 1U<'all>' of dirrdion~ or in~tructions 
from the employl'l'. That information and that. additional ~kill he is 
eutitlrd to nse for thr benefit. of himself ami the benefit of the public 
who gain the advautn!!,'e of his having bt~d :;ueh admirable im;truction. 
The case in which the Court. interft>res fur the purpo~<' of prutrction is 
whrre use i~< made, uot of the ~<kill which the man ma? have acquired, 
but of the st>cret::; of the t mdP or profes:;ion which he had no right to 
n•vcal to an~· onr else .... " 
7 See, e. g .. Bl'iggs v. R. R. Do11nelley & Sons Co., 589 F. 2d 39, 41 (CAl 
1H78) (Illinois law); American lfot Rod A8sn .. Inc . '· Carrie1·, 500 F. 2d 
12fi9, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina hLw) ; Alstoll Studios. Inc. v. 
Lloyd V. Gil:'ss t~ Associates. ~92 F . 2d :279. 2S:2 (CA4 197-!) (Virginia 
hw) ; !llixing Equip111ent C'o . , .. Philadelphia Gear. l11c .. -!:36 F. 2d 1308, 
1312 (CA:3 1971) (New York law): Watel' Servir·es. Inc. v. 'l'esco Chemi-
tals, I nr•., 410 F . 2d 163, 1G7 (CA5 HHi9) (Georgia law); T{p,;latc•mcnL 
(Sec·ond) of Ccmtml'ts § 330 (Teut .. DrafL No . 12, }.Jarch 1977) . 
8 See, e. y., AMon Studios, Inc. \'. Lloyd V. Giess & A8sociates, 492' 
F. 2d 279, 2KB (('A4 1974) (holding void IUHlcr \'irginia law lL covenant 
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com.bination of factors might well persuade a common law 
court to hold tho covenant unenforceable in equity. 
But even if the Court were correct as a matter of common 
law that Snepp's duty to seek prepublication review was a 
fiduciary duty, the constructive trust remedy imposed here 
would not be appropriate. When an employee uses his em-
ployer's confidential information for his own personal profit, 
a constructive trust over those profits is obviously an appro-
priate remedy because the profits are the direct result of 
the breach. But Rnepp admittedly did not use confidential 
information in his hook; nor were the profits from his book 
in any sense a product of his failure to submit the book for 
prepublication review. For even if Suepp had submitted 
the book to the agency for prepublication review, the Gov-
ernment's censorship authority would surely have been limited 
to the excision of classified material. In this case, then, it 
would have been obliged to clear the book for publication in 
precisely the same form as it now stands.0 Thus, Sllepp has 
not gained any profits as a result of his breach; the Goveru-
ment, rather than Snepp, will be unjustly enriched if he is 
required to disgorge profits attributable entirely to his own 
legitimate activity.10 
with no gt.'Ogr~q>hieal limit:tlion): Amel"ican llot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Ca1·· 
1·ier, 500 F . 2d 12o9, 1279 (('A~ 1\JH) (holding void uncln North Caro-
lina htw a covenant with no dura.tioual or g<>ographieal limit <ttion); E. L. 
Conwell & Co. v. Gutbel'let. 42H F . 2d 527, 52R (CA4 1970) (holding void 
under Maryland law u. covenm1L with no dmatiomd or geographical 
limitation) . 
9 lf he had submitted the book to the a~enc·y and tlw agency had re~ 
fused to eou,;Pnt to the pni.Jliention of PPrtaiu material in it, Snepp could 
have obtained jndieial rrviPW to d<'t<'rmin<> whethrr the agency was cor-
rect in l'Ol1>'Jdering lh<' material elaR:;ifi<>d . See United States\. Marchetti, 
466 F. 2d 1309, 1;317 (CA4 1972), r<'r1. d<'uied, 409 U. S. 10G3. 
10 As the Court of Ap[wal~ held, to the extent that the (iovernm<>nt seek~:~ 
to ptmi~h Snrpp for ])J'(•aehing hi ,.; obligntion to ~ubmit th<> manu~cript 
for pn·pub!Jration n·vil'w or to ddPr oth<>rl:l from engaging iu ::;imilar 
brearhe,.;, punitivo dttllHII):<'-' :tr<> rl<·arl~· a more appropriate remedy than a 
con:;trurt ivo tru:;t., 1' ••• ~incr n t·o nst nwtiv<> tru:;t depend~ on the con-
cept of 11njn:;t <'Jil'i<·htnPnt rather than deterrence and puni:;hnwnt. See 
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Although recognizing that Suepp did not divulge any con~ 
fidential information in his book, the Court nevertheless states 
that the Govermuent has been harmed by its publication. It 
makes this factual determination on the basis of testimony 
by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turucr, stat· 
ing that Snepp's book and others like it have jeopardized the 
CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence services by mak· 
ing them unsure of the agency's ability to maintain confi-
dentiality. Admiral Tumer's truncated testimony does not 
explain whether these unidentified "other" books actually 
contained classified informatiou (unlike Snepp's) or whether 
foreign agencies fear the publication of unclassified in-
formation which Snepp and other CIA employees have a 
First Amendment right to dissemiuate. 11 If the former is 
true, I fail to see how Snepp's book, which does not reveal 
confidences, has exacerbated the problem. And if the latter 
is true, then the reluctance of foreign governments to work 
with our government must be accepted as au inevitable by-
D. Dobb:;:, Law of Rcmcdie~ § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246 (1973)." 595 
F. 2d, at 937. 
11 The Di8trid .Tndge su~tained the Government's objeciions to ques-
tions con<'<>rning the identitr of other agents who had published the unau-
thorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 130. However, 
Admiral Turner did trstify that the h:mnful ma,lerial::; involved "[p]ri-
marily the appearnncr in the United States media of identification of 
r:;onrces and method::; of collPcting intelligence .... " Tr. 14a. This type 
of information i~ certmnly <'onfidrutial and is specifically the type of in-
formation that Snf'pp has maintained he did not revral in Decent Interval. 
See, e. g., Snepp's Decrmber 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show, 
in which he l:itated: " ... I have made a very determined effort not to 
ex)losc i:iOurces or mcthorli:i .... " Government's Requei:its for Admissions, 
Record Item 19. 
Snepp's attorneys wPre alHo foreclosed from a~king Admiral Turner 
whethrr particular forrign ~ource,.; had stopped cooperating with United 
States' authoritif's as a direct rP:::ult of the publication of Decl!llt lntet·val. 
Tr. 138. Thus, it i,; unclear wlwther or why foreign ~ources ma.v have 
r<>actrd uufavorably to its publication. Howcvrr, William E. Colby, the 
CIA's former DirPctor, did indicate in hi:; te::;timony that foreign nations 
generall ' have ·~ stri<'ter secrecy code than docs the United States. :Tr, 
175...:176. 
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product of the exercise of First A1nendwcnt rights by gov· 
ernmeut employees. 
II 
The Court's decisiou to dispose of this case summarily on 
the Govermneut's couditioual cross-petition for certiorari is 
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits. 
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth 
Circuit's decisiou insofar as it affirmed the entry of au injunc-
tion requiriug him to submit all future mauuscripts for pre-
publication review and remanded for a determination of 
whether punitiw damages~ appropriate for his failure to ~ t0 
submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication. 
The Government filed a brief iu opposition as well as a ·cross-
petition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated, 
however, that it was cross-petitio11ing ouly to bring the eutire 
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide 
to grant Snepp's petition. The Government explained that 
11 [b] ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of ap-
peals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's 
interest, the governmeu t has not independently sought review in 
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government 
stated that 11 [i]f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petitiou for a 
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871. it should also grant this cross-
petition. If the petition iu No. 78-1871 is denied, this peti-
tion should also be denied." Petition, at 5. 
Given the Govermneut's position, it would be highly inap-
propriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction, 
to grant the Governmeut's petition while deuying Snepp's. 
Yet tha.t is in essence what has been done.12 The majority 
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this 
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as 
manifestly "without merit." Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that 
12 I have been unable to di::;covcr any previou::; ca~e in which the Court 
has acted m; it does today, reaehing the merits of a conditional ero~s­
pei.ition dc::;pii.e itl:i belief that the petition dO('S not merit granting: 
C(lrtiorad, 
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Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own 
merits. 
The Court's opinioll is a good demonstration of why this 
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily 
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact 
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive 
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the 
Court forges ahead aud summarily rejects that remedy on the 
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not 
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security," ante, at 6, and (b) that it might 
require the Government to reveal confidential information 
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather 
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might 
thus be left with "uo remedy at all," ante, at 7. It seems 
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either 
ground by the Government's acquiescence in the punitive 
damages remedy. Moreover, the second rationale 13 is eutirely / 
speculative and, iu this case at least, almost certainly wrong. 
The Court states that: 
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an 
award of punitive damages might force the Government 
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised 
to protect." 
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government 
would Le entitled to punitive damages simply by proving 
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to 
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for pre[mbli-
cation review and that the Government relied on these mis-
represelltatious to its detriment. ] fail to see how such a 
showing would require the Government to reveal any con-
fidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery 
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 7. 
18 Which, iL ;;lwuld be uotrd, due:; uol <Lllpl·ar anywhere in the Govern~ 
jnpnt's 5 page croHs-p!'tition, 
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III 
'l'he uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmakiug 
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable 
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this 
case. 
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused 
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that 
his remedy at law was iuadequate. Wit}'wut waiting for all 
opportunity to appraise the adequacy of the punitive damages 
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion 
that equitable relief is necessary. 
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware 
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to 
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to 
criticize his govern men t.1'1 lnhereu t in this prior restraint is 
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority 
to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an 
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the de-
mands of secrecy. 'l'he character of the covenaut as a prior 
restraint 011 free speech surely imposes an especially heavy 
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It 
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me 
that that burden has been met. 
I respectfully dissent. 
14 The mere fact that the aget1cy hws thr authority to rrview the text 
or a eritical book in search of classifi£•d information before it, is publi~hcd 
i:> bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover, 
the right t.o delay publication until the revirw is completed i~ it~elf a form 
of prior restraint that would not. hr t olemted in other contrxts. See, 
e. g .. New York T·imP8 Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska 
Press Association v. St·uart, 427 U.S. 539. In view of the }"ational inten•;;t I 
in maintaining an effective intelligence servire, I am not prepared to ~a~· 
that the r<>::;traint is nrrr~;;arily intolerablr in thi~ context. I am preparrd 
to :;ay, however, that crrt iorari hnving bPen gmntrd, the issue :surely ~hould 
not he re~olved in the absence of full brirfiug and argumPnt. 
41~k.,e ~ ...;_ 





As Snepp would have access to highly sensitive 
information, the Agency required as a precondition 
to his employment in 1968 that he execute an 
agreement "not to disclose any classified 
information relating to the Agency without proper 
a,_~~#-( 
authorization." Pet. 58a. -Ul. the same agreement 
1\ 
Snepp promised not to publish "any information or 
material relating to the Agency its activities or 
intelligence activities generally, either during or 
after the term of [his] employment ~ithout 
) 
specific prior approval of the Agency." Id., at 
59a. 
lfp/ss 1/7/80 
Both the District Court and Court of 
Appeals found that publication by a former 
intelligence agent of unreviewed material relatinq 
to intelligence activities can be detrimental to 
vital national interests even if the information is 
unclassified. If a former agent may rely on his 
own judgment as to what information may be 
detrimental, classified information could be 
revealed by him without the opportunity of the CIA 
with its broader understanding of what may in 
fact expose secrets or sources - to prevent 
publication. Sources relied upon include the 
foreign intelligence services of friendly nations 
as well as secret agents, often operatinq in 
foreign countries. The continuing availability of 
these sources would be jeopardized if the CIA could 
not, by the preclearance process prevent 
compromising them and even endangering the safety 
of agents. 
Admiral Turner, director of the CIA 
testified without contradiction ••• 
lfp/ss l/7/80 
Greg: Add a footnote alonq the following lines: 
~:/ In belittling Admiral Turner's 
testimony, the dissent by Mr. Justice Stevens 
states that if our country loses the cooperation of 
foreign intelligence services this "must be 
accepted as an inevitable byproduct of the exercise 
of First Amendment rights by qovernment employees". 
~' 6, 7. We would not have thought that a CIA 
agent with access to sensitive intelligence 
information can be viewed as iust another 
"government employee". Indeed, it is more than a 
little surprising that one would sugqest seriously 
that the government of the United States is 
helpless, by virtue of the First Amendment, to 
prevent the disclosure of information vital to the 
security of our country and hence, perhaps, to the 
preservation of all freedoms. 
Nothing in the decisions of this Court, 
zealous as we have been to protect First Amendment 
rights, justifies the dissent's position. See n. 
3, sopra, and cases cited therein. See also, Mears 
u.s. ( l 9 . . ) • 
-----
In any event 
2. 
the dissent's argument is irrelevant in this case. 
Here we have an express undertaking by Snepp, 
voluntarily assumed as a precondition to beinq 
employed by the CIA, pursuant to which he aqreed to 
the preclearance procedure. 
lfp/ss l/7/80 
Despite express findings to the contrary 
by the courts below, Mr. Justice Stevens - at the 
outset of his dissent - states that "the interest 
and confidentiality that Snepp's contract was 
designed to protect have not been compromised". 
~ost, l. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at 
odds with the record in this case, the dissent 
bifurcates the secrecy agreement of September 16, 
1968, and treats the two interdependent provisions 
thereof as if they were separate and unrelated 
obligations. Mr. Justice Stevens suggests that 
the preclearance agreement is unenforceable under 
common law principles, and analogizes Snepp's 
undertaking to a "covenant not to compete". He then 
argues that it would not survive under the "rule of 
reason". One hardly would have thought that an 
analogy drawn from the private world of business 
has the slighest relationship to an express 
agreement entered into pursuant to the National 
Security Act by the Director of the CIA for the 
purpose of "protecting intelligence sources and 
methods from unauthorized disclosure". 50 U.S.C. 
§403(d) (3). 
.. 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
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PEu C u RIAM. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Centl·al intelligence Agency 
CIA) . Hek ontends that imnitive damages are an inappro~ 
priate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the j udg-
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certaih CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1~68, however, Snepp had 
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish ... any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [hisl employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
also 
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating .. 
to the _ Agency without proper authorization." Id., at 58a.1 / 
l: Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also / 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book \vithout submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would perlllit the book for prepublication clearauce. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8 ~ 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp'if 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable' 
as a prior restrnint on protected speech. 
Whcu Suepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed 
the agrecnwnt that expres::;ly obligated him to ;;ubmit any proposed publi-
l'<l'tion for vrior review. He doe~ not claim that he executed tbis agre/ 
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936.4 In other words, 
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. ~ 
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the~ 
mrnt under durrss. Inderd, he voltmtaril~· reaffirmrd his obligation when 
he left the Ageney. We agree with tlw Court of Appeals that Snepp's 
agrrrment is an "entirely nppropriatr" exrrci:;r of the CIA Director's 
statutorr mandate to "protec[t] intelligrncr source:; and methods from 
mwuthorizrd disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § .t03 (d) (3) . 595 F. 2d, nt 932. 
{ /itiheme, thie Couet'e "'""' moke dm thet ~~~;;!!;~ ev~>e 
absence of an express agreement~ould have~reaonable restric-
tions on ~ employe~etse-of their irat · mendment righ~ 
I' to pro~ ubstantial government-inter~ Civil Service Comm'n 
v. etter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973) ; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id., at 844-
848 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972). 
Thr Government has a compelling intrrest in protrcting both the :;ecrecy 
of information important to our nn.tional security and the appearance of 
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intel-
_iigcnce service. See p. 5, infra. The agrrement that Snepp signed is a 
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest . 
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United StateB 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate hi~ agreement not. to publbh an~· f"lassified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at l:H3. Marchetti therefore did not con:;idcr the appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over~ 
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue 
in Marchetti. 
c;J-c_+J v 1-./-i'e.-5 ,fl.._ 'e2-f-
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possibility of puuitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial- could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote . "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d., 
at 938. Prepublicatiou clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were bdh a speculative .... f-
ancl inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. "we agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con-
structive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he slgned, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship.5 The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance. 
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obliga-
tion- he had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified 
information, including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-/ 
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read : "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
III, unders1and that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
Oo,nernment . . . . " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
Snepp's dUtl<'::l and his conceded access to confidential sources and ma-
tr riab could rstablish a truot relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) . Few types of 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that. 
reposed in a C!A employee with Snepp's duties. 
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend- at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he ma.y reveal 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources- could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelli11;ence from domestically based or controlled 
sources. the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the~ 
7 Every major nation in t he world has an intelligence servire. What-
rvr r fairly may be ~aid about ~orne of it ~ past nctivitie;:, the CIA (or it s 
predecr~sor the OSS) is an agc,ncy thought by every Pre::; ident since 
Frnnklin D . Hoosevelt to be c::;sential to the ~;erurity of the United States 
and- in a l:lense-the free world . It il:l impossible for a government wi::;ely 
to make crit ical deci::;ions about foreign policy and national defen ::;e with-
out. tlH' benefit of dependablr foreip:n intelligence . See generally T . Powers, 
The M.o Who Kept the Sm et' (1979). / 
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security of information that might compromise them and 
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Uudisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo- , 
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's ~ 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material~ 
8 In *ttf~~ Admirnl Turner's testimony, MR. Jus·riCE S•rEVENs' 
di:;sPnting opmion declares that damage to our Nation's ability to cooperate 
with foreign intelligence services "mnilt bP accepted as an inevitable 
byvrodnct of the exercise of Fir~t Amrndment rights by government 
employer~." Post, at 6-7. This notion tll;tt the Government is hrlpless 
to protrct sources of intelligence which m9.y be vital to the preservation 
of national Recurity and the co11duct of foreign affair~ finds no support 
· · · ~ in thr deci~ions of this Court. We have held con-
sistently tha!,> he Government can m .'ltict its employees · · 
J;~iPo;l Anwnament r.jghtf!' in orde to proteet . ubatantial-g menrtntp-
~ Ree ca~e:; cited, at n. 3, supm. One Jhould have thought that tlfo:;e 
j}?ii'rPdent;; applied with sprcial force to a"'tiA agent who had acces.~ to 
sen:;itiw intellig<>nce. In any eve11t, the dissent's statement is scarcely 
relevant in light of th<:' exprC'Htl ohlig:t t ion th:t t. Snepp voluntarily undertook 
ns .tt cbndi1 io.n of his employmrnt with the CIA. 
.. 
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classified or not--for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Govemment. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.0 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might fore~ / 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that/ 
0 Although both the District Court and the Court of AppPals expressly 
found otherwi;;e, ~JR . Jus'l'ICE STE\'ENS say~ that ''thr intere~:;t in ron-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract waH designed to protect ha::; not bePn 
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the ba;;i:,; of a premi;;e wholly at 
odds with the record, th<> dissent bifmcates Snepp's 1968 agre<>m<>nt and 
treat~ its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unr<>lated obliga-
tions. MR. JusTICE S·rEVENS then analogize~; Snepp's prepublication review 
agreemt"nt with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to 
comppte with his employPr.L A body of private law intended to pre:::erve ~crs r I _..,.. 3-
rompPtition, however, simp!; ha ::; no bearing on a contract made by tlu~ 
Dirertor of tlw CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to 
"proterl II intelligence sourres and methods fwm unauthorized di~:;closme." 
50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 
J(t JudgP Hoffman';; di;;sent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damages on!~· upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937-
938. 
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. ·Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable riskf'l, it has no remedy at aU. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trustX!I It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
coutribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Suepp's profits, and we 
~the full judgment of the District Court. 
11 See id .. at 939 (Hoffmau, .T., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . 
1\TH . .lu::~TJCE , '!'EVENt\ eonePdf'~ thai, rvrn in tlJP ab::;encr of a written 
ront met, an employre has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post , at 3. 
HP abo conerdrs that all prrsonal profitR gainrd from the rxploitation of 
:;urh information are imprrssed with a con!;tructive trust in favor of the 
crnployet. Post, at 5, In thil:' <'Hse, he sePms to think that the common 
ri2-.--a-b). -t-1.,.~ 
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lHw would not treat infornwtion as "ronfidPntial" unlP::;s it were "clas::;ified." 
SPr, e. fJ., post. at 3. Wr havr though! that the rommon-hnr obligafion 
was con~idPrably more expansive. Rrr, e. g .. RPstatement (Second) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and CommPnt c, 404 and Commt>nts b, d (1958); 
V Scott on Trusts § 505 (1967). But since this case involvP::; a written 
eontrart :>pPcifirally designPd to prevent tht> disclosure of confidrntial 
information, we have no occasion to linger over that QUP:>tion. There i:> 
no need to invoke common-law principle!:> in order to impose a con ·tructive 
trust on Rnepp'i:l profits. 
-
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ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATE~ 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October-, 1979 
PER CURIAM. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a. 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inap· 
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to sub1nit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg-j 
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA a.gent, Snepp published 
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp I 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
·executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish . . . any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The \ 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." ld., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
I d. , at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.' 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement ." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA . .. without the express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative.)> Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 18~181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable-
as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed I 
thr ngreement that cxpre;;:,; ly obligated him to submit auy proposed publi-
·catiou for prior review. He dOt'~ not claim that he exec·uted this agree-· 
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub- / 
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the in.i unction agaiust future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested ou the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935--936.4 ln other words, 
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. 
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
ment under durcs:;; . Inclf'f'd, hf' voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when 
he left the Agency. We agrcr with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's 
agreement il4 an "f'ntirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's 
statutory manda tc to "protec [ tl intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosurf'," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932. 
Moreover, this Court 'i1 rai1<'R make clf'ar that~even in the ab~enc!' of an I J ~ 4! 
exprf's.~ agre!'mrnt~the CIA b,rtt'd to prot crt. ~ubstantial governmmt in- C.,t>O "I) 
tercst,; by imposing rraHonablr restrictions on employer activities that in 
otll{'r <'Ontexts might b<> protrrtf'd by thr Fir~t Amf'ndmf'nt. Civil Ser-vice 
Comrn'n v. Letter Carriers. 413 U. S. 54-R, 565 (1973); ::;er Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); 
id., at 844-84, (PowEu,, J., concmring); Cole v. Z:li('hrmlson, 405 U.S. 676 
(1972). Tho Govrrmnrnt has a compelling intere:;t in protecting both the ) 
serrrcy of information imvortant to our national security and the appear-
nnce of ronfidrnt iality so p~srntinJ to the !'ffect.ive operation of our foreign 
intrlligf'nce srrvice. Srr p. 5, infm. The agreement that Snrpp signed is a 
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest. 
• The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his ag;reement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1313. Marchetti thrrefore did not ron;.:id!:'r thr appropriate remedy for-
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue-
in Marchetti. 
,. 
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the I 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." !d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con .. 
structive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed. Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship.G The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance. 
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obliga-
tion-he had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified 
information, including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously ) 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position of tntst in that Agency of the 
GoV'Crnment ... . " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of' 
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and ma-
terials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . Few types of 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend- at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA- with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire. What-
ever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its I 
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President ;;ince 
Franklin D . Roosevelt to be essential to the security of the United States 
and-in a sense-the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely 
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defPnse with-
out the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, 
The Man Who Kept t he Secrets (1979). 
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security of information that might compromise them a.nd 
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Uudisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
s Jn questioning the force IAdmirnl Turner's testimony, MR. JusncE 0 F 
Sn;vENS' di,senting opinion ~clares that damage to our Nation's ability 
to cooperat<' with for<'ign intelligence services "must be accepted as an 
inevitnble byproduct of the exerci;;<' of First Amendment rights by govern-
ment employees." Post, at 6-7. This notion that the Government is 
helpi<'I>S to protect sources of intelligence which may be vital to the preser-
vat.ion of nat ional s<'curity and the conduct of foreign affairs finds no 
sup1)0rt in the d<'cisions of this Court. We have held consistently that, 
in order to protect, substant ial governml'nt int<' rests, tlw Government can 
restrict its employe&; in activities that in other contexts might be protected 
by the First Amcndmrnt. See cases cited, at n. 3, supra. One would 
have thought. that those prrc<'d<'nts applied with sp<'cial force to a CIA 
agent who had acrrss to sen;;itive intelligence. In any event, the dissent's 
statrment. i:s scarce!~· relevant in light of the express obligation tha.t Snepp 
voluntarily undertook as a condition of his employment with the CIA_ 
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c1assified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.u / 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Avpeals expressly 
found otherwise, MR. JusTICE STEVENS says that "the interest in con-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been 
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at 
odds with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and 
treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obliga-
tions. MR. Jus'ricE 8'l'EVENS then analogizes Snepp's prepublication review 
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to 
compete with his employer. Post. at 3. A body of private law intended 
to preserve competition, however, ::;imply has no bearing on a contract 
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obliga-
tion to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure." 50 U.S. C. §403 (d)(3). 
10 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
'938. 
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.11 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
11 See id ., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS conct>des that, even in the absence of u, written 
contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3. 
He also concedes tl1at all personal profits gained from the exploitation of 
such information are impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the 
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common 
law would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were "classified." 
See, e. g., post , at 3. We have thought that the common-law obliga.tion 
was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958); 
V Scott on Trusts § 505 (1967) . But since this case involves a written 
contract specifically de;,;igned to prevent the disclosure of confidential 
information, we have no occasion to linger over that question. There is 
no need to invoke common-law principles in order to impose a constructive 
tru t on Snepp's profits. 
SNEPP v. UNfrE:D STATES g 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand I 
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full 
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In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a. 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inap· 
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally cross~petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg- l 
ment from which both parties seek relief. 1 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
·executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish ... any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking 11not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization;'' /d., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from' the Agency in 1976, .Snepp also 
i 
• 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
-clearance. The Government brought this suit. to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.• 
The District Court found that Snepp had 11willfully, delib-
. erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had 11caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
!d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
· The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
'Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid oontract.• 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been m'ade public 
by CIA •.• without the express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a.. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
a The Court of Appea1s and the District Court rejected each of Sneppta 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 18(}-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
·snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceablel 
· as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluptarily signed 
the ngreement that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publi-
'Ca.tion for prior rt:."view. He docs not claim that 'he executed this agree-
~-
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublica.tion review had inflicted 
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligence. Id., at 93&-936.' In other words, 
the court thought that Snepp;s fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. 
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
ment under duress. Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed ·his obligation when 
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that· Snepp's 
agreement is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's 
statutory mandate to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from 
unautl10rized disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932. 
Moreover, this Court's cases mal<e clt•a.r thnt.-even in the nbsence of an 
express ngret>mt>nh-the CIA/ncted to protect. substantinl government in- c...en .• Jt5:2 L....a.rJe._, 
tcrests by imposing rt>asonatJe rt>strictions on employee activities that in 
other contexis might bt> protected by the First Amendment. Civil Service 
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. 
Valeo , 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); 
id ., a.t 844-848 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 
(1972). The Government has a compelling intere:;t in protecting both the 
secrecy of information imporhmt to our nntionnl security and the appear-
ance of confidentiality so essential to the efft>ctive operation of our foreign 
intclligt>nre service. See p. 5, infra. The ngreement that Snepp signed is a 
reasonable means for protecting this vital intt>rest. 
• The Government's concession distinguished this case from United Statu 
v. Marchetta', 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1313. Marchetti t-herefore did not considrr the approprinte remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the \ 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreeme~t, he 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." /d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con ... 
structive trust. 
-u 
Snepp's employment with the CIA. involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognizea that be was 
entering a ~rust relationship.5 "The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the ·Agency without submitting it for clearance. 
Snepp stipulated at tria1 that-after undertaking this obliga-
tion-he had been tcassigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had · been granted 1Cfrequent access to classified 
information, including information regarding intelligence 
sources arid methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
Government ... . " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and ma-
terials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types or 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that. 
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp . should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information . and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence service. What-
ever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its 
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since 
Franklin D. Roost>velt to be essential to the security of the United States 
and-in a sense-the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely 
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense with-
out the benefit. of drpendable fore;11:n intelligNlCe. See gPnerally T . Powers~ 
The M11n Who K<>pt t.he Secrets (1979). 
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security of information that might compromise them and 
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
8 In uestioning the forceL_Admiral Turner's testjmony, MR. JusTICE 
STEVENS' 's.spnting opinion d!:'Clares that. damage to our Nation's ~ 
t<> cooperat with foreign intelligence semces "must. be accepted as an 
inevitable byp uct of the exercise of First Amendment. rigbteby govern-
ment employees. Pwt, at. 6-7. 'l11is notion that jhe' Government is 
helpless to protect s 1rces of intelligence which m~t)C vital to the preser-
vation of national 8(> rify and the conduct of forPign affairs finds no 
support in the decisions f this Courj,.---We have hrld ronf::istently that, 
in order to protect substan 'al go :efilment. intrrE>:Sts, thr Government can 
restrict its ernployePS in activ · that in other contrxts might be protected 
by the First Amcndme . See asPS cited, at. n. 3, supra. One would 
have thought that osP prrcedrn applied with sp<•rial force to a CIA 
agent. who ha cces:> to sen!:'itive int igence. In nny rvent, the dissent's 
statemrn 's scarcdy relPvant in light o 1e express obligation that Snepp 
volu rily undertook as n cm1dition of 1 · employmrnt with the CIAr 
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c1assified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.9 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes · that the a.Ctual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such a.s Snepp's generally 
.are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative a.nd unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
_the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly 
found otherwise, MR. JusTICE STEVENS says that "the interest in con-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been 
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at 
odds with the record, tl1e dis...<:ent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and 
treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obliga-
tions. MR. JusTICE STEVENS then analogizes Snepp's prepublication review 
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to 
compete with his employer. Po.st, at. 3. A body of private law intended 
to preserve competition, however, simply has no bearing on a contract 
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obliga-
tion to "protec[t] intelligence source~ and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure." 50 U.S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 
10 Jud~e Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available ' if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
dama~es only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appe~ majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
'938. 
\ 
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant RO elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Govemment run this risk. 
In 8 letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Govemment cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of 8 
breach of trust.11 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
11 See id .. at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS conCE'des tl1at, even in the absence of a written 
contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3. 
He also c.oncedes that all personal profits gained from the exploitation of 
such information are impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the 
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common 
law would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were "classified." 
See, e. g., post, at 3. We havr thought that the common-law obligation 
was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Re&t,atement. (Second) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958); 
V n Trusts § 505 (1967) . But since this case involves a written 
contract specifically 6c~igncd to l'revent tlle disciGs~o~~d8lltial­
inf.oR~n,.we-htwe-n<HW~~·u;ion to lingei-Ove!'-t-hat-question:--!fhere-is 
~-t~~mmon-ln·w;~rHl~ples...in..order-4G-imJ'IOI:le-a-constntcti~ 
tnn;t en Sm pt*-vrofitft;-
-1-o de-+e-.r ~ , t-.,e__ s'-' ~ t.> 
~uc_} ar1 reJcz'-1--/~ s[._ij,tL'. 
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oreacn, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of thi~ equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full 
judgment of the District Court. 
So ordered. 
lfp/ss 1/17/80 Rider A, fn. A (Snepp) 
In questioning the force of Admiral Turner•a · 
testimony, Mr. Justice Stevens' ~issentinq ooinion would 
aflv.i b~ t-e.~ 
place the blame·~ the concern of foreign intelligence 
-to 
services not f:t the deai'::f hazards of allowinq an 





~.fi..a4.l~~ the CI"i,to classify what "should have 
been classified or of the foreign government's disagreement 
with our government's classification policv". Post, at 6-7. 
Apart frem ~he fact t~ Mr. Justice Stevens' views in this 
.... ot c--t.., -6 ~~ slso 
respectLfind no support in the record,LtheyLreflect ~ 
thiA17 a misappreciation of concern reflected by Admiral 
Turne~'s testimony. tf in fact infor~ation is Ret prep~~ 
l..tiA... ...£! 
tclassifi~~ or~ in the public domai~neither the CIA nor 
,..(, ··h 
foreign aqencies would be concerned. The Problem t~~A~ 
......... -
mak~~ure in advance, and by proper procedures, that~ 
information ~ detrimental to national interests is -o~ 
-6 ~r'-t,/,c_a-1-,~ t"'elt";G._ . J 
published. Without a dependable ~~:r;.~. procedur~ no 
intelligence agency or responsible government official could 
be assured that an employee privy to sensitive information 
miqht not conclude on his own - innocently or otherwise -
that it should be disclosed to the world. 
The dissent finds an "implication in the Court's 
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lfp/ss 1/17/80 Rider A, fn. 8 (Snepp) 
In questioning the force of Admiral Turner's testimony, 
Mr. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion would attribute the 
concern of foreign intelligence services not to the hazards of 
allowing an agent like Snepp to publish whatever he pleases, but 
to the CIA's failure to classify what "should have been classified 
or of the foreign government's disagreement with our government's 
classification policy". Post, at 6-7. Mr. Justice Stevens' views 
in this respect not only find no support in the record, but they 
~ 
also reflect a misappreciation of~concern reflected by Admiral 
Turner's testimony. If in fact information is unclassified or in 
the public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be 
concerned. The problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper 
procedures, that information detrimental to national interests is 
not published. Without a dependable prepublication review 
procedure, no intelligence agency or responsible government 
official could be assured that an employee privy to sensitive 
information might not conclude on his own - innocently or 
otherwise - that it should be disclosed to the world. 
The dissent finds an "implication in the Court's 
opinion" that the CIA should have "carte blanche to censor" 
employees' publications. Snepp's contract, however, requires no 
more than a clearance procedure subject to judicial review. If 
Snepp had submitted his material for review and the Agency had 
found it to contain sensitive material, it would have been left to 
the Agency to seek an injunction against publication. See Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (CA4), cert. denied, 421 
~.S. 992 (1975)~ United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (CA4), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
~: ... 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided January -, 1980 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN 
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement 
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency 
any information he intended to publish ab'out it for prepubli..: 
cation review.1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the 
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor 
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classi-
fied, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the 
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926, 
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit 
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for 
prepublication review. However, the Government has con-
ceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic ma-
teriaP Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality 
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made 
the same commitment. 
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that 
" ... Decent Interval contains classified information or any information 
concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA," 
the Government staled that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintiff does 
not so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession, 
the district judge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts 
to determine whether Decent Interval in fact. contains information that 
the Government considers clas.~ified . See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral 
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu, 
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153. 
. ' 
•.t' 
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been 
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Gov-
ernment unprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a 
constructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the 
sale of the book. Because that rrmcdy is not authorized by 
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for 
the Court to dispose of this novel issue summarily on the 
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I re-
spectfully dissent. 
I 
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported 
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although 
Congress has enacted a number of criminal statutes punishing 
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified 
information, 3 it has not seen fit to authorize the constructive 
trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor does either of the 
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such 
remedy in the event of a breach.4 The Court's per curiam 
(,..-n-n""""-.J\---:-tQ;--T..----~o~p~m~l-:=:'OI~ii'Jsuggestrthat its result is supported by a~nnwn lav; _,..,_.,_.,' ·- ~ blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts:"UBut neither 
of these branches of the common law supports the imposition 
·~ J 
of a constructive trust under the circumstances of this case. 
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a set-
tlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for 
8 See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 798, which imposes a prison term of 10 years 
"and a $10,000 fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certain types of 
·classified information; 18 U. S. C. § 794, wbich makes it a criminal offense 
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defense information 
to a foreign government; and "5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdraws the 
right to government retirement benefits from a person convicted of violat-
"ing these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401, 
which provides 11dministrative sanctions, including discharge, against em-
ployees wbo publish classfied information. 
4 In both bis original employment agreement and the termination agree-
ment Snepp acknowledged the criminal penalties that might attach to any 
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he 
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cause for termina-
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the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is 
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses 
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his 
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the 
common Jaw even in the absence of a wTitten employment 
agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified" 
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the com-
mon law would support the implication of a constructive trust 
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential 
inf onna tion.~ 
But Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential 
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, im: 
posed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to 
obtain prepublication clearance. In order td justify the im-
position of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to 
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to dis-
close, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in 
the common law to support such an approach. 
Employment agreements often contain covenants designed 
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies 
with his duty not to disclose or misuse confidential informa-
tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to com-
pete. Contrary to the majority's appr.oach in this case, the 
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply 
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they 
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary, 
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an in-
dividual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable only if they 
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." That rule, 
w.i.Ze, e. g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-0, Inc., 447 F. 2d 1387, 1392 
(CA4 1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginja law); Tla:pek v. 
Chevron Oil Co., 407 F. 2d 1129 (CAS 1969) (Arkansas Jaw); Structural 
Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 
F. Supp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mich. 1975) (Michigan Jaw); Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 396 (c) (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, after the 
termination of the agency the agent: ... (c) has a duty to aecount for 
profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets and other confidential 
information, whether or not in competition with t.he principal .••• "). 
.4 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
~s the court held in Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. Cas. 
[1916] 688, 704, the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does 
not outweigh the public interest in keeping the employee in the workforce: 
. .u ••• [A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the 
skill and · knowledge in · his trade or profession which ·he has learnt 
in the course of his employment by means of directions or instructions 
from the employer. That information and that additional skill he is 
entitled to · use for the benefit of himself and the benefit of the public 
:who gain ·the advantage of his haYing· had such admirable instruction. 
'The case in which the Court interferes for the purpose of protection is 
where use is made, not of the skill which the man may have acquired, 
but of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to 
rC;:fjl to any one else ... ·." 
...li€ee, e. g., Briggs v. R. ·R. Donnelley & Sons Co .. 589 F. 2d 39, 41 (CAl 
1978) (Illinois law); American Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Carrier, 500 F. ·2d 
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina law); Alston Studios, Inc. v. 
:Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2d 279, 282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia 
law); Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc ., 436 F. 2d 1308, 
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law); Water Services, Inc . v. Tesco Chemi-
cals, Inc., 410 F. 2d 163, 167 (CA5 1969) (Georgia law); Restatement 
(S nd) of Contracts § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 12, March 1977). 
ee, e. g., Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 
--~. 2d 279, 283 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Virginia law a covenant 
.• i\ 
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ght well pers common w 
nant unenfor able in equity. 
as a matter o 
lo er's confidential information for his own personal profit, 
a constructive trust over those profits is obviously an appro-
priate remedy because the profits are the direct result of 
the breach. But Snepp admittedly did not use confidential 
information in his book; nor were the profits from his book 
in any sense a product of his failure to submit the book for 
prepublication review. For even if Snepp had submitted 
the book to the agency for prepublication review, the Gov-
ernment's censorship authority would surely have been limited 
to the excision of classified material. In this case, then, it 
would have been obliged to clear the b?o~r publication in 
precisely the same form as it now stands. Thus, Snepp has 
not gained any profits as a result of his breach; the Govern• 
inent, rather than Snepp, will be unjustly enriched if he is 
required to disgor~rofits attributable entirely to his own 
legitimate activity. 
with no geographical l]mitiltion); American Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Car-
rier, 500 F. 2d 1269, 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Nort.h Caro-
lina Jaw a covenant with no durational or geographical limitation); E. L. 
Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F. 2d 527, 528 (CA4 1970) (holding void 
under Maryland Jaw a covenant with no durational or geographical 
ii~j~tion). 
_ffllf he had submitted the book to the agency and the agency had re-
fused to consent to the publication of certain mat€rial in it, Snepp could 
have obtained judicial review to de1ermine whether the agency was cor-
rect in considering the material classified. See United States v. Marchetti, 
466. f. 2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
_.U../As the Court of Appeals held, to the extent that the Government seeks 
to punish Snepp for breaching his obligation to submit the manuscript 
for prepublication review or to deter others from engaging in similar 
breaches, punitive damages are clearly a more appropriate remedy than a 
constructive trust, " ... since a constructive trust depends on ' the con-
cept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See 
6 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246 {1973)." 595 
F .• ~d, at 937. 
J3'the District Judge sustained the Government's objections to ques-
tions concerning the identity of other agents who had published the unau-
thorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 136. However, 
Admiral Turner did testify that the harmful materials involved "[p]ri-
marily the appearance in the United States media of identification of 
sources and metl1ods of collecting intelligence .... " Tr. 143. This type 
of information is certainly confidential and is specifically the type of in-
formation that Snepp has maintained he did not reveal in Decent Interval. 
See, e. g., Snepp's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show, 
in which he stated: " ... I have made a very determined effort not to 
ell:pose sources or methods .... " Government's Requests for Admissions, 
'Record Item 19. 
Snepp's attorneys were also foreclosed from asking Admiral Turner 
whether particular foreign sources had stopped cooperating with United 
States' authorities as a direct result of the publication of Decent Interval. 
·Tr. 138. Thus, it is unclear whether or why foreign sources may have 
reacted unfavorably to its publication. However, William E. Colby, the 
CIA's former Director, did indicate in his testimony that foreign nations 
generally have a stricter secrecy code than does the United States. Tr. 
175-176. 
f'! •. 




The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on 
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is 
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits. 
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth 
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunc-
tion requiring him to submit all future manuscripts for pre-
publication review and remanded for a determination of 
whether punitive damages would be appropriate for his failure 
to submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication. 
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a cross-
petition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated, 
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire 
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide 
to grant Snepp's petition. The Government explained that 
"[b]ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of ap-
peals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's 
interest, the government has not independently sought review in 
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government 
stated that "[i] f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petition for a 
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871, it should aJso grant this cross-
petition. If the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this peti-
tion should also be denied." Petition, at 5. 
Given the Government's position, it would be highly inap-
propriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction, 
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's. 
Yet that is in essence what has been doneSJ The majority 
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this 
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as 
manifestly "without merit." Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that 
jjJ have been unable to discover any previous case in which the Court 
has acted as it does today, reaching the merits of a conditional cross-
petition despite its belief . that the petition does not merit granting 
certiorari. 
--~----r . 
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Snepp's petition . would not have been granted on its own 
merits. 
The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this 
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily 
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact 
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive 
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the 
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the 
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not 
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security," ante, at 6, and (b) that it might 
require the Government to reveal confidential information 
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather 
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might 
thus be left with t(no remedy at all," ante, at 7. It seems 
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either 
ground by the Government's acquiescence in tqj~JPUnitive 
damages remedy. Moreover, the second rationale.!:»is entirely 
speculative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong. 
The Court states that: 
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an 
award of punitive damages might force the Government 
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised 
to protect." 
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government 
-would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving 
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to 
-·comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepubli-
cation review and that the Government relied on these mis-
representations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a 
showing would require the Government to reveal any con-
fidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery 
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 7. 
Aich, it should be noted, does not appear anywhere in the Govern-
ment's 5-page cross-petition. 
1 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
III 
The uninhibited character of toda.y's exercise in lawmaking 
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable 
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this 
case. 
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused 
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that 
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an 
opportunity to appraise the adequacy of the punitive damages 
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion 
that equitable relief is necessary. 
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware 
of the fact tha.t its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to 
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to 
criticize his governmenJ$/ Inherent in this prior restraint is 
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority 
to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an 
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the de-
mands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior 
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy 
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It 
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me 
that that burden has been met. · 
I respectfully dissent. 
~ere fact that the agency has the authority to review the text oPa' ~~~ic~' book in search of classified information before it is published 
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover, 
the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form 
of prior restraint that would not be tolerated in other contexts. See, 
e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539. In view of the national interest 
in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I am not prepar~ed:;:_:,t~o...:;s;:;:.a'.:;.'---;;..-------, 
that the restraint is necessarily intolerable in this context. I amfi:irepa.red ( t\l)~erJL 
to say ..]o.s e: E'l. that, certiorari having been granted, the issue surely should ) . J 
not be resolve<rin the absence of full briefing and argument. 
/ 




5/ In light of its heavy reliance in the text on 
~rinciples of fiduciary duty and contract law and its 
failure to identify any other source for the result it 
announces today, I find the Court's statement in a footnote 
that there "is no need to invoke common law principles in 
order to impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits," 
ante, at 8 n. 11, surprising, to say the least. 
78-1871 and 79-265 
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Insert B 
The Court has not persuaded me that a rule of reason 
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenant to submit to 
prepublication review. Like an ordinary employer, the CIA has 
a vital interest in protecting certain types of information; at 
the same time, the CIA employee has a countervailing interest 
in preserving a wide range of work opportunities (including 
work as an author) and in protecting his First Amendment 
rights. The public interest lies in a proper accomodation that 
will preserve the intelligence m5ssion of the agency while not 
abridging the free flow of unclassified information. When the 
government seeks to enforce a harsh restriction on the 
employee's freedom~/ despite its admission that the interest 
the agreement was designed to protect--the confinentiality of 
classified information--has not been compromised, an equity 
court might well be persuaded that the case is not one in which 
the covenant should be enforced. 
But even assuming that Snepp's covenant to submit to 
prepublication review should be enforced, the constructive 
trust imposed by the Court is not an appropriate remedy. If an 
employee has used his employer's rreturn to text page 5.1 
9/ The covenant imposes a serious prior restraint on Snepp's 
ability to speak freely, see infra n. 15, and is of indefinite 
duration and scope--factors that-would make most similar 
covenants unenforceable. fBack to cites in printed footnote q 
(previously note 8) .] 
-. · 78-1871 and 79-265 
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Insert C 
Despite the fact that Snepp has not caused the government 
the type of harm that would ordinarily be remedie0 by the 
imposition of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to 
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the 
government has suffered some harm. But, in light of. the 
sketchy trial record in this case, even that factual 
determination is difficult to support. The Court bases its 
finding of harm on testimony freturn to text, p. 6] 
Insert D (p. 6) 
And if the Jatter is true, then the reluctance of foreign 
I share the Court's appraisal of the importance of an 
effective intelligence service and I agree with it that the riA 
has broad power to protect its vital sources bv classifying 
information whose disclosure may compromise its mission. T 
cannot agree with the implication in the Court's opinion, 
however, that the agency has carte blanche to censor its 
employees' pubJication of even unclassified information or 
information that is already in the public domain on the basis 
78-1871 and 79-265 
- 5 -
of its opinion that publication may be "detrimental to vital 
national interests." Ante at 5. The CIA never attempted to 
assert such power over Snepp in either of the contracts he 
signed~ rather, the agency itself limited its censorship power 
to preventing the disclosure of "classified" information. 
Moreover, even assuming that a11owing the CIA the power to 
impose such a wide-ranging prior restraint would be goo~ 
national security policy, I would have difficulty reconci1ing 
such a policy with the demands of the First Amendment. 
·' 
. ' 
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In No. 78- 1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) . He also contends that punitive damages are an inap-
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg-
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed an agreement promising that he would "not . . . 
publish ... any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his] employment .. . with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." ld., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
" 
. ,. 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, 
the comt determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had "caused the United States irreparalJlc harm and loss.'' 
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoinerl future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a coostructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed' 
his obligabon "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA . , . without the exptess written consent of the Duector of Central 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 6la. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad• 
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In bis petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primanly on tl1e claim that his agreement is unenforceable' 
as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When Snepp accepted employment w1th the CIA, he voluntarily signed 
·the agrf'f'lllPnl thnt cxpre::;t;ly obligated him to submit any proposed publi-
tatiou fo1· prior review. He· d·~s not claim that he executed thb agree-
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intellige11Ce. ld., at 935-936.4 ln other words, 
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. 
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
mrnt unch•r durr~"· Ind(•ed, lw voluntarily rraffirmed his obligation when 
he lrft tlH' Agrn<:y . We ugreP with the Court of Appeal~ that Snepp's 
agreemPnt i~ :m ''pntJrp)~· appropriatt>" exrreise of thC' CIA Director's 
statutm~· mandntP to "protec lt] intelligence :sources and methods from 
unauthorized dit-~clo~urc," 50 U. S. C. § 408 (d) (8). 595 F. 2d, at 932. 
Morcm·rr, this Court'~ C'a;;cl': make· elt>:ll' that~cvC'n in the ab~ence of an 
exprr~s agr<·Pnwnt-t hC' CIA ronld havP nd<·d to protrt'f ><ub;;tantial gov-
rrnmC'nt. intrrr~t,.. b~· impo"ing rPm;onabiP rr><trietion,.. on rmplo~·pp activi-
tir:-: ilwt in ot brr· eon tPXIH mighi bP protect('([ by thr .Fir::;t Amendmrnt. 
Civil 8er1'1ce Comm'n v. Ldter Carriers. 413 1J . R. 5-lB, 5fi5 (Hl/3); oC'C 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 11. R. 1, 25-2R (lfli'fl): Greer \'. 8pock, 424 LT. S. 
828 (1970): id .. at l'.f4-S4S (PowELL . • T., C'onru ning) : C'ule \'. Richardson , 
405 LT. S. 6/fi (1!172).. Thr C:ovrmmrnt ha,; n. romp<·lling intere:;t in pro-
tcrting hoth tbr . .;rri'<'C' ~' of information important to 0\11' national i->'<'Curity 
and tho nppea r:llH'<' of C'onfidPntiality ~o rRsPntial to the f'ffPctiv<' O])('ration 
of om t'orc·ig;n intPIIigPJlf'C' ,.;rrvieP. &or p. 5, infm. Thr agre<'nwni that 
SnPpp "ignPd i>< a rrn"'onahlr mran" for protPcting thiH vital intrn';;t. 
• The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
viola.te hifl agrerment not to publit-h any c/w;sified informatiOn. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1313. Marchetti thcrf'forP did not con.-idf'r tht> appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue 
in Marchetti. 
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote. "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested ill Snepp the trust of the CIA." !d., 
at 938. Prepublica.tion clearance was part of SHepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued. were both a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con-
structive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship.G The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance. 
Shepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obliga-
tion-he had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified 
information, including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
G The first sentence of the 1968 agreement rrad: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
III, undrrstand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agrncy, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
Government . .. . " Pet. 58a. 
6 Qu1te apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
Snepp's dutie~ and ' his conceded. access to confidential sources and ma-
terials could establish a tru~t relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, .T., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types oi 
governmental employment' involve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities cau be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies ou his own judg-
ment about what i11formation is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiviug intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every maJor nation in the world has an intelli~enre servire. What-
ever fa.irly may be said about. som!:' of its past. activities, the CIA (or its 
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President ~ince 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to b!:' essential to the Hecurity of the United States 
and-in a spnse--the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely 
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national d!'fense with-
out the benefit of dPpcnduble forrign intelligrncc. See generally T. Powers. 
The Man Who Kept the Scrrets (1979). 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
security of information that might compromise them and 
even eudanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Undisputed evidt~nce in this case shows that a. CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Tumer. Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into husiness with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record. both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
sIn qll(·~tioniug tlw forcr of Admiral Tumpr'~ rr~timon~·, :"\fn . .TL'H'l'Icg 
S·I'EmKR' di~~<'nting opinion would :t tf ributc• tlH• conc·Prn of fon•ign in-
te11igt'I1C't' ~c·rncP~ not fo the hazard~ of :11lowing au agc·ut likt• Srwpp to 
puhli~h whafewr lw plea . ;<'~. but, to flu• CIA':-; failure• to (']a~:-;if\ what :\ 
"~>hould hn vc· !wen l'la:-;~iti<'d or ~ t lH' forc·igu gov('f'rlllwnf'~ di"ag;rf't•nwut [_+o J 
with Oil!' go\'c•nmwnf '~ ela~"ifiratiou polie~· ." Post, at fi-7. :\I H .• J L'H'l'!CE 
STJ·;n;N:;' vil'w,.: rn thi~ l't'"P<'C't. not onl~· find no ~uppurf in tlw l'l'C'OI'cl, 
but. Ow~ · al~o l'<'fl<'rt a rni~apprPlwn»ion of the c·orH·f'rll rf'flc·!'tc-d h~· Ad-
miral Tunwr\ f<•><f imon~· . If in fad. in format iun i~ tllll'la""ifiPd or in 
thr public· domain , IIPitlH·r fhr CIA nor· t'orrign ag;t'lll'it·" would be· c·on-
cernrd. The problc·tn i.• fo t·ll~lll'<' in ruloance, and b~· proppr pmc·pdurrs, 
that. inform:dron dt·trimc•nf:d to natior~:~l int<'r<'~t~ i,; not pnhli"IH•d . With-
out a depc·ndablP prc·puhli<"afion r!'virw pro<'Pdt!l't', no illlt•llig<'rH't' ag;PIH'Y 
or re~pon~ihlc go\'t'rllllll'llt oflieial could he a~~ured that. an cmployel' 
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!ClassifiPrl or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
'harmed the lTnited States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935·; 
456 ~., . Supp., at 180.0 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
privy 1o st·n~itive iuformation might not C'Oneludt> on hi" ow11-innoeently 
or ot .hcrwi~<<~tha1 it. ~<houlcl l><• di;;C'Io~Pd to the world. 
The di~;::<·nt finds an ''impli<'alion in th<' Court'~ opinion" that thr CIA 
should hnv<' "cw·te blanche 1o r<•n;::or" rrnplo~·<'<'~' puhli<'at ioll>'. SnPpp'~ 
contrac·t, lww!'\'!'1', n•qu1rc>,.; 110 mon• than a elearanrt• proerdurp ,;uhjt•ct 
to judic·ial l'!'viPw . lf Snc·pp hnd submittPd hi;; lliHtt>rial for reviPw aud 
t.he Ag<'1le~ · had found it to c·m1tain ,.;c•n,-i1ivr matt•rial. it would havp been 
left to tlw Agl•nry to sepk an injunction Hgainst puhlic·ation. Sre Alfrt>d 
A. Knupj , Inc. v. Colby. 509 F. ~d 1aG2 (C'A4) . ei•rt. d('ll1<'<L 4~1 U. S. 
992 ( Hl75) ; Uuit t>d ;:)tati'S \ . Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA-t), (·crt. 
denied, 409 P . S. 106:3 (1972) . 
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of AppealR expressly 
found otherwise, M~t. JusncE STEVEN:5 says that "thP interest in con-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protPrt has not been 
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basi:-; of a premisr wholly at 
odds with the rrcorcl, the dissent bifmcate::; Suepp's 1968 agreement and 
treats its interdrpendent provi~ions a::> if tht'Y imposed unr('lated obliga-
tions . MR . .JusTICE 8'1'EVBNS then analogize" Snepp's prepublication revirw 
agreement with the Government to a private cmploype's cov('nant not to 
compew wtth hi;, employrr. Post, at. 3. A body of privatp law intended 
to presprve f'Olll]JPtition , however, l'impl~ · ha::; no bra ring 011 a cont raet 
made by tlw Dirrctor of t.be CIA in conformity with hi,- ~f<ttutory obliga-
tion to ''pro1C'eLtJ intelli~~:enc•t> ~>ource;; m1d mPthod:; from l!Uauthorized 
disclo urc." 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3) . 
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the Court of Appeals left it '0 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant RO elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in cri111inal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, 11requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.11 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
10 Judgr Hoffman '~ dis~ent :,;uggest"' that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F . 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
038. 
11 See id. , at 939 (Hoffman, .T., eoncurring m part and dissenting in part). 
MR. JusTinJ S'I'~~\'BNS coneedl't; that., rwn in the abownce of a written 
contraet, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the cour:;e of his employment. Post , at 3. 
lie also COncedes t.hat alJ per~ona) profit ~; gaiuPd from thE' exploitation of' 
such information arr impressed with a constructive trm;t in favor of the 
employer. Post, at 5. In thi~; ca;;e, he :seems to think that the common 
law would not tn•at information as "confidE-ntial" unle:ss it were "classified ." 
Sec, e. g. , post, at 3. We have thought tllllt the common-law obligation 
waH considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comment::; b, d (1958); 
V Scott on Trusts § 505 (1967). But ~ince thi:; ca::;e involves a written \ 
eontract. sp<>eifi<·all.\· mtpo~ing a. !ru"t, wr ll<'l'd pot look to thP common 
law to d<'tcnuinc 1:-\m•pp '~ fidm:iary relati onship. 
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only fund.s attributable to the 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ag~s out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full 
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PER CURIAM. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a. 
judgment enforcing an a.greement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) . He also contends that punitive damages are an inap· 
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross~petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgM ,. 
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the a.ccount without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
·executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish . . . any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." /d., at 58a.1 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had 11willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had 11caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
I d. , at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA . .. without the express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative.u Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F . Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Court of Appeals a.nd the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F . 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 181}-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable' 
as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed 
thr ngrerment that expre:osly obligated him to submit any proposed publi-
·t ation for prior review. He doe~ not cfuim that he executed t his agree-· 
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936.4 In other words, 
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. 
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
ment under duresR. Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when 
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's 
agreement is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's 
statutory mandate to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932 . 
..MQ.reover, this Court'R cases make rlen.r thnt~even in the ab::;ence of an 
express ngreemPnt,-the CIA/artrd to protect substantial govermnent in- c.c~.A./.52 L.....:a.tJe_, 
tcrcst,; by imposing rensonnt!P restrictions on employee activities that in 
other contexts might br protrcted by the Fir:;t Amendment. Civil Service 
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); liN' Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); 
id., at 844-848 (PowELL, J., c•oncurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 
(1972). Tho Govrrmnent hn~ n compelling interest in protecting both the 
secrecy of information important to our national security and the appear-
nnce of confidentiality ~o essentinl to the effect-ive operation of our foreign 
intclligencP service. Sec p. 5, in/l·a. The agreement that Snrpp signed is a 
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest. 
• The Government's conc•ion distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CAli), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government clajmed that a former CIA employee intended to 
viohLto hm agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1313. Marchetti tluorefor<' did not consider the a11propriatc remedy for-
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue-
ln M arcl!etti. 
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the I 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." !d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hofl"man argued, were both a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con .. 
structive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed. Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship.0 The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance. 
Snepp stipulated at trifil that-after undertaking this obliga-
tion- he had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified 
information, including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
UI, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
Government .. .. " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of' 
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and rna~ 
terials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff~ 
man, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types or 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 5 
tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle--
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
informa.tion that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire. What-
ever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its \ 
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the security of the United State~ 
and-in a sense-the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely 
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense with-
out the benefit of dependable fore;~~:n intelligence. See generally T. Powers, 
The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979). 
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security of infonnatiou that might compromise them and 
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
8 In uestioning the forceL,Admiral Turner's testimony, Ma. JusTICE 
STEVENS' ·sseuting opinion declares that damage to our Nation's ability 
to cooperat with foreign intelligence services "must. be accepted as an 
inevitable byp uct of the exercise of First Amendment rights by govern-
ment employees. Post, at. 6-7. This notion that_) h Government is 
helple:>S to protects 1rces of intelligence which m11-y!Se vital to the preser-
vation of national S<' rit~· and the conduct of foreign affairs finds no 
support, in the decisions I' this Court. We have held consistently that, 
in order to protect. substan 'al gg_yernment intere;;ts, the Government can 
restrict, its employees in activ '6 that in other contexts might be protected 
by the First Amcndme . See ases cited, at n. 3, supra. One would 
have thought that. hose prrceden applied with spPcial force to a CIA 
agent who ha , cce::;:s to sen ~:<itive int igence. In any event, the dissent's 
statenwn · · scarcrly relevant in light o e expre;;s obligntion tha.t SuepJl .7 :rily undertook "" a condition of 1 • employment with the CIA. 
•.' 
1-17-80 
No. 78-1871, Snepp v. U.S. 
new footnote 8, page 6 
In questioning the force of Admiral Turner's testimony, 
Mr. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion would attribute the 
concern of foreign intelligence services not to the hazards of 
allowing an agent like Snepp to publish whatever he pleases, but 
to the CIA's failure to classify what "should have been classified 
or of the foreign government's disagreement with our government's 
classification policy". Post, at 6-7. Mr. Justice Stevens' views 
in this respect not only find no support in the record, but they 
also reflect a misapprehension of the concern reflected by Admiral 
Turner's testimony. If in fact information is unclassified or in 
the public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be 
concerned. The problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper 
procedures, that information detrimental to national interests is 
not published. Without a dependable prepublication review 
procedure, no intelligence agency or responsible government 
official could be assured that an employee privy to sensitive 
information might not conclude on his own - innocently or 
otherwise - that it should be disclosed to the world. 
The dissent finds an "implication in the Court's 
opinion" that the CIA should have "carte blanche to censor" 
employees' publications. Snepp's contract, however, requires no 
more than a clearance procedure subject to judicial review. If 
Snepp had submitted his material for review and the Agency had 
found it to contain sensitive material, it would have been left to 
the Agency to seek an injunction against publication. See Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (CA4), cert. denied, 421 
u.s. 992 (1975): United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (CA4), 
cert. denied, 409 u.s. 1063 (1972). 
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Government. 595 F . 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.9 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
\ 
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that___ 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly 
found otherwise, MR. JusTICE STEVENS says that "the interest in con-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been 
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at 
odds with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and 
treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obliga-
tions. MR. Jus'l'ICE S'I'EVENS then analogizes Snepp's prepublication review 
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to 
compete with his employer. Post, at 3. A body of private law intended 
to preserve competition, however, simply has no bearing on a contract 
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obliga-
tion to "prot.ec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure." 50 U.S. C. §403 (d)(3). 
10 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
'938. 
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.11 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
11 See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS concedes that, rven in the absence of a written 
contract, an rmployee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3. 
He also concedes t}utt all personal profits gained from the exploitation of 
such information are impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the 
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common 
law would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were "classified." 
See, e. g., post, at 3. We ha.ve thought that the common-law obligation 
was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958); 
V tt n Trusts § 505 ( 1967). But since this ca.;,;e involves a written 
contract specifically tiel!igned to,>~osur confidential 
iufomw:io we-ha no-occ:urion to linger over that question . There is 
..1~ to-iiTvulre eommon-la principle.s.i1Lord6r to impot>e-tt constructi¥& 
trQilt. BB Snepp' ~rofit .-
1 ,_ t<J b'SI:_j a -4-vc.s"t> ~ V1..€_~ 
koi:: ltrok. -lv -fL.. e.. ~1-1..-"\~ /oz_t-J 
-1-v de.-+e..r~;~ S~~t.> 
~lA-C.) ~( re-/oz~.,~ s~ij/', 
• 
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breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full 
judgment of the District Court. 
So ordered. 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITION F10R WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OP' A:fl'EALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78--1871 and 79-265. Decided January-, 1980 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom · MR. JusTICE BRENNAN 
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed.an employment agreement 
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency 
any information he intended to publish about it for prepubli~ 
cation review.1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the 
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the. power to censor 
its employees' critical speech, but rather ·to ensure that classi~ 
· fied, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the 
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926, 
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F . 
2d 1309, 1317 (CA~. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
In this caSe Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit 
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for 
prepublication review. However, the Go~emment has con~ 
ceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic m~ 
terial.2 Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality 
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in ' 1976 in which he made 
the same commitment. 
• In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that 
". ,'. Decent IntervoJ contains classified infol'IJlation or any information 
concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA," 
the Government stated that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintitf'does 
npt so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession, 
the district judge sustained the Government's objections to qefense efforts 
to detennine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that 
the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral 
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu. 
the CIA'e Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153. 
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that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not 'been 
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Gov-
'ernment unprecedented and drastic . relief in the form of a 
eonstructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the-
sale of the book. Because that · remedy is not authorized by 
. any applicable law and because tt ·is most inappropriate for 
'the Court to dispose of this novel i~sQe s\.unmarily on the 
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, · I re-
spectfully dissent. 
I 
\. The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported 
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although 
, Congress has enacted a nu:,nber of criminal statutes punishing 
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified 
information,~ it has not seen fit to authorize the constructive 
'· trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor does either of the 
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such 
remedy in the event of a breach! The Court's per curiam 
opinion seems to suggest that its result is supported by a 
blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts.>ll But 
8 See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 798, which impolo'es a prison term of 10 years 
and a $10,000 fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certain types of 
classified information ; 18 U. S. C.§ 794, which makes it a criminal offense 
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defense information 
to a foreign government; and 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdraws the 
right to government retirement benefits from a person convicted of violat-
ing these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401, 
which provides administrative sanctions, including discharge, against em-
ployees who publish classfied information. 
~ In both his original employment agreement and the termination agree-
ment Snepp acknowled~ed the criminal penalties that might attach to any 
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he 
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cause for ternlina-
tion of his employment. No other remedies were mentioned in either 
· agreement. 
:; In light of its heavy reliance in the text on principles of fiduciary 
· · duty and contract law und its failure to identify any other source for the 
:result it. announc~ today, I find t.he Court's statement in a footnote that 1\..u.J 
there "is no need to invoke common law principles in order to impose a 
' ' 
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neither of the&- branches of the common law supports the 
impositiOn of a constructive trust under the circumstances of 
this case. 
Plainly this iH not a typical trust situation in which a set-
tlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for 
the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is 
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses 
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his 
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the 
common law even in the absence of a written employment 
agreement, i.s the duty to protect confidential or "classified" 
information, If Snepp had breached that obligation, the com-
mon law would support the implication of a constructive trust 
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential 
information ,6 
But Snepp did l10t breach his duty to protect confidential 
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, irnu 
posed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to 
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the im-
position of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to 
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to dis-
close, labeling them both as "fidueiary." I find nothing in 
the common law to support such an approach. 
Employment agreements often contain covenants designed 
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies 
with his duty not to disclose or misuse confidential informa-
tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to cornu 
constructiv:fl 'Lru,;t. on Snepp'.-. profits," ante, at 8, n . 11, surprising, to ( 
e,a.y t.he )ea.-st. 
6 See, e. g., Spm·y Rand Co1'p. v. A-T-0, Inc. , 447 F . 2d 1387, 1392 
(CA4 1971), cen demed, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia law) ; Tltrpek v. 
Chev1'on Oil Co., 407 .F. 2d 1121:1 (CA8 1969) (Arkansas law) ; Stl"uctuml 
Dynamics Research Cm-p. v. Engineering Mechanics R esearch Corp., 401 
F. Supp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mich. 1975) (Michigan law) ; Re~;tatement 
(Second) of Agency §a96 (c) (1958) (" Unless otherwise agreed, after the 
termination of the agm1ey the agent. : ... (c) hal:! a duty to account for 
profits made by the' ;;ale or use of trade secret8 and ot.ht>r confidential 
lnfo.rm>~.tion, whPLhP-r or not, in eompetitiou with t.he priiwipal . ••• ") . 
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pete. Contru.ty to the majority's approach in this case, the 
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply 
because they suvport a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they 
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary, 
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an in· 
_dividual's fr~~dom of t~ade, they are enforceable only if they 
can survive scrutiny under the "nile of reason." 'That rule, 
originally laid down in the seminal case of Mitchel v. Rey· 
nolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (17ll), requires that 
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a 'legitimate 
. interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidenti-
ality), that the employer's interest not "be outweighed by the 
public interest,'1 and that the covenant not be of any longer 
duration or wider georaphicaJ scope than necessary to protect 
the employer's iuterest.8 
'The Court has not persuaded nie that a rule of reason} 
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenant to submit 
to prepublicatiou review. Like an ordinary employer, the 
CIA has a vital wterest in protecting certain types of infqr-
. 7 As the court held in Herbert Mor1·is. Ltd. v. Sa:xelby, 1 App. Ca . 
'[1916] 688, 704, the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does 
not out,weigh the public interest in 'keeping the employee in the workforce: 
~a ••• [A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the 
skill and knowledge in his trade or profession which he has learnt 
in the courl:le of his employment by means of directions or instructionl:j 
from the employer. Th~~ot information and that additional skill he is 
entitled to use for the benefit of hin1self and the benefit, of the public 
who gain the advantage of his having had such admirable instruction. 
The case in which the Court interferes for the purpose of protection is 
where use is made, not of the skill wl1ich the man may ha.ve acquired, 
but of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to 
reveal to an)' one el:>e. . . / ' 
8 8«_., e y., !Jriggs v. R. R. Donn£lley & Smt8 Co., 589 F . 2d 39, 41 (CAl 
1978) (Illinois law) ; Arne1ican Hot Rod Ass-n., Inc. v. Can'ier, 500 F . 2d 
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina law); Alston Studios, 1rw. v • 
. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F . 2d '279, '282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia 
la.w) ; Mixing ]i}quiprnent Co. v. Philadelphia ·oear, "Trw., 436 Jl,. 2d 1308, 
13~2 (CA3 1971) (New York law) ; Water Services, 'Inc. v. Tesco Chemi• 
r:als, lnc., 410 },. 2d 163, 167 (CA5 1969) (Georgia law) ; Restatement. 
(Second.) of Contractt! § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 12, MaJ'ch 1971). 
.. 
' 
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mation ; at the same time, the CIA employee has a counter~ 
vailing interest iu preserving a wide range of work oppor~ 
tunities (including work as an author) and in protecting his 
First Amendment rights. The public interest lies in a proper 
accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission of 
the agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified 
information . When the Government seeks to enforce ·a harsh 
restriction on the employee's freedom 9 despite its admission 
that the interest the agreement was designed to protect-the 
confidentiality of classified information-has not been com-
promised, an equity court might well be persuaded that the 
case is not one in which the covenant should be enforced. 
But even assuming that 8nepp's covenant to submit to pre~ 
publication review should be enforced, the constructive trust 
im~sed by the eourt ls net an appropriate remedy. If an 
employee has used his employer's confldential information for 
his own personal profit, a constructive trust over those profits 
is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are 
the direct result of the breach. But Snepp admittedly did 
not use couflden tial information in his book; nor were the 
profits from his book in any sense a product of his failure to 
submit the hook for prepublication review. even if 
Snepp had submitted the book to the agency for prepublic~ 
tion review, the Government's censorship authority woul<t 
surely have been limited to the excision of classified material. 
In this case, then, it would have been obliged to clear the 
book for publication in precisely the same form as it now 
o Tlw covena.ut impOI:les a serlou~ prior restraint on Snepp's ability to I 
speak freely, Si~ infra n. 15, and is of indefinite duration and scope-. 
f1wl.ors that would llll\ke mo.st. similar covenants unenforceable: See, e. g., 
Alsto·n Studio~>. lnc. v. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2d 279, 
283 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Virgin~t law :t covenant with no 
geographiCal hmitat.ion); American Hot Rod Assn., lru: . v. Carrier, 500 
F. 2u 1~6\J, 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under North Carolina 
law a cov£-JlHnt wlth no durational or geographical limitation) ; E. L. 
Conwea & Co . v. Gutberiet, 429 F . 2d 527, 528 (CA4 1970) (holding voicf' 
under Maryland hl.W a envemmt with no durational or geogr-aphical 
limitation) • 
6 
~ands?0 'rhus, Snepp has not gained any profits as a result 
of his breach; the Government, rather than Snepp, will be 
unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits attrib-
utable entirely to his own legitimate activity.11 
Despite the fact that Snepp has. not caused the Govern-
ment the type of harm that wo~ld ordinarily be remedied by 
the imposition of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to 
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the 
Government has suffered BQme harm. But, in light of the 
'•. sketchy trial record in this. case, even that factual determina-
tion is difficult to support_ The Court bases its finding ·of 
hann on teatimony by the Director of the CIA,· Admiral 
Stansfield Turner. stating that Snepp's bOolc and others like 
it have jeopardized the CIA's relationship with foreign in-
telligence services by . making them unsure of the agency's 
ability to maintain confidentiality .. · Admiral Turner's trun-
Cfl-ted testimony does not ·explain whether these unidentified 
"other'' books actually contained clas8ified information (un-
like Snepp's) or whether foreign ·agencies fear the publication 
of unclaBSified information which Snepp and other CIA em-
ployees 'have a First Amendment right to disseminate.12 · If 
10 If he had · ~ubmitted the book to the agency and the agency had re-
fused to consent to the· publication of certain material in it, .Snepp could 
have obtained · judicial review to determine whether the agency was cor-
rect in con.sidering the material clasSified. See United States v. Marchetti, 
466 F. 2d 1309,· 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
11 As the Court of Appeals held, to the extent that the Government seeks 
to punish Snepp for· breaching · his obligation tQ -submit the manuscript 
for prepublication review or to deter others from engaging in similar 
breaches, punitive damages are clearly a ·more appropriate remedy than a 
constructive tmat; · ". . . since .a constructive · trust· depends on· the con-
cept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See 
D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246 (1973)." ·595 
F. 2d, at 937. 
12 The District Judge sustained the Government's objections to ques-
tions concerning the · identity of other agents who had published the unau-
. thorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 136. However, 
Admiral Turner did 'testify that the harmful lDaterials involved "[p)ri-
.: marily -the appeamnee in the United States tnedia of identification ~9!' 
j+L/ 
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the former is true, I fail to see how Snepp's book, which does 
not reveal confidences, has exacerbated the problem. And if 
tpe latter is true, then the reluctance of foreign governments 
to work with our Government is a consequence either of the 
failure of the agency to classify information that should have 
b~ classified or of the foreign government's disagreement 
with our Government's classification policy. 
I share the Court's appraisal of the importance of an ef-
.fective intelligence service and I agree with it that the CIA 
has broad power to protect its vital sources by classifying 
information whose disclosure may compromise its mission. 
I cannot ·agree with the implication in the Court's opinion, 
however, that the agency has carte blanche to censor its em-
..12.------p~lo-:YEl;-.. ' publication of even unclassified information or infor-
mation that is already in the public domain on the basis of 
its opinion that publication may be "detrimental to vital 
national iuterest." Ante, at 5. The CIA never attempted to 
assert such power over Snepp in either of the contracts he 
signed ; rather, the agency itself limited its censorship power 
to preventing the disclosure of "classified" information. 
Moreover, even assuming that allowing the CIA the power to 
impose such a wide-ranging prior restraint would be good 
national security policy, I would have difficulty reconciling· 
such a policy with the demands of the First Amendment. 
sources and method::~ of eollecting intelligence . .. . " Tr. 143. This type 
of information is certainly confidential and is specifically the type of in-
formation that Snepp has maintained he did not reveal in Decent Interval. 
See, e. g., Snepp's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show, 
in which he stated: " ... I have made a very determined effort not to 
expose sources or methods .••• " Government's Requests for AdmiSBions, 
Record Item 19. 
Spepp's attorneys were also foreclosed from asking Admiral Turner 
whether particular foreign sources had stopped cooperating with United 
States' authorities as a. direct result of the publication of Decent Interval. 
Tr. 138. Thus, it is unclear whether or why foreign sources may have-
reacted unfavorably to its publication. ~owever, William E. Colby, the' 
CIA's former Director, did indic11te in his testimony that foreign nation~r 
genjlrally have a stricter secrecy code than does the Unite~ States. Trr . 
17.5-l'Z6.. . 
...... ~ 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
II 
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on 
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari- is 
just as unprecedented ~s its disposition of the merits. 
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth 
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunc-
tion requiring him to s'ubmit all f\J:ture manuscripts for pre-
publication review and remanded for a determination ·of 
whether punit!ve damages would be appropriate for his failure 
to submit Decent Irderval to the_agency prior to its publication. 
The Government filed· a brief in opposition as well as a cross-
petition for certiorari ) tQe Government specifically stated, 
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire 
case before the Court in the..event that the Court should decide 
to grant Snepp's ,petition. , The G<:}vernment explained that 
" [b] ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of ap-
peals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's 
interest, the government has not independently sought review in 
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government 
stated that "[i]f this Court grants .[Snepp's} .. . petition for a 
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871, it should also grant this cross-
petition. lf the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this peti-
tion should also be denied." Petition, at 5. 
Given the Government's position, ·it would be ·highly inap-
propriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction, 
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's. 
Yet that is in essence what bas been done.u ·The majority 
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this 
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as 
manifestly "without merit~" Ante, at 2, n. 3. It·is clear that 
Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own. 
merits. 
. 18 I have been UMble to discover any previous case· in which the Court 
· has acted as it doe!:! today, reaching the merits of a. conditional cross-· 
petition detipite it8 belief that the petition does not merit gr~tnting: 
' certiorari, 
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The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this 
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily 
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact 
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive 
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the 
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the 
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not 
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security," ante, at 6, and (b) that it might 
require the Government to reveal confidential information 
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather 
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might 
thus be left with "no remedy at all," ante, at 7. It seems 
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either 
ground by the Government's acquiescence in . the punitive 
damages remedy. Moreover, the second rationale His entirely 
speculative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong. 
The Court states that : 
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an 
award of punitive damages might force the Government 
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised 
to protect." 
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government 
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving 
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to 
comply with his duty to subll).it the manuscript for prepubli-
cation review and that the Government relied on these mis-
representations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a 
showing would require the Government to reveal any con-
fidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery 
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante,' at 7. 
III 
The uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking 
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable-
:14 Which , it should be noted, does not appear anywhere in the Govern-
ment's 5-page cross-petition. 
; 
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principles that favor a more conservative approach to this 
case. 
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused 
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that 
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an 
opportunity to appraise the adequacy of the punitive damages 
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion 
that equitable relief is necessary. 
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware 
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to 
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to 
criticize his government.15 Inherent in this prior restraint is 
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority 
to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an 
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the de-
mands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior 
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy 
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It 
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me 
that that burden has been met. 
I respectfully dissent. 
15 The mere fact that the agency has the authority to reView the text 
of a critical book in search of cl~ssified information before it is published 
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover, 
the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form 
of prior restraint that would not be tolerated in other contexts. See, 
·e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. ·,713; Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. In view of the national interest 
in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I am not prepared to say 
that the restraint is necessarily intolerable in this context. I am, 'however, 
prepared to say that, certiorari having been grant~d, the issue surely 
should not oo resolved in the absence of full briefing and argument. 
To: The Chi.8f Jusr, t 't;; 
Mr. Justice Bronn an 
Yr. Justice Stev:art 
l4:r. Justice Wh1te 
Mr. Jmrt;' ce 1.b.rallall 
t<fT. Jl l . .J .• ·:') Blaokmun 
Ur. Jmrt 1ce Powell 
Mr. Ju.s t1 co Rabnquist 
From: Yx. Justice Stevens 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided January -, 1980 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN 
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement 
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency 
any information he intended to publish about it for prepubli-
cation review.1 'The purpose of such an agreement, as the 
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor 
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classi-
fied, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the 
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926, 
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit 
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for 
prepublication review. However, the Government has con-
ceded that the 'book contains no c1assified, nonpublic rna. 
teriaJ.2 Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality 
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made 
the same commitment. 
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that 
" • .. Decent Interval contains classified information or any information 
concerning intelligence or CIA lhat has not been made public by CIA," 
the Government stated that "[fjor the purpose of this action, plaintiff does 
not so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession, 
the district JUdge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts 
to determine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that 
the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral 
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu~ 
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153, 
·. 
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that nep p\, ctw lt-a,ct, was designed to protect has not been 
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Gov" 
ernment Ullprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a 
constructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the 
sale of the book. Because that r€'medy is not authorized by 
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for 
the Cour·t to dispose of this novel issue ·summarily on the 
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I re-
spectfully dissent. 
'I 
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported 
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although 
Congress has enacted a nuniber of criminal statutes punishing 
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified 
information,3 it has not seell fit to authorize the constructive 
trust remedy the Court ·creates today. Nor does either of the 
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such 
remedy in the event of a· breach.1 The Court's per curiam 
opinion seems to suggest that its result is supported by a 
blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts." But 
8 See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 798, whieh imposes a prison term of 10 years 
and a $10,000 fine for knowingly ~tnd willfully publishing cerULin types of 
classified information ; 18 U.S. C.§ 794. which makes it a criminal offense 
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defense information 
to a foreign government; and 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdmws the 
right to government retiremenL benefits from a person convicted of violat-
ing these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401, 
which provides administrative sancti011~, including discharge, against em-
ployees who publish clas::;ified information. Thus, even in the ab::;rnce of] 
:1 ronstruct1vr trust remedy, Hll agrnt like Snepp would hardly be f.ree, as 
the majorit~· ,;uggest;:;, "to publish whatevrr he pleases." Ante, at o, n. 8. 
4 In hoth his origmal employment agreement and the Lerminatiori agree-
ment Snepp u.cknowledged the criminal penalties that might atta.ch to any 
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he 
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cau<>e for tenni..t1a,. 
tion of hi~:~ employment;. No other remedie~:~ were mentioned in either 
agreement. 
6 ln a foot note, &l'P ante, at 8, n. 11, the Court ~ugge::;t:;; thai it need not 7 
look to tlw r·ommon law to ~uppor1 it~ holdmg beeau<>e the ca~c involve1:1 a 
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neither of these branches of the common law supports the 
imposition of a constructive trust under the circumstances of 
this case. 
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a set-
tlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for 
the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is 
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses 
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his 
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the 
common law even in the absence of a written employment 
agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified" 
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the com-
mon law would support the implication of a constructive trust 
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential 
information.6 
But Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential 
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, im-
posed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to 
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the im-
position of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to 
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to dis-
dose, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in 
the common law to support such an approach. 
Employmellt agreements ofte11 'Contain covellants designed 
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies 
with his duty not to clisclose or misuse confidential informa-
written contrnrt Bnt, inn~murh as tlw eontract itself does not state what] 
remedy is to be applied in the PVE'nt of a breach, the eommon law iH the 
only Rouree of Jaw to whieh we can look to determine what cou~titul<'S 
an appropriate rPnwdy. 
(l See, 1'. g., Sper1·y Rand Corp. v. A-T-0, Inc., 447 F. 2d 1387, 1392 
(CA4 1971), cert,. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia law) ; Tla:pek v. 
Chevron Oil Co., 407 .F. 2d 1129 (UAH H)(i9) (Arkan~as law) ; Structural 
Dynamics Nesearch Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Re8earch Corp., 401 
F. Snpp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mirh. 1975) (Michigan law) ; R{'statement 
(Serond) of Ageney § 39o (r) (1958) ("Unle~s otherwi::;c agreed, <lfter the 
Lermination of the agency the agent: ... (c) ha~:> a duty to account for 
profits madtl by the ::;alP or u,.;c of trade ,;erret" and other eonfidential 
infornmtion, whether or uot. in eornpl't.ition wit.h the principal .•• ,''). 
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tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to com-
pete. Contrary to the majority's approach in this case, the 
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply 
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they 
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary, 
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an in-
dividual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable only if they 
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." ·That rule, 
originally .laid down in the seminal case of Mitchel v. Rey-
nolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, ·24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), requires that 
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate 
interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidenti-
ality), that the employer's interest not be outweighed by the 
public interest.7 and that the ·covenant not be of any longer· 
duration or wider georaphical scope than necessary to protect 
the employer's interest.8 
The Court has not persuaded me that a rule of reason 
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenaut to submit 
to prepublication review. Like an ordinary employer, the 
7 As t!JP court lwld in Herbert Mol'1·is. Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. Cas. 
P916] 688, 704, 'the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does 
not outweigh the public interest in keeping the ·employee in the workforce : 
" • . . [A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the 
skill and · knowledge in his · trade Dr profession which he has learnt 
in the course of hio; employment by means of directions or ino;tructions 
from the employer. That information and that additional ~kill he is 
entitled to use for the benefit of him::;elf and the benefit of the public 
who gain the advantage of his having lH\d such admirable instruction. 
The case in which . the Court · interferes for · the purpose of protection is 
where use is ma.de, not of · the ·skill which the man may have acquired, 
hut of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to 
reveal to any one ebe. . . ." 
8 See, e. g. , B1iggs v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 589 F . 2d 39,41 (CAl 
1978) (Illinois law) ; American Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. CmTier, 500 F. 2d 
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina. la.w); Alston St·udios, Inc . v. 
Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F . 2d 279 , 282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia 
law) ; Mixing Equipment Co . v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F. 2d 1308, 
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law) ; Water Services. Inc . v. 'l'esco Chemi-
cals, Inc., 410 F . 2d 163, lfi7 (CA5 1969) (Georgia. law) ; Re:>tatement 
(Second) 0f Contracts § ~30 (Tent. Dra.ft No. 12, March HJ77). 
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CIA has a vita] interest in protecting certain types of infor-
mation; at the same time, the CIA employee has a counter-
vailing interest in preserving a wide range of work oppor-
tunities (including work as an author) and in protecting his 
First Amendment rights. The public interest lies in a proper 
accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission of 
the agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified 
information. When the Government seeks to enforce a harsh 
restriction on the employee's freedom,9 despite its admission 
that the interest the agreement was designed to protect-the 
·confidentiality of classified information-has not been com-
promised, an equity court might well be persuaded that the 
case is not one in which the covenant should be enforced.10 
But even assuming that Snepp's covenant to submit to pre-
publication review should be enforced, the constructive trust 
imposed by the Court is not an appropriate remedy. If an 
employe<' has used his employer's confidential information for 
his own personal profit. a constructive trust over those profits 
is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are 
the direct result of the breach. But Snepp admittedly did 
not use confidential information in his book; nor were the 
:J The rownan! impose::; a , erious prior restraint on Snrpp'~ ability to 
~>peak frr<·l y, ~rr mfra n. 15, nnd i~:> of iudefiuite duration and :>ropc"-
faclon; that. would makr moRt ~imilar rovenantH unenforc~·abl<' . See, e. y ., 
Alston Studws , Inc. v. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F . 2d 27!), 
2R3 (CA4 197+) (holding void under Virgiua law a covenant. with no 
geographical lit111tation) ; American llot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Carrier. 500 
F . 2d 126!), 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under North Carolina. 
bw a cov<>nant w1th no dumtional or geographical limitation) ; E. L. 
Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F . 2d 527, 5:28 (CA4 1970) (holding void 
under Maryland law a covenant with no dumtimml or geographical 
limitation) . 
10 Th!' Coul"l rorr('ctly point:; out thaL the Government may regulate 
certain aPtivitie~ of 1t;; employer>< that would be protected by thr First 
Amendmrut 111 otlwr rontext:<. Aute, a! :3, 11 . 3. But none of tlw ca;;es it 
C'itr~< illvolvrd a requirem<>ut that an employee ;;ubmit a propo::;rd public 
statrml'nt for pr<'rPIPa~r cen:;orKhip or approval. The Court ha,; not pre-
viou;o;l~ ron:;Hinrd the rnforrrabilit~· of thi::; kmd of prior rt'litramt or tlw 
remedy lhal :;hould he impo~ed in tiH' event of a breach, 
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profits from his book in any sense a product of his failure to 
submit the book for prepublication review. For, even if 
Snepp had submitted the book to the agency for prepublica-
tion review, the Government's censorship authority would 
surely have been limited to the excision of classified material. 
In this case, then, it would have been obliged to clear the 
book for publication in precisely the same fonn as it now 
stands.n Thus, Snepp has not gained any profits as a result 
of his breach; the Government. rather than Snepp, will be 
unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits attrib-
utable entirely to his own legitimate activity. 
Despite the fact that Snepp has not caused the Govern-
ment the type of harm that would ordinarily be remedied by 
the imposition of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to 
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the 
Govemment has suffered some harm. The Court states that 
publication of "unreviewed material'' by a former CIA agent 
"can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the pub-
lished information is unclassified." Ante, at 5. It then seems 
to suggest that the injury in such cases stems from the 
agency's inability to catch "harmful" but unclassified informa-
tion before it is published. I do not believe, however, that 
the agency has any authority to censor its employees' publica-
tion of unclassified informatiou on the basis of its opinion that 
publication may be "detrimental to vital national interests" 
11 If he had ~ubnntted tlw book to the rtgeucy and the agent')' had rc-
fm;ed to consent to the publication of certain material in it, Snepp could 
have obtained jndJCial review to determine whether the agency was cor-
rect in considering the material classified. See United States v. Marchetti, 
46ti F . 2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972) , cert. denied, 409 U. S. 106:3. It is 
uotPworthy that thP Court dot·~ uot di~agree with the Fourth Circuit's 
view in Marr·hetti, reiterated in Snepp, that a CIA employe!:' ha,; a Fir~t 
AuwndmPnt nght to p11bli~h uncla~~ified information. Thu~, despitP its 
referpnce in footnote ;~ of itH opmion to the Government';; so-called com-
[WIIing intere:st in protecting " thP appearance of confidentiality ," ante, at 
3, n. 3, and de~pite :-;orne ambiguity in the Court's rcfrreiH'C to "detri-
uwutnl ' and "harmful" HI' oppo~rd to ~classifird" information, ante, at 
5, l do not undN;,iaud the Court to imply that the Governnwnt could 
ohtain <Ill inJllll<:t wu again~l t ht' publication of unclas~ified mformation .. 
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or otherwise "identified as harmful." Ibid. The CIA never 
attempted to assert such power over Snepp in either of the 
coutracts he signed; rather, the agency itself limited its cen-
sorship power to preventing the disclosl,.lre of "classified" 
information. Moreover, even if such a wide-rauging prior 
restraint would be good 11ational security policy, I would have 
great difficulty reconciling it with the demands of the First 
Amenumeut. 
The Court also relies to some extent on the Government's 
theory at trial that Snepp caused it harm by flouting his pre-
publication review obligation and thus making it appear that 
the CIA was powerless to prevent its agents from publishing 
any information they chose to publish, whether classified or 
not. The Goverument theorized that this appearance of 
weakness would discourage foreign governments from coop-
erating with the CIA because of a fear that their secrets might 
also be compromised. In support of its position that Snepp's 
book had in fact had such an impact, the Government intro-
duced testimony by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stans-
field Turner, stating that Snepp's book and others like it had 
jeopardized the CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence 
services by making them unsure of the agency's ability to 
maintain confidentiality. Admiral Turner's truncated testi-
mony does not explain, however, whether these unidentified 
"other" books actually contained classified information.12 If 
so, it is difficult to believe that the publication of a book like 
12 The Dist ri<"1 .TudgP su::;tained the Government's objeclioni> to ques-
tions concerning the identity of other agents who had published the unau-
thorized works to which Admiral '1\uner referred. Tr. 136. However, 
Admiral TurnPr did testify that the harmful materials involved "[p]ri-
marily the appearance in the United States media of identification of 
sources and method::; of collecting intelligence . ... " Tr. 143. ThiR type 
of information is certainly confidential and is specifically the type of in-
formation th,tt Snepp has maintained he did not reveal in Decent Interval. 
See, e. g., Snepp 's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomonow show, 
in which he l:itated : " . . . I have made a very determined effort not to 
expose ::;ourrr:; or methods, . •. " Government's Requests for Admissions, 
Rerord Tteru 19. 
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Sitepp's, which does not reveal classified information, has 
significantly weakened the agency's position. Nor does it 
explain whether the unidentified foreign agencies who have 
stopped cooperating with the CIA have done so because of 
a legitimate fear that secrets will be revealed or because they 
merely disagree with our Government's classification policies.13 
In any event, to the extent that the Government seeks to 
punish Snepp for the geuera.lized harm he has caused by 
failing to submit to prepublication review and to deter others 
from following in his footsteps, punitive damages is. as the 
Court of Appeals held, clearly the preferable remedy" ... 
since a constructive trust depends on the concept of unjust 
enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See 
D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246 
(1973) ." 595 F. 2d, at 937.11 
II 
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on 
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is 
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits. 
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth 
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunc-
tion requiring him to submit all future manuscripts for pre-
publication review and remanded for a determination of 
whether punitive damages would be appropriate for his failure 
to submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication. 
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a cross-
1 ~ Snep]l 's attorneys were forr<"losrd from asking Admiral Turnrr whethrr J 
particular forrign source:; had stopped eooperating with United Stat<>s' 
authontiC's as a dm'ct result of tlw puhlictttion of Decent Interval . Tr. 
138. 'flnt::l, it. is nne1flltr whether or· why foreign sources may hav<> reacted 
unfavorably to it:; publication. However, William E. Colby, the CIA's I I 
former Dirretor, drd indicate in hi~ te~timony that for~1 nation~ generally +e. 
have a Htrretrr ,;ecrecy code than does the United Statel:i. Tr. 175-176. 
14 One of the Court's justifications for rb; constructiw trust n•medy is 
that ' 'rt cannot :saddle the former agent wrth exemplary damagel:i out of all 
proportron to his gam.'' Ante. at 9. This solicitude for Snepp'::; welfare 
is ra fher iron1e m view of tbe dmconian nature of the remedy imposed by 
lhe Court todny . 
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petition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated, 
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire 
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide 
to grant Snepp's petition. The Government explained that 
"[b] ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of ap-
peals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's 
interest, the government has not independently sought review in 
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government 
stated that "[i] f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petition for a 
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871, it should also grant this cross-
petition. If the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this peti-
tion should also be denied." Petition, at 5. 
Given the Government's position, it would be highly inap-
propriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction, 
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's. 
Yet that is in essence what has been done.15 The majority 
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this 
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as 
manifestly "without merit." Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that 
Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own 
merits. 
The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this 
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily 
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact 
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive 
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the 
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the 
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not 
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security,'' ante, at 7, and (b) that it might 
require the Government to reveal confidential information 
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather 
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might 
1 5 I hav<· heen unable lo di~cover any pn'vious ca:;e in which the Court 
bas acted as it does today, reaching the merits of a conditional cross-
petition desp1te its belief that the petition does not merit granting 
certiorari. 
·. 
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thus be left with "no remedy at all," ante, at 8. It seems 
to me that the Qourt is foreclosed from relying upon either 
ground by the Government's acquiescence in the punitive 
damage remedy. Moreover, the second rationale '6 is entirely 
specqlati ve and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong. 
The Court states that: 
"Proof of the tortiou~ conduct necessary to sustain an 
award of punitive damages might force the Government 
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised 
to protect." 
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government 
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving 
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to 
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepubli-
cation review and that the Government relied on these mis-
representations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a 
showing would require the Government to reveal any con-
fidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery 
.into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 8. 
III 
The uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking 
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable 
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this 
case. 
Ji'irst, for ceuturies the English-speaking judiciary refused 
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that 
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an 
opportunity to appraise the adequacy of the punitive damage 
remedy in this case, the Court has jurnped to the conclusion 
that equitable relief is necessary. 
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware 
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to 
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to, 
10 Which, it should be noted, do{•s uof appet~r anywhere in the Govern- ·· 
ment's 5-page cross-p~ttition .. 
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criticize his government.' 7 Iuherent in this prior restraint is 
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority 
to delay the p4blication of a critical work or to persua-de an 
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the de-
mands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior 
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy 
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It 
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me 
that that burden hlts been met. 
I respectfully dissent. 
17 The mere fact that the agency has the authority to review the text 
of a critical book in search of classified information before it is published 
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover, 
the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form 
of prior restraint that would not be tolerated in other contexts. See, 
e. g., Netv York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539. In view of the national interest 
in maintaining an effective intelligence ~ervice, I am not prepared to say 
that the r~traint is necessarily intolerable in this context. I am, however, 
prepared to say that, certiorari having been granted, the issue surely 
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In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement 
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency 
any information he intended to publish about it for prepubli-
cation review.1 'The purpose of such an agreement, as the 
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor 
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classi-
fied, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the 
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926, 
932 (CA4 1979) ; see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit 
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for 
prepublication review. However, the Government has con-
ceded that the book contains no c1assified, nonpublic ma-
terial.2 Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality 
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made 
the same commitment. 
2 In response to an intetTogatory asking whether it contended that 
" • .. Decent Interval contains classified information or any information 
concerning mtelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA," 
the Government stated that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintiff does 
not so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession, 
the district JUdge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts 
to determine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that 
the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral 
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135 ; and of Herbert Hetu) 
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153, 
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that uep p'b coli tmct was designed to protect has not been 
compromised. Nevertheless, the Comt today grants the Gov-
ernment unprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a 
<lOnstructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the 
sale of the book. Because , that remedy is not authorized by 
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for 
the Court to dispose of this novel issue ·summarily on the 
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I re-
spectfully dissent. 
'I 
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported 
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although 
Congress has enacted a nuniber of criminal statutes punishing 
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified 
information,8 it has not seeu fit to authorize the constructive 
trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor does either of the 
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such 
remedy in the event of a· breach.4 The Court's per curiam 
opinion seems to suggest that its result is supported by a 
blend of tbe law of trusts and the law of contracts." But 
8 See, e. g., 18 U . S. C. § 798, whirh impo:ses a pri::;on term of 10 years 
and a $10,000 fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certa.in types of 
classified infonnation ; 18 U . S. C. § 794. which makes it a criminal offense 
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defen~e information 
to a foreign government ; atld 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdraws the 
right to government retirement benefits from a per::;on convicted of violat-
ing these statutes. See al:o Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401, 
which provides administrative sanction~, including discharge, again~:>L em-
ployees who publish classified information. Tim:; , even in the absence of] 
a ron:structivl' trul:lt remed~· , an ageut like Snepp would hardly be free, as 
the majority ~ ugge::;t::;, "to publish whatever l1e pleases." Ante, at 6, n. 8. 
4 In both his original employment agreement and the tenninatiori agree-
ment Snepp a.cknowledged the criminal penalties that might attach to any 
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he 
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cau~:>e for termina-
tion of his employment. No other remedies were mentioned in either 
agreement. 
fi In a foot11ote , bPf' unte, fit 8, n . 11, the Court suggests that it neC'd not 7 
look to tlw f'ommon Jaw to ~upport it~ holding becaul:le th<' ca;:;e iuvolve;; a 
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neither of these branches of the common ]aw supports the 
imposition of a constructive trust under the circumstances of 
this case. 
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a set-
tlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for 
the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is 
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses 
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his 
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the 
common law even in the absence of a written employment 
agreemeut, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified" 
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the com-
mon law would support the implication of a constructive trust 
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential 
information.6 
But Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential 
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, im-
posed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to 
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the im-
position of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to 
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to dis-
close, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in 
the common law to support such an approach. 
Employment agreements often •contain covenants designed 
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies 
with his duty not to disclose or misuse confidential informa-
writtc·n conirari But, inasmuch as the <"ontract itl:lrlf do<·~ not Riate what·] 
remedy is to br applied in thr Pvent of a brcarh, the common law i:; the 
only ROlli'<'<' of law to which we can look to determine what conHtitutPs 
an approJwiate rem<·dy. 
~ Sel•, e. g., Sperry Rand Cm·p . v. A-T-0, Inc ., 447 F . 2d 1387, 1392 
(CA4 1971), cert .. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia law) ; Tlapek v. 
Chevron Oil Co. , 407 F . 2cl 11:.>-n (CA8 H)("i9) (Arkan:;as la.w) ; Structural 
Dynamics Nesearch Corp . v. Engineeri?!{J 111echauics Re8mrch Corp., 401 
F. Supp. 1102, 1120 (ED l\Jirh. 1975) (Michigan law) ; H~statement 
(Se<·ond) or Agency§ 396 (e) (1958) ("Unle~R otherwise agreed, after the 
termination of !he agency the agent: ... (c) hn::; a dut.~· w account. for 
profits m:tdl~ by the ::;ale or n::;c of t radr o>c·crel::; and other eonfidrntia1 
inforrrmLwn, whether or not in competitiOn wit.h Lhe prineipal. •• .'' ) . 
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tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to com-
pete. Contrary to the majority's approach in this case, the 
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply 
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they 
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary, 
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an in-
dividual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable only if they 
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." ·That rule, 
originally laid down in the seminal case of Mitchel v. Rey-
nolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, ·24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), requires that 
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate 
interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidenti-
ality), that the employer's interest not be outweighed by the 
public interest.7 and that the covenant not be of any longer 
duration or wider georaphical scope than necessary to protect 
the employer's interest.8 
The Court has not persuaded me that a rule of reason 
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenant to submit ( 
Lo prepublication review. Like an ordinary employer, the 
7 As !he court held in Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. CaR. 
P916] 688, 704, the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does 
not outweigh the p'ublic interest in keeping the employee in the workforce: 
· " ... [A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the 
kill and · knowledge in his · trade or profession which he has learnt 
in the course of hit:~ rmployment by means of directions or in~tructions 
from the employer. That information at'ld that additional ~kill he is 
entitled to use for the benefit of him~elf and the benefit of the public 
who gain the ~tdvantage of his having had such admirable instruction. 
The case in which the Court interferes for 'the purpose of protection is 
where use is made, not of · the skill which the man may have acquired, 
hut of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to 
reveal to any one elt:~e ... . " 
8 See, e. g. , B1iggs v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 589 F. 2d 39, 41 (CAl 
1978) (Illinois law); American Hot Rod Assn., Inc . v. Carrier, 500 .F. 2d 
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina law); Alston Studios, Inc . v. 
Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2rl 279, 282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia 
law) ; Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F . 2d 1308, 
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law) ; Water Se1·vices. Inc . v. 'l'esco Chemi-
cals, Inc., 410 F. 2d 163, 157 (CA5 1969) (Georgia law) ; Re;;!atement 
(Second ) nf Contrac t~:> § R30 (Tent. Draft No. J2, March 1977). 
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CIA has a vital interest in protecting certain types of infor-
mation; at the same time, the CIA employee has a counter-
vailing interest in preserving a wide range of work oppor-
tunities (including work as an author) and in protecting his 
First Amendment rights. The public interest lies in a proper 
accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission of 
the agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified 
informatio11. Wheu the Government seeks to enforce a harsh 
restriction on the employee's freedorn,11 despite its admission 
that the interest the agreement was designed to protect-the 
confide11tiality of classified information-has not been com-
promised, an equity court might well be persuaded that the 
case is not one in which the covenant should be enforced.10 
But evt>n assuming that Snepp's covenant to submit to pre-
publication review should be enforced, the constructive trust 
imposed by the Court is not an appropriate remedy. If an 
employee has used his employer's confideHtial information for 
his own persm1al profit, a constructive trust over those profits 
is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are 
the direct result of the breach. But Snepp admittedly did 
not use confidential information in his book; nor were the 
D Tho eon'nan{ imposP~ a srrious prior restraint on SnPpp't'l ability to 
RpClLk fredy, sre mfra n. 15, and is of indPfinite duratiou and scope-'--
faclor::; that. would make mo,;t ~milar eovenant~ ltnenforcf'~thlP. See, e. g., 
Alston Studius. lru·. v. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 493 F. 2d 279, 
2R3 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Virgma la.w a covenant, with no 
gPogmphieal limitation) ; American 1-Iot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Canier. 500 
F. 2d 1269, 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under North Carolina. 
bw a rovcnant w1th no dura.tional or gPographical limit at ion) ; E. L. 
Conwell & Co. v. Gutbe1·let, 429 F. 2d 527, 528 (CA4 1970) (holding void 
under Maryland law a covenant with no dumtional or geographical 
limitation) . 
10 The Court rorreetly point~ onl that the Government may regulate 
ccrt a in activit iPs of 1l~ employe<'~' tlw.t would be protect Pel by the First 
Amendnwut 111 othrr eontPxt:::. Ante, at :3, 11 . :3. Hut none of the CllHCS i~ 
c·ites mvolved a rcquiremeut that au employee submit a propo~ed public 
&tatrnwnt for prPrel<'a~c een,or::~hip or approval. The Court has not pre-
viou~ly <'OllHtdered t lw rnforerabilit~· of thi~ kind of prior rc'Htraml or lho 
remedy that ;;hould br impo:sC'cl 111 thf' event of it breach, 
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profits from hi:s book in any sense a product of his failure to 
submit the book for prepublication review. For, even if 
Snepp had submitted the book to the agency for prepublica-
tion review, the Government's censorship authority would 
surely have been limited to the excision of classified material. 
In this case, theu, it would have been obliged to clear the 
book for publication in precisely the same form as it now 
stands.11 Thus, Snepp has not gained any profits as a result 
of his breach; the Government, rather thau Suepp, will be 
unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits attrib-
utable entirely to his own legitimate activity. 
Despite the fact that Snepp has not caused the Govem-
ment the type of harm that would ordinarily be remedied by 
the imposition of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to 
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the 
Government has suffered some harm. The Court states that 
publication of "unreviewed material" by a former CIA agent 
"can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the pub-
lished information is unclassified." Ante, a.t 5. It then seems 
to suggest that the injury in such cases stems from the 
agency's illability to catch "harmful" but unclassified informa-
tion before it is published. I do not believe, however, that 
the agency has any authority to censor its employees' publica-
tion of unclassified information on the basis of its opinion that 
publication may be "detrimental to vital national interests" 
11 H he hat! ~uhmittC'd th<' book to thC' rtgency and the agency hat! rC'-
fu:;cd to consent to the publication of certain material in it, Snepp could 
have obtained judicial review to determine whether the agency was cor-
rect in considering the material classified. See United States v. M a1'chetti, 
46() F. 2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. clt>uied, 409 U. 8. lOUa. It i~ 
uotPworthy that the Court clop;; not di~agree with the Fourth Circuit':; 
vi<·w in Marchetti, reJterated i11 Snepp, thai n CIA emplo:vP<' ha,; a Fir~t 
Amendnwnt n~llt to publi:::h nnclas:-;ified information. Thu,.;, de,.;pitc its 
refrrPn(·f' in footnote :3 of it~ opmion to the Government's so-called com-
pt>lling llltPI'PHt in protecting '' tlw appearame of confidentialit~·," ante, at 
3, n. 0, and de;;pitC' Home ambi~uity in the Court'~ rcfC'rPn<'e to "d<'t ri-
lllPJJtal '' and '' lmrmful '' a~ opposPd to «rla~~ifil'd" information, ante, at 
5, l do not lllld<>r:;tand tlw Court to imply that the GovemmC'nt could 
obtain au lll,1\lllt'twn agaJI!H( t h<· publication of unclassified mformat ion .. 
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or otherwise "identified as harmful." Ibid. The CIA never 
attempted to assert such power over Snepp in either of the 
co11tracts he signed; rather, the agency itself limited its cen-
sorship power to preventing the disclosure of "classified" 
information. Moreover, even if such a wide-ranging prior 
restraint would be good natioual security policy, I would have 
great difficulty reconciling it with the demands of the First 
Amemlmen t. 
The Court also relies to some extent on the Government's 
theory at trial that Snepp caused it harm by flouting his pre-
publication review obligation and thus making it appear that 
the CIA was powerless to prevent its agents from publishing 
any infonnation they chose to publish, whether classified or 
not. rrhe Govemment theorized that this appearance of 
weakness would discourage foreign governments from coop-
erating with the CIA because of a fear that their secrets might 
also be compromised. In support of its position that Snepp's 
book had in fact had such an impact, the Government illtro-
duced testimony by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stans-
field Turner, stating that Snepp's book and others like it had 
jeopardized the CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence 
services by making them unsure of the agency's ability to 
maintain confidentiality. Admiral Turner's truncated testi-
mony does not explain, however, whether these unidentified 
"other" books actually contained classified information.12 If 
so, it is difficult to believe that the publication of a book like 
12 Thfl District. Judge susta.h1ed the Government's objections lo ques-
tions concerning the identity of other agents who had published the unau-
thorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 136. However, 
Admiral Turner did testify that the harmful materials involved "[p]ri-
marily the appearance in the United States media of identification of 
sources and method::; of collectiug intelligf'nce . ... " Tr. 143. This type 
of information is certainly confidential and is specifically the type of in-
formation that Snepp has maintainf'd he did not reveal in Decent Interval. 
See, e. g., Snepp's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show, 
in which he sta.ted : " ... I have made a very determined effort not to 
expose sourees or methods, . • ." Government's Requests for Admissions, 
Reeord Item 19. 
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Suepp's. which uoes not reveal classified iuformation, has 
significantly weakened the agency's position. Nor does it 
explain whether the unidentified foreign agencies who have 
stopped cooperating with the CIA have done so because of 
a legitimate fear that secrets will be revealed or because they 
merely uisagree with our Go~crnment's classification policies.13 
In any event, to the extellt that the Government seeks to 
punish S11epp for the geuera.lized harm he has caused by 
failing to submit to prepublication review and to deter others 
from following in his footsteps, puuitive damages is. as the 
Court of Appeals held, clearly the preferable remedy" . . . 
since a constructive trust depends on the concept of unjust 
enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See 
D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246 
(1973)." 595 F . 2d, at 937.11 
II 
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on 
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is 
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits. 
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth 
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunc-
tion requiring him to submit all future manuscripts for pre-
publication review and remanded for a determination of 
whether punitive damages would be appropriate for his failure 
to submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication. 
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a cross-
1~ Snepp's a Horney:; were foreclos<•d from asking Admiral TurnPr wheth<•r J 
particular forrign sources had :;topped cooperating with United Statt>:s' 
authoritlC's a;; a din•ct. result of tlw publication of Decent luterval. Tr. 
138. Till!:,;, it. is ·uncll'I<Lr ~'hethPr or why foreign sources may hnvr reacted 
uufnvorably to it:; publiration. HowPwr, William E. Colby , the CIA ':; I I 
formrr Director, did indicatt> in hi~ testimony that for~1 nation:; geuerally .fr. 
have a ~t nct er ::;pcrecy code than does the UnitPd State,;. Tr. 175- 176. 
14 One of t he Court 's justification,; for tb constructive trust remedy is 
that "it ('anuot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all 
proportion to hi ~ gam.'' Ante, al 9. This solicitude for Snepp '~ welfare 
i:s ratlwr irolli(' in View of the dra('onian naLure of the remedy imposed hy 
the Court loday. · 
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petition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated, 
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire 
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide 
to grE~.nt Snepp's petition. The Government explained that 
"[b] ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of ap-
peals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's 
interet!!t, the government has not independently sought review in 
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government 
stated that "[i]f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petition for a 
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871 , it should also grant this cross-
petition. If the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this peti-
tion should also be denied." Petition, at 5. 
Given the Government's position, it would be highly inap-
propriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction, 
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's. 
Yet that is in essence what has been done.1 5 The majority 
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this 
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as 
manifestly "without merit." Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that 
Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own 
merits. 
The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this 
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily 
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact 
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive 
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the 
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the 
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not 
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security," ante, at 7, and (b) that it might 
require the Government to reveal confidential information 
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather 
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might 
lfi r ha V! ' heen unable t.o dio;cover any previoul:l cm;e in whirh the Court 
has acted as it docs today, reaching the merits of a conditional cross-
petition despite its brlief that the petition does not merit granting 
certiorari. 
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thus be left with "no remedy at all," ante, at 8. It seems 
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either 
ground by the Government's acquiescence in the punitive 
dam~:~-ge remedy. Moreover, the second rationale ' 6 is entirely 
spem-1lative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong. 
The Court states that: 
"Proof of the tortiou~ conduct necessary to sustain an 
award of punitive damages might force the Government 
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised 
to protect." 
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government 
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving 
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to 
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepubli-
cation review aud that the Government relied on these mis-
represeutations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a 
showing would require the Government to reveal any con-
. fidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery 
into the Age11cy's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 8. 
III 
The uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking 
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable 
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this 
case. 
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused 
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that 
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an 
opportunity to appr'aise the adequacy of the punitive damage 
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion 
that equitable relief is necessary. 
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware 
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to 
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to' 
10 Whieh, it 8hould be noted, does not appcm anywhere in the Govern- · 
ment's 5-page cross-petitii:m .. 
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criticize his government.17 Inherent in this prior restraint is 
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority 
to delay the pqblication of a critical work or to persuade an 
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the de-
mands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior 
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy 
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It 
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me 
that that burden has been met. 
I respectfully dissent. 
17 The mere fact that the agency has the authority to review the text 
of a critical book in search of clal:lSified information before it is published 
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover, 
the right to delay publication until the review il:l completed is itself a form 
of prior restraint that would not be tolemted in other contexts. See, 
e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539. In view of the national intere~:>t 
in maintaining an etfecti'"e intelligence service, I am not prepared to say 
that. 1 he restraint. il:l nece~:>sarily intolerable in this context. I am, however, 
prepared to say tha.t, certiorari lmving been granted, the is:sue :surely 
,hould not be resolved m the ahoence of full briefing and argument,. 
~ ~ 1-,Z.?-~1> 
ro: The Chief Justice 
Mr. .Justl. co Brennan 
Mr . .Just1cr.J Stewart 
Mr. Jus• 1~1te 
Mr. Tut, ·shall 
'1r. Ju;• 
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In No. 78- 1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) . He also contends that punitive damages are an inap-
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg-
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish . . . any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating ~ 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.t / 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
'· 
;, 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willful1y, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact thai publication of the book 
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore eujoi rwrl future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 ~ 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed' 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the exptess written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative.17 Pet. 6Ia. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad• 
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 4"56 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. "595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primanly on t11e claim that his agreement is unenforceable' 
as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When Snepp accepted employment wtth the CIA, he voluntarily signed 
the agn'<'llH'nt tlmt CXJH'c:s:;ly obligated him to :submit any proposed publi-
cation fol prior revi!:lW. lie' <!i~, not, claim that, he executed thi:; agr/' 




SNEP'P v. UNITED STATES 3 
It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
11irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Suepp's book divulged 
no classified ihtelligence. ld., at 935-936.4 In other words,/ 
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. 
It therefore liinited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
mrnt undPr durr~,:;. Indeed, hr voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when 
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's 
agreement is nn "entirely appropriate" exerci~e of the CIA Director's 
statuto!':'' mandatP to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from 
tmauthorized disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2cl, at 932. 
Moreover, this Court's eas<"' 1mi'k<- clrar that~ev!:'n in the absence of an 
exprpss ngr<•cment-thP CIA could have nC't<'d to prot(·et ~ub:stantial gov-
emmrnt, intrrc::;t:.; h~ · imposing rr;t:souablc l'f'~t .rict ions ou Pmployrr activi-
tirl'l thnt in o!hrr routrxt~ might br protec·ted by tlw Fir::;t Amt•ndmen!. 
Civil SPJ'm'cp r'omm'n v. Lettet Canif'l's. 413 U. S. 548, 5f\5 (1973); :;f'{' 
uckley v. Vall'o, 42-t U. B. 1, 25-2R (1976); Greer " : Spuck, 424 U. S. 
828 (Hl7o): id .. ai R4.t-R+R (PowELL. J., ronrurring) ; Cole v. Richardson, 
405 U. S. ()7fi ( l!l72). Thr Gowrnmrnt. hn~ n rom]wlling in!rrest in pro-
tecting both f hr ~crrPry of informn!ion important to our national ;;ecurity 
and ibn llpJWnrnner of r<mficlC'Ilfiality so rssential to thP effectivE~ operation 
of om for<•ign intt'lligruc<• ~rrviee. Sr(• p. 5, infra. The agreement that 
Snf'pp f'ignrd if' n rpasonablP rl'ICHJJI' for protrciing t.hiR vital intrrest. 
he Government'~ concession distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
viola.te hiH agreement. not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1313. Marchetti thcrf'forf' did not con:>ider t.he appropriate remedy for 
the bteach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By .relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals ov/er-
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages. Judge Hoffman argued. were both a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con-
structive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship." The trust agreement specifi-
cally itnposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting · for clearance. 7-"-.. ; ~~-.;z...f.,-~ 
Shepp stipulated at trial that-after underta ing this obliga-
tion-he had been "assigned to various positions of trust" 
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified 
information, including information regardi11g intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.n Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this bacvk 
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublic -
5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "1, Frank W. Snepp, 
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
GoV~ernment . ... " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
Snepp's duties and his conceded· access to confidential sources and ma-
terials could establish a truHt relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, .J., concurring in part and · di:;senting in part). Few types of 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that. 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties 
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disc~osure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to ' publish unclassified information:. Nor does 
it contend-at ' this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
tha~in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree- .....(\ 
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an ) 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital m:ltioual interests even if the pub~i~hed information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrin:1ental, he may revea:l 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the~ 
1 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire. What-
ever fairly ma.y be ::;aid about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its 
predeces::;or the OSS) is an agency thought by every President ~ince 
Franklin D. Hoosevelt to be essential to the security of the United States 
and-in a st>use-the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely 
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense with-
out the benefit of dependable foreign intelligencr. See generally T . Powers. 
The Man Who Kept the Secret« (1979) , / 
.. 
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security of lnfonuation that might compromise them and 
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a. CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the pffecti veness of 
American i ntelligcncc operatious. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he sa.id, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had ·more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
canuot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's ~ 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-/'" 
sIn qu<•>'tionin~ thr forrr of Admir,d Tur·rwr'" t<'>' fimon~·, :\Tn. ,fl',.,-rrcg 
~~;Ns' di~"Pnting opinimr~·mlo at~rilmt<• th<>~ of fHrt"i~n in-
.t.elligetwe ,·'JTice.;; not fo th~azard~ of allowing Hn .rg('nt- likt• Snepp lo 
publish whaf<'vrJ' lw plea~r~ . but. toJ!ltP CI,\'n fuilut'P te e br.•.~if:l-~ 
~.rkLruJ.\UJ-hc.un <·ltl ..... ifi~l o.r (f tlw fot·Ei ~u gtn·t t'tllll(o'ut'• di .... tgre<·meu 
with onr iowt·rmwnf',-1 {'IH~~iftcation pol~1 81, at of:J. :\JR . .Tu,.;TJCE: 
·n:n;N;;' virw~ in tlu~ I'<'SJlf'l't not on!~· nd no ~upporl in thr n•pord , 
but. t hry abo rpfft•r t n mi~a pprrhm~ion of t hP r·otwerJl n·flc•eted h~· Ad-
miral Tlll'lll'r',- f <'~l unony. If in fnc·t. in forma f ion i~ llll<"la:<;-;ifiPd or in 
the J>llblir domain, uP it h<·r t h<' CIA 11or forrign :t!(<'JH'i<·" would h<· C"on-
cernrd. Tlw probl!'lll i~ lo rn~urP in advanc<', ;md h~· prop<•r Jli'O<'<'Ulll'l'O', 
iJ..lat. inforuwtron drtrimc•nfal to wrtional intrt'<'~ts i~ not publi"hr·d . With-
out n. dPJH'ndal.JI<- JH'< 'JHthli<"ation 1'!'\'iPw prorP<hm·, no intPIIig;Pn<'e ag<'JH'Y 
or re:;pon~ible goverumenl oflh·inl could be a:-~ured that. au employee 
lfp/ss 1/29/80 
suggests that the concern of foreign intelligence 
services may not be occasioned by the hazards of 
allowing an agent like Snepp to publish whatever he 
pleases, but ra~ ~the release of classified 
~ 
information or the disagreement of foreign agencies 
" 
. h ~ w1t ou)\ classification policy. Post, 
at 7-8. 
·.< 
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rcilassified ot· not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
'harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
'456 F. Supp., at 180.9 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ent's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
The Government could not pursue the only reme 
privy to S('n~itive information might. not eonf'lndr on hi,.. ow -innoecntly 
or othcrwi,p--t hat 11. ><hould lw di~elo:sPd to thP world. 
q;'he dissm~t limls- 'Ill "ia~~hrttre ~"'01 · ·. 
" >4~•· &~~· ·~~' E'!H:playl'('•·' 1 Sucpjl" 
coutr~~Rt, l1owe\·cr, l'f4llJr<• · no morp tlum a deuranetc> )JroePdtltP sol~~(, 
to_judicial 1'('\'i<•w. lf SnP)lp had snbmittC>d his ·. for n•view und 
tlw Agener had fmUld it to <·ontain RPn~itivl:\ lURtPrial, •• W<8ttld luwt'" ~~ 
I hf' Agt•tw~· ~ an injnnetion ttg11in:st pnblieati~ Sre Alfred 
A. nopf, /II(:. " · Coib!l ,,.509 F. ~d 1302 (CA4). c!·rL df~niPd, -l:.!l 1J. S. 
W2 (Hl75) ; United ~lutes \ . llfan·heltl, -166 F . 2d 1309 (('A-!), <'<'ft. 
~d. 409 r. s. 10oa (1972) . 
9 Although both the District Court and the Comt of Appeals exprc~sly 
found otherwise, MR. Jus'l'ICE S'l'EVI!:NS savs that "tlw int<'rest in con-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract Wll.'l designed to protect has not been 
compromi::1ed." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the bat~i;; of a premi:sP wholly at 
odds with the rrcorcl, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agrerment and 
treats its intPrclrpcndent provisions a:; if they imposPd unrelutecl obliga-
tions. MR. JusTICE STEVENS then :walogizes Snepp's prPpublication review 
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to 
compel{• w1th hi" employPr. Po.~t, at. 3/ A body of private law intended - .5': 
to pres<•rve rotnpPtition , howevt>r, simPly ha:; no bParing on a eontract 
made by tlw Direetor of t.he CIA in conformity with hi.- ~tatutory obliga-
tion to ''proterJ t] int<'lli~rnef' :-;ource" n.ud nwthod:; from unauthorized 
dl"'"'"'"·" 50 u s C'. § 40.> (d)(3) . / 
(\ 
- ----- --------. 
lfp/ss 1/29/80 Rider A, p. 7 (Snepp) 
~ 
The dissent argues the Court is allowing 
" 
the CIA to "censor" its employees' publications • 
.!..9_. , at 6-7. 
no more than 
Snepp's contract, however, requires 
a clearance procedure~::ial 
review. If Snepp, in compliance with his 
~~/-w:LJ; 
~~eement, had submitted his manuscript for review 
and the ~ency had found it to contain sensitive 
material, presumably - if one accepts Snepp's 
·.J., 
A-- 4fo :sa:a 
present assertion of good intentions - ~ 6e ffort -5 -/-LA-
harmful disclosures. 
to eliminate or =prct:_e:(-
~ - ~ 1--
u.c..,... ~) 
Absent agreement~ the ,Agency 
would have been made 
would have borne the burden of seeking an 
injunction against publication. 
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full 
judgment of the District Court. 
1-30-80 
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
PER CURIAM. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inap-
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit an 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
I 
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg-
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish ... any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." Id., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
2 SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 
Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge cla13sifted information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. . It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would pennit the book for prepublication clea.rance. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book ' 
had "caused the United States · irreparable harm and loss." 
Id., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
· breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that ·snepp had breached a valid contract.8 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the •express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about .$60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his ·publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp•s 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable 
as a prior restraint on protecfed speech. 
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed 
the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publi-
cation for prior review. He does not claim that he executed this agree-
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 3 
It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
11irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936.4 In other words, 
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. 
ment under duress . Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when 
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's 
agreement is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's 
statutory mandate to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932. 
Moreover, this Court's cases make clear thair-even in the absence of an 
express agreement-the CIA could have acted to protect substantial gov-
ernment interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activi-
ties that in other contextA might be protected by the First Amendment. 
Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see 
Brown v. Glines, - U. S. - (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 
25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spack, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id., at. 844-848 
(PowELL, J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U. S. 676 (1972) . The 
Government haA a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of 
information important to our national security and the appearance of con-
fidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence 
service. See p. 5, infra. The agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable 
means for protecting this vital interest. 
"The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Governil'l.ent claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue 
in Marchetti. 
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It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con-
structive trust. 
11 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that ·he was· 
entering a trust relationship.5 The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting the information for 
clearance. Snepp stipulatea at trial that-after undertaking 
this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of 
trust" and that he had been granted "frequent access to classi-
fied information, including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 'Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
G The first sentence of the '1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
Gov•ernment .... " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and ma-
terials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types of 
·· governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 5 
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that, in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servil'e. What-
ever fairly may be sajd about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its 
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the security of the United States 
and-in a sense--the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely 
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defrnse with-
out the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, 
The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979). 
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security of information that might compromise them and 
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
8 In questioning the force of Admiral Turner's testimony, MR. JusTICE 
STEVENS' dissenting opinion suggPsts that the concern of foreign intelligence 
services may not be occaf>ioned by the hazards of allowing an agent like 
Snepp to publish whatever he pleases, but by the relrase of classified 
information or simply the disagreemrnt of foreign agencies with our Gov-
ernment's classification policy. Post, at 7-8. MR. JusTICE STEVENs' 
views in this respect not only find no support in the record, but they 
also reflect a misapprehension of the concern reflected by Admiral 
Turner's testimony. If in fact information is uncla:::sified or in the 
public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be concerned. 
The problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper procedures, that 
information detrimental to national interest is not published. With-
out a dependable prepublication review procedure, no intelligence agency 
or responsible government official could be assured that an employee 
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dassified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.0 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
privy to sensitive information might not conclude on his own-innocently 
or otherwise-that it should be disclosed to the world. 
Tho dissent argues that the Court is allowing the CIA to "censor" its 
employees' publications. !d., at 6-7. Sncpp's contract, however, requires 
no more than a clearance procedure ~ubject to judicial review. If Snepp, 
in compliance with his cont.ract, had submitted his manuscript for review 
and the Agency had found it to contain sensitive material, presumably-
if one accepts Snepp's pre~ent assertion of good intentions-an effort 
would have been made to eliminate harmful disclosures. Absent agree-
ment in this respect, the Agency would have borne the burden of seeking 
an injunction against publication. See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 
509 F. 2d 1362 (CA4), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly 
found otherwise, MR. JusTICE STEVENS says that "the interest in con-
fidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been 
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at 
odds with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and 
treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obliga-
tions. MR. JusncE STEVENS then analogizes Snepp's prepublication review 
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to 
compete with his employer. Post, at 3-5. A body of private law intended 
to preserve competition, however, simply has no bearing on a contract 
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obliga-
tion to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
disclosure." 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d)(3). 
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The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
-This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.11 It deals fairly with both parties by con-
1 0 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
·damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F . 2d., at 940. 
·· The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
. 938. 
11 See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissent ing in part) . 
MR. Jusn cE STEVENS concedes that , even in the absence of a writ ten 
contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3. 
·He also concedes that all personal profits gained from the exploitation of 
·such information are impressed with a construct ive t rust in favor of the 
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common 
law would not t reat information as "confident ial" unless it were "classified." 
See, e. g., post, at 3. We have thought that the common-law obligation 
was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c) , 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958); 
V Scott on Trusts § 505 ( 1967). But since this case involves the breach 
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full 
judgment· of the District Court. 
So ordere-d. 
of a t rust agreement that specifically required the prepublication review 
of all information about the employer, we need not look t.o the common 
law to determine the scope of Snepp's fiduciary obligation. 
1. 
NO. 78-1871: SNEPP V. U.S. 
INSERT B 
In deprecating Admiral Turner's testimony, the dissent 
declares that damage to our Nation's ability to cooperate with 
foreign intelligence services "must be accepted as an inevitable 
byproduct of the exercise of First Amendment riqhts by government 
employees." Post, at 6-7. _...._ This statement totally iqnores the 
cases in which we have held that the Government can restrict its 
employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in order to 
protect substantial qovernment interests. See note 3, sopra. One 
should have thouqht that those precedents applied with special 
force to a CIA aqent who had access to sensitive intelliqence. In 
any event, the dissent's statement is scarcely relevant in light 
of the express obligation that Snepp voluntarily undertook as a 
condition of his employment with the CIA. 
NO. 78-1871: SNEPP V. U.S. 
INSERT A ( YJ s-) 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
found that a former intelligence agent's publication of 
unreviewed material relating to intelligence activities can 
be detrimental to vital national interests even if the 
published information is unclassified. When a former agent 
relies on his own iudgment about what information is 
detrimental, he may reveal information that the CIA--with its 
broader understanding of what may expose classified 
information and confidential sources--could have 
1-.- ;fl.~~ 4P ~ IA(..J,..(l4,1~ b'tl'~..c.cA~~ 
as harmful. he CIA obtains information 
intelligence services of friendly nations 7_, and from agents 
operating in foreign countries. The continued availability 
of these sources depends upon the CIA's ability to quarantee 
AI~~ 7tt -1'1'71 
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ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, 
Director of the CIA, testified without contradiction . 
NO. 78-1871: SNEPP V. U.S. 
INSERT .J C, 
Although both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals expressly found otherwise, MR. JUSTICE STEVENS says that 
"the interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract was 
designed to protect has not been compromised." ~, at 1-2. 
Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at odds with the record, 
the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and treats its 
interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated 
obligations. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS then analogizes Snepp's 
prepublication review agreement with the Government to a private 
employee's covenant not to compete with his employer. JNe canno;, 
bel Ul\le t.h.a-t ,4 body of private law intended to preserve 
~;·"1'-4 ~~ . ( ~
competition~~a._ aft¥ bearingAon a contract made by the Director of 
the CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to "protec[t] 
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." 
50 u.s.c. § 403(d)(3). 




MR. JUSTICE STEVENS conceeds that, even in the absence 
of a written contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to 
protect confidential information obtained during the course of his 
employment. Post, at 3. __.._ He also conceeds that all personal 
profits gained from the exploitation of such information are 
impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the employer. 
Post, at 5. ~this case, he seems to think \ the common law would - * ,r-
not treat information as "confidential" unless it were 
"classified." See, e;q;, post, at 3. We ~ have thought that 
the common law obligation was considerably more expansive. See, 
e;g;, Restatement (Second) of Agency~~ 396(c), 400 and Comment c, 
404 and Comments b, d (1958); V Scott on But 
since this case involves a~~i~ written contract 
occasion to linger over that question. 
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No~. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979 
PER CURIAM. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inap-
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg-
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish ... any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its .activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.r 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also. 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge cl<usified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978) . The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
f d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.3 
I 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "never,' to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the express written consent of the Dmctor of Central 
Intelligence or his representative.,, Pet. 61a. 
2 At the time oi suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties · 
and other pote11tial profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978) . 
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, 
• nepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable·· 
a a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When ~nepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed 
the agreement that expre;;::;ly obligated him to submit any proposed publi~ 
cation fm ])l'ior .review. He· doos not claim. that he cxeeuted this agree--· 
SNEPP v. UNITED STATES 3 
It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
11ational security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
t,he court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
, '11epp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
·tructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that SHepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Government's concession-
for the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligeuce. I d., at 935-936.4 In other words, 
the court thought that Suepp's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to preRerving the confidentiality of classified material. 
nwnt under dnrE'S>'. liH.lN•d, he ,·oluntanly reaffirmed hi~ obligation when 
he left 1lw Ag!'tlcy. WE' agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's 
n~n·enwn1 iH an ''mtirely np]Jropriatr" exerci~e of the CIA Director's 
sf atH!ot-:; manda tc· to " prot <'C[ t] intelligence sources and methods from 
HnauthorizPd di~closlll'P," 50 U. S. C. § 40:3 (d) (3) . 595 F. 2d, at 932. 
1\ltH'<•owr, thi" Co11r!'::< ea:;es make clear that~rwn in thE' ab~t·nce of an 
oxprP.RS agr('enu·nt-tlw CIA eoulcl havr acted to protPc1 ~ubHtantml gov-
t•nlm<•nt infpn·~t,; hy impo,;ing rE'fuionabll• rp::;triction~ on employee artivi-
fiP.~ that in otlwr context<' might 'bl• protPcted by thr .Fir::;t Amrnclmrnt. 
('i1 •il ::lel·uice ( 'omm'n v. Letter Carl'iens, 41:3 LT. S. 54~, 565 (HJ7a); sre 
HnJ!I'n 1. Uliw's. - F . S. - (HJHO); Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U. S. 1, \ 
2,)-~S (10/(i) : Oret'l' , .. Spock , 4:24 U . 8. 82S (1!:17()) ; id., at. 844--848 
( l'owELL • • 1., concurring): C'ole v. Rir·hardso11, 405 U. S. 676 (1972 ). The 
Gon•r·nmPnf haM a ('Ompelling in!Prc•;;(. in protecting both tlw ~Pcn~cy of 
information important. to our national ,.;pcurit.y and t.he appearanec of con-
f.illl·ntiality ~o P~Pntial to tlw rffretin· operation of our forE>ign intelhgence 
~en·i<·<· . ~<'<' p . 5, i11jra. Thr agn•(•mpnt tha.t. Snepp :;igned i:s n rea:sonuble 
Jllf•:HJ,; for proft>('ting !.hi,; \'ita! intcre:;t .. 
4 The GovernmE'nt's concession distinguished this case from United States 
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4) , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) . 
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d, 
at 1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remedy for 
the brcRch of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over~ 
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue 
in Marchetti. 
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It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
r0fusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote. "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con-
' tructive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
en tcring a trust relationship.5 The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting the information for \ 
clearance. Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking 
this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of 
trust" and that he had been granted "frequent access to classi-
fi'eu information, including information regarding intelligence 
ources and methods." 456 F. Supp. , at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
:; The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
liT, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
;\grncy, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
Government . .. . " Pet . 58a. · 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
nepp's dtHies and his conceded access to confidential sources and ma-
terials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
lllan , J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . Few types of 
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that. 
repo ed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
nepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that, in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Keither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital natioJtal interests even if the published inform'ation is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what Inay expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
t·eceiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire. What-
ever fairly rna) Le ~aid about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its 
prPdeces;;or the OSS) is an agency thought by every Pre:;Jdcnt since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be e;;;;ential to the security of the United States 
aml-in a ;;em;e--the frer world. It i:; impossible for a government wisely 
lo make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense with-
out the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See g~nerall:y T . Powers •. 
'1~he Man Who Kepi the Secrets (197.9}. 
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security of information that might compromise them and 
evell endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Uudisputcd evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CJ A, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
"we h$Ve had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
T 11 view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
sIn questioning the force of Admiral Turner'::~ testimony, MR .. JusTICE 
i'l'l't~v~;m,;' dis:;enting opinion suggests that the concern of for<,ign intelligence I 
lit'rvi1·es may not. be oceasiOJwd by the hazard:; of allowing UJ1 agent like 
Rw·pp to publish whatever he please:;, but br the relt•a:se of cla:ssified 
information or :simply the disagreement of foreig11 agencirs with our Gov-
('rlllllPJJt',: <'la:<:oinration policy. Post, at. 7-8. MR. .JusTICE STEVENs' 
\'ii'Wf' in thi::; re:spect not only find no support in the record, but they 
:d~o n•Hect. a misaP})rehen~;ion of the concern reflected by Admiral 
TtH'IH'r ':s te~timon)·. lf in faet information is unelasoified or in the 
public· dom«in, nc>itlH'r tho CJA nor foreign agenci<'t~ would 'be concerned. 
Tho prol>lc'lll i;; to ensll!'(' in advance, and by proper proc('dure:s, tha.t 
iuformation dc>t rimental to national interest is not publiHh<'d. With-
out. :o d<'pendahle prPpublication review procedure, no intelligl'Hce agency 
or n·HpousJhle government oflicial could be a:;:mred that m1 employee' 
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.9 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Tndeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquanti:fiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
privy to sen:>itivt• informution might not conclude on hil- owu-innocently 
or ot.herwi::;<~that it. should lw disclo;;ed to the world . 
The di&;ent. argues thal the Court. is allowing the CIA to "cen,;or" its 
c•mployre:;' publication:,. ld., nt 6-7. Sn<:>pp';; eontract, however, requires 
110 more than a cl<•aratH'P procrclur<:> ~ubject to judicial revirw. If Snrpp, 
in eomplian<·<• with hi;; cont rue(, had ,;ubmittcd hi,.; mami:>cript. for review 
and the Agency had found it, to contain sensitive mat<:>rial, pr<•sumably-
if one acc•l'pt,.; Hnepp's pre><Pnt a:-:sertion of good intention;;-an effort 
would htLv<:> be<·n madr to eliminate harmful disclo:>ure,;. AbsPut agree-
nH·nt in thi~ rP:<pl'et, the Agrncy would have bonw the burdrn of ~Peking 
an iujmwtiOII again~t publication. Sec• Alfred A. Knopf, Inc . v. Colby, 
509 F. 2d 1:m2 (C'A4), <·<>rt. deniPd, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); Umted States 
v. Marchetti , .. !(\() F. 2d 1:309 (CA4), cert .. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly 
fuund otherwisP, Mn. Ju::;ucE STEVEN::; says that " the interest in con-
fidentiali1y that Snrpp'::; contract wa::: designed 1o protect has not been 
compromi~ed." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the ba~i::; of a premi~c wholly at 
odds with the recorcl, the di15sent bifurcates Snepp':,; 1968 agreement and 
treats it~:~ in1erdependent provision,; as if they irnpo:::ed unrelated obliga-
tions. Ma. JusTICE S'l'JWENS then mmlogizes Snepp's prepublication review 
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to 
l'umpete with hi::; employer. Post, at 3-5. A body of private law intended 
Lo prellerw competition, however, :::imply ha::; no bearing on a contract 
tnade by thu Dirertor of thu CIA in conformity with hi" st<ttntory obliga-
t iou to "1 1rotee L t j intelligrnce :>omces <Uld methods from 1111au thonzcd' 
di:Sclo::>ure"" 50 U. S. C. § 40:! (ct:) ';$). 
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The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant ~o elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.ll It deals fairly with both parties by con-
10 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive 
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940. 
The Court ot Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law 
thnL the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will sUpport an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
93 . 
n Sec id., at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
MH. JusncE S'l'EVEN"s concedes that, evel'l in the absence of a written 
coll1'ract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3. 
fie also concedes that aii personal profits gained from the exploitation of 
l:lllrh information are ib:l.pressed with a con~tructive trust in favor of the 
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common 
Ia w would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were "classified." 
Sec, e. g .. post, at 3. We have thought that the common-law obligation 
was Ponsiderably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of 
Agcney §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958); 
V S<·ntt on Trn:;ts § 505 (1967.) . But siuee this case involve;; the breach•. 
SNEPP ·v. UNIT ED STATES 9 
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to dctrr those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
b1·each, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
coutribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a coustructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full 
judgment of the District Court. 
o ordered. 
of a tru:4 u~rt>Pment that specifically required the pr<·publication review 
of all information about the employer, w<• need not look to the common 
law to determine the scope of Snepp':; fiduciary obligution. 
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()N PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 7 1871 :wd 79-255. Decided February 19, 1979 Q q ~~ 
PER CuRIAM. 
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a 
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he 
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inap-
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all 
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In 
No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions 
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to 
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We 
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg-
ment from which both parties seek relief. 
I 
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published 
a book ~bqut certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp 
published the account without submitting it to the Agency 
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his 
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had 
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ... 
publish ... any information or material relating to the 
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either 
during or after the term of [his] employment ... with-
out specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The 
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent under-
taking "not to disclose any classified information relating 
to the Agency without proper authorization." Id., at 58a.1 
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also 
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information 
and not to publish any information without prepublication 
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce 
SnepJ: 's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had 
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to sub-
mit future writings for prepublication review, and an order 
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit 
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book 
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2 
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib-
erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with 
the CIA and the [19681 secrecy agreement" by publishing his 
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. 
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that 
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he 
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, 
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book 
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss." 
!d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future 
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive 
trust on Snepp's profits. 
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District 
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.8 
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed 
his obligation "neYer" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public 
by CIA ... without the express written consent of the Director of Central 
Intelligence or his representative.>• l?et. 61a. 
2 At the time ot suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad-
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties 
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 1'79 (ED Va. 1978). 
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's 
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition ior certiorari, 
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable 
as a prior restraint on protected speech. 
When Snepp accepted employmrnt with the CIA, he voluntarily signed 
the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publi-
ca'tion for prior 'review. He does not claim that ·he executed this agree-
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub-
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted 
11irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our 
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, 
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of 
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, con-
cluded that the record did not support imposition of a con-
structive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's percep-
tion that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish 
unclassified information and the Governrr.ent's concession-
for the purposps of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged 
no classified intelligence. !d., at 935-936. 4 In otl>er words, 
the court thought that Snepp 's fiduciary obligation extended 
only to ureserving the collfidentiality of classified material. 
ment nndrr durPH~. lTlch·rd, Jw ,·oluntaril.'· rraiiirmrd his obligation when 
he lrft tlw .\f!:<'TH'~·. We> :tl!n'<' ll'ith tlw Court of AppPal~ that Snepp's 
agrrrmc>nt i~ nn "Plltll'l·l~· :tp[n·opriatt>" <'xc>rri~r of the CIA Director's 
statutory mandntc· to " protc•c·l t] intC'JligPncc· ~omcc>< and methods from 
tmauthon zc·d di~<·lo~mc·," .10 r . fj_ C. § 40:~ (d) (:3). 595 F. 2d, at 932. 
l\for!'on'r. till" Court·, <·:t~c·~ mnk<' l'l<'ar tlwt-<'YC'n in thC' ubsC'nce of an 
exprr~~ :tgrP<'Illl'lll-1 h<· ( ' l.\ <"<ndd han' ac·t!'d to protret ~ub:-<tantial gov-
rrmllC'nl. int<·rc·,-1~ h~ illlpo,-iu'" rP:L>'OII:thl<' rP~tril'tiou" on C'mployer activi-
ti~ that in oiiH·r c·ouft·xJ, might ))(' JH'OtPI'tNl b~· thl' Fir~t Amrndment. 
Ci1•il Sert•ir'<' ('r1111111'" ' T.('/t(l' ('urrier~<. -na F. S. 548, 5G5 (Hl73); see 
B1'ou·n '. {;linr'H. - r. ~- - ( 1980): Buckley " · Yoleo, 424 U. S. 1, 
25-28 (l!liGl: Orr·1·1' Y. Spud. -1:2-t U. 8. S:2S (Hli6): id., at 844-848 
(PowELL, J ., c·otH'Ilt'l'in).!:): ('ole \'. Rirhal'd.~o/1. 405 F. S. fi76 (1972). The 
Gon•rnmrnt h<t" :1 t·onlpPIIin).!: intN!',:t in profcoding: hoth the :secrecy of 
inform;dion importnnl to our n;tlional ''<'r\lrit~· aud the npprnrnnce of con-
fidt·ntiali t~· "o C'~,.c·nlial to tlu· !'fT<•C'tin• oprr;ilion of onr forC'ign intelligence 
~rn·i<'e. Rc•f' p. G, i11jro. ThP agrr<'TD<'Ill that Sncpp signed i:; a rea;:;onable 
mr:m-; for prol<·<·ting t hi,: 1·il al int Pn•,:f". 
4 The Governmrnt.'s concesswn di~tinguished this case from United States 
v. Ma1'chetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). 
There, the Government rlaimcd that a former CIA employee intended to 
violate his agrcrmrnt not to puhli:-<h an.v classified information. 466 F . 2d, 
at 1313. M nrch,tti thrrpforc did not ronRidrr the appropriate remedy for 
the breach of an agreemrnt to submit all material for prepublication 
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over-
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue-
in Marchetti. 
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It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the 
possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury 
trial-could prove tortious conduct. 
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the 
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he 
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary 
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." /d., 
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's under-
taking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Puni-
tive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative 
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with 
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation 
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con-
structive trust. 
II 
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely 
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was 
entering a trust relationship.6 The trust agreement specifi-
cally imposed the obligation not to publish any information 
relating to the Agency without submitting the information for 
clearance. Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking 
this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of 
trust" and that he had been granted "frequent access to classi-
fied information, including information regarding intelligence 
sources and methods." . 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp pub-
lished his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously 
G The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, 
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the 
Government ... . " Pet. 58a. 
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of 
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and ma-
terials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff-
man, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types of 
governmental employment inYolve a higher degree of trust than that 
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties. 
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violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica-
tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with 
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. 
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon 
whether his book actually contained classified information. 
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-
Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does 
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book 
contains classified material. The Government simply claims 
that, in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree-
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an 
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to 
publish would compromise classified information or sources. 
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim 
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a 
breach of his trust. 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed 
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental 
to vital national interests even if the published information is 
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judg-
ment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal 
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of 
what may expose classified information and confidential 
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to 
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled 
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence 
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in 
foreign countries. The continued availability of these for-
eign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the 
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelli~ence servil'e. What-
ever fairly may be said about >'omc of its pasl activities, lhe CIA (or its 
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be e~sent ial to the security of the United States 
and-in a sense--the frPe world . It i,; impossible for a government wisely 
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense with-
out the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, 
The Man Who Kept t11e Secrets (1979}. 
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security of information that might compromise them and 
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. 
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's 
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency 
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to per-
form its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the 
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and 
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine 
months," he said, 
uwe h~ve had a number of sources discontinue work with 
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very 
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had 
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intel-
ligetlee services with whom we conduct liaison, who have 
questioned whether they should continue exchanging in-
formation with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I 
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or 
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo-
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456 
F. Supp., at 179-180.8 
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's 
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-
8 In questioning the force of Admiral Turner'~ testimony, MR. JusTICE 
STEVENs' di,;:;(•nting opinion ~ngge:;t::; that the concern of foreign intelligence 
services may not be ocrR:<ionPd by the hazard:; of allowing an agent. like 
Snepp to publish whatever hr pleases. but by the relea<;e of cla&;ified 
information or Himply the di:;agrrement of forrign Hgencie,; with our Gov-
ernment's cla.-;:,;ification policy. Post, at 7-8. MR. .JusncE STEVENS' 
views in thi~ rrspcct not only find no support. in the record, but they 
also reflf>ct a misapprrhrn><ion of tlJP concern reflectrd by Admiral 
TurnPr's tc~timony. If in fact information is uncla~sified or in the 
public domain, 1wither the CIA nor foreign agf>ncie.s would be concerned. 
The problem i,; to rnHure iu advance. and by proper procedures, that 
information detrimental to national intPrt.>st is not publi::;hed. With-
out a dt.>pendable prepublication review procedure, no intelligence agency 
or resptmsihle govennnen t official could be as::mred that an employoo 
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably 
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 
456 F. Supp., at 180.9 
III 
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government 
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong. 
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the 
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar 
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual dam-
ages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally 
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alterna-
tive, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recover-
able after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if 
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Govern-
ment's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain. 
privy to ~Pn~itive information might not conclude on his own-innocently 
or otherwise-! hat it. should be disrlo~rd to the world. 
The cli,-sPnt argurs that the Court. is allowing the CIA to "censor" its 
employee's' pul>lieaiion.". !d .. nt (i-7. Snepp'::; cont ract , however, requires 
no more than a eiParam•c• prorrdure :'ubject to judicial rrview. If Snepp, 
in compliame with his contract., had :,;ubmitt rd hi:; manu::;cript. for review 
and the Agrncy had found it to conta in ::;en::;itive material, J1resumably-
if one ac·c•ppts Snc'pp';: pre:'('llt a~;,.l:'rtion of good intrntion::;-an effort 
would have bc•c•n madP to l'limina te harmful di:,;clo::;ure;;. Ab~ent agree-
ment. in thi,; I'P:'prrt., the Ag<'m~· would have borne the bu rden of seeking 
an injunction against publieation . See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 
509 F. 2d 13(i2 (CA-1), eert. tlrniPd, 421 U. S. 9H2 ( 1975) ; United States 
v. Marchetti, 4()6 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), rPrt. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) . 
9 Although both the Di::;trict Court and the Court of Appeals expressly 
found otherwise, l\JH. JUi:>TICE STgvENS says that "the interest in con-
fidentiality that Snrpp's contract was designed to protect has not been 
compromised." Post. at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at 
odd:; with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and 
treats its interdPpendent provi:;ions as if they impo:;ed unrelated obliga-
tions. MR. JusTICE STEVEN:; then analogize· Snepp's prepublication review 
agreement with the Governmrnt to a private employee's covenant not to 
compete with hi:; rmployer. Po8l, at 3-5. A body of private law intended 
to preserve competition, however, f'imply has no bearing on a contract 
made by the Director of the CIA in conformi ty with hi:; statutory obliga-
tion to "protec[t] intelligence .sources and method:; from unauthorized 
disclosure." 50 U.S. C. §403 (d)(3). 
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The Government could not pursue the only remedy that 
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of 
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proaf of the tortious conduct 
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force 
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that 
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a 
jury if the defendant RO elects, would subject the CIA and its 
officials to probing discovery into the Agency,s highly con-
fidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. 
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director 
Colby noted the analogous problem in ctitnitutl cases. Exist-
ing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of 
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the 
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu-
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its 
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at aii. 
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the 
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a 
breach of trust.11 it deais fairiy with both parties by con• 
10 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un-
available if the Government must bring suit ifi a State that allows punitive 
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F . 2d ., at 940. 
The Court of Appeals ina]ority, howevei', held as a ffiattt\r of federal law 
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agree-
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
938. 
11 See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS concedes that, even in the absence of a written 
contract , an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential 
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3. 
He al~o concedes that ali j:wr~onal profits gained froln the exploitation of 
such information are imprc~srd with a constructive trust in favor of the 
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common 
law would not treat information as "confidential;' unless it were "classified.'' 
See, e. g., post, at 3. We have thought that the common-law obligation 
was considerably more expan::;ive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958); 
V Scott on Tni::;t:S § 505 (1967). But ::;iuce thi~ case involve~ the breach 
·. 
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent 
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear 
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in 
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust 
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his 
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored 
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. 
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the 
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary dam-
ages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the 
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equit-
able and effective means of protecting intelligence that may 
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to 
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full 
judgment of the District Court. 
So ordered. 
of a trust agreement that specifically required the prepublication review 
of all information about the employer, we need not look to the common 
law to determine the scope of Snepp 's fiduciary obligation. 
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Nos. 78-1871 and 79-~65. Decided February 19, 1979 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN 
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement 
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency 
any information he intended to publish about it for prepubli-
cation review.1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the 
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor 
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classi-
fied, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the 
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2'd 926, 
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063. 
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit 
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for· 
prepublication review. However, the Government has con-
ceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic ma-
teriaP Thus, by defi-nition, the interest in confidentiality-
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made 
substantially the same commitment. 
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that 
11 
••• Decent Interval contains classified information or any information 
concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA," 
the Government stated that "rfJor the purpose of this action, plaintiff does 
not so contend." Record ' Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession, 
the district judge sustained-the Government's objections to defense efforts 
to determine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that· 
the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral 
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu; 
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153. 
'. 
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that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been 
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Gov-
ernment unprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a 
constructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the 
sale of the book. Because that remedy is not authorized by 
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for 
the Court to dispose of this novel issue summarily on the 
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I re-
spectfully dissent. 
I 
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported 
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although 
Congress has enacted a number of criminal statutes punishing 
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified 
infonnation,3 it has not seen fit to authorize the constructive 
trust remedy the C'ourt creates today. Nor does either of the 
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such 
remedy in the event of a breach.4 'The Court's per curiam 
opinion seems to suggest that its result is supported by a 
blend of the law of trusts a11d the law of contracts.5 But 
8 See, e. g .. lR U. S. C. § 798, which imposes a prison term of 10 years 
and a SIO,OOO fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certain types of 
clas::;ified infonna1ion ; 1R U. S. C. § 794. which makes it a criminal offense 
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defense information 
to a foreign government: and 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdraws the 
righ t to govrrnment retiremrni benefitH from a per:son convicted of violat-
ing these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401, 
which provides admiui;;trative ~anctions, including discharge, against em-
plo~·rrR who publi~h ela~:>ified informntion. Tim;;, pvcn in t·hp ab~cnce of 
a cou::;tructivr tru~t rmwdy, nn agrnt likr Snepp would hardly be free, as 
the majority ::;uggc>~t~, "to publish wl1nt(•vrr hr piPa~rs." Aute, at 6, n . 8. 
4 In both his original employme11t agreement and the termination agree-
ment Snepp acknowledgrd the criminal penaltie;:; that might attach to any 
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he 
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cause for termina.-
tion of his employment. No other remedies were mentioned in either 
agreement. 
5 In a footnote, see aute, :t! f:-0. 11. 11, 1 he Court ~uggr~t~ 1 hat it need not 
look to the common law to ~upport it,.; holding bccau>'e the <'ase involves a 
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neither of these branches of the common law supports the 
imposition of a constructive trust under the circumstances of 
this case. 
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a set-
tlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for 
the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is 
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses 
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his 
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the 
common law even in the absence of a written employment 
agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified" 
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the com-
mon law would support the implication of a constructive trust 
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential 
information. 6 
But Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential 
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, im-
posed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to 
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the im-
position of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to 
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to dis-
close, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in 
the common law to support such an approach. 
Employment agreements often •contain covenants designed 
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies 
with his duty not to disclose or misuse confidential informa-
written ro11tracl. Hut, li1u~mueh a~ tlw contract it:;rlf cloPs not state what 
remedy i;; to be applied in the pvmt of 11 breach, thP common law is the 
only sourer of law to which we can look to determine what constitutes 
an appro]Jrintr rPmcdy. 
6 See, e. g., Sperry Rand Corp . v. A-T-0, Inc., 447 F . 2d 1387, 1392 
(CA4 1971), eert. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia law); Tlapek v. 
Chevron Oil Co., 407 F. 2d 1129 (CAS 19o9) (Arkansas law); Structural 
Dynamics Research Corp. , .. Enginee1ing Mechanics Research Corp., 401 
F. Supp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mich. 1975) (Michigan law); Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 396 (c) (195~) ("Unless otherwise agreed, a.fter the 
termination of the agency the agrnt: ... (c) has a duty to account for 
profits made by the sale or u:>e of trade secrets and other confidential 
inforxnation, wheU1er or not in competition with the principal .••• "). 
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tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to com~ 
pete. Contrary to the majority's approach in this case, the 
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply 
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they 
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary, 
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an in-
dividual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable only if they 
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." That rule, 
originally laid down in the seminal case of Mitchel v. Rey-
nolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), requires that 
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate 
interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidenti-
ality), that the employer's interest not be outweighed by the 
public interest,7 and that the covenant not be of any longer 
duration or wider geographical scope than necessary to protect 
the employer's interest.8 
The Court has not persuaded me that a rule of reason 
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenant to submit 
to prepublication review. Like an ordinary employer, the 
7 As the court held in Herbm·t Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. Cas. 
[1916] 688, 704, the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does 
not outweigh the public interest in keeping the employee in the workforce: 
1
' ••• [A]n employer canrnot] prevent his employee from using the 
skill and knowledge in hi~; trade or profession which he has learnt 
in the course of hi:s employment by means of directions or instructions 
from the employer. That information and that additional skill he is 
entitled to use for the benefit of himself and the benefit of the public 
who gain the advantftge of his having had such admirable instruction. 
The case in which the Court. interferes for the purpose of protection is 
where use is made, not of the skill which the man may have acquired, 
but of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to 
reveal to any one else .... " 
8 See, e. g., B1iggs v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 589 F. 2d 39, 41 (CAl 
1978) (Illinoi~; law); Ame1ican Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Cm·rier, 500 F. 2d 
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina la.w); Alston Studios, Inc. v. 
Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2d 279, 282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia 
law); Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc ., 436 F. 2d 1308, 
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law); Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemi-
cals, Inc., 410 F. 2d 163, 167 (CA5 1969) (Georgia law); Restatement, 
(Second) of Contracts § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 12, March 1977). 
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CIA has a vital interest in protecting certain types of infor-
mation; at the same time, the CIA employee has a counter-
vailing interest in preserving a wide range of work oppor-
tunities (including work as an author) and in protecting his 
First Amendment rights. The public interest lies in a proper 
accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission of 
the agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified 
information. When the Government seeks to enforce a harsh 
restriction on the employee's freedom, 11 despite its admission 
that the interest the agreement was designed to protect-the 
confidentiality of classified information-has not been com-
promised, an equity court might well bE' persuaded that the 
case is 110t one in which the covenant should be enforced.10 
But ewn assuming that Snepp's covenant to submit to pre-
publication review should be enforced, the constructive trust 
imposed by thC' Court is not an appropriate remedy. If an 
employee has used his employer's co11fidential information for 
his own personal profit. a constructive trust over those profits 
is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are 
the direct result of the breach. But Snepp admittedly did 
not use confidential information in his book; nor were the 
8 The covrnant impo~f'~ n s<'riou,; prior restraint on Snepp's ability to 
spea.k fret•ly, set" iufra n. 15, and is of imiE>finite dnrntion Hnd scope-
factor::; tha t. would makr most ,;imilar covenants mwnforecablt'. Src, e. g., 
Alston Studios. Inc. v. Lloyd l'. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2d 279, 
283 (CA4 1974) (holding void nnder Virgina b~w a. covenant with no 
geogra.phieal limitation) ; American Hot Rod Assn., Inc. "· Carrier, 500 
F. 2d 1269, 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Notih Carolina 
law a covenant with no dur<1tional or geographical limitation); E. L. 
Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F. 2d 527, 528 (CA4 1970) (holding void 
under Maryland law a covenant with no durational or geographical 
limitation). 
10 The Court rorrrctl:v point;, out that the Government. may regulate 
certain activi!it's of it~ emplo)·re~ tha.t would be protected by the First 
Amendmeut, in otll('r rontrx1,:. A11tc. at 3, n. 3. Bnt none of the ca.~es it 
cite::; involvt:d a r('quirPmeu1 that an C'mployec submit all propo~ed public 
statC'ment~ for prerrlra~e rPn~orship or approval. The Court has not pre-
viously COIL.~iderE'd thr enforceabilit)· of thi;; kind of prior re::;traint or the 
remedy that showd. he impo,:ed in the event of 1~ breach. 
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profits from his book in any sense a product of his failure to 
submit the book for prepublication review. For, even if 
Snepp had submitted the book to the agency for prepublica-
tion review, the Government's censorship authority would 
surely have been limited to the excision of classified material. 
In this case. then. it would have been obliged to clear the 
book for publication in precisely the same form as it now 
stands.11 Thus, Snepp has not gained any profits as a result 
of his breach; the Government. rather than Snepp, will be 
unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits attrib-
utable entirely to his own legitimate activity. 
Despite the fact that Snepp has not caused the Govern-
ment the type of harm that would ordinarily be remedied by 
the impositioll of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to 
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the 
Government has suffered some harm. The Court states that 
publication of "unreviewrd material" by a former CIA agent 
"can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the pub-
lished information is unclassified." Ante, at 5. It then seems 
to suggest that the injury in such cases stems from the 
agency's inability to catch "harmful" but unclassified informa-
tion before it is published. T do not believe, however, that 
the agency has any authority to censor its employees' publica-
tion of unclassified information on the basis of its opinion that 
publication may be "detrimental to vital national interests'~ 
11 If he had ~uLmii t('(l llw hook to the agency and the agency had re-
fused to con:.:ent to the public·ation of certain material in it, Snepp could 
have obtained judicial review to determine whether the agency was cor-
rect in considering the material elnssificd. See United States v. 'M ar·chetti, 
466 F . 2d 18mJ, 1:317 (CM H.li:Z) , tPrt. dt·nied, 409 U. S. 1063. It is 
noteworthy that the Colll't dot•,; not d.i:.:agrre with the Fourth Circuit'~ 
view in Jfarrhl!tti. reiterated in 8ue]Jp, that a CIA employee hn;; a First 
AmendmC'Ilt right to publi~h uncla:.::.:ifird information. Thu~, de:spite its 
refereuC'r in footnote 3 or it~ opiniou to the C:ovrrnment '~ :so-railed com-
pelling int<•rf"'t in protediu11: " the• appeamnrc of ronfideutiality," ante, at 
3, n. a, and dP:>pitc ~omP ambi~~;nit~· in the Court'~ rPfl'rPuce to "detri-
mental" and "ha rmful'' a~ oppo:.:C'd to " C'Ia~:;ified " information, ante. at 
5, I do not under."taud thP Comt to illl]>ly that the Gowrnment could 
ob,tain an injunction aga~n:;t the publication of unclu:;:sificd information, 
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or otherwise "identified as harmful." Ibid. The CIA never 
attempted to assert such power over Snepp in either of the 
contracts he signed; rather, the agency itself limited its cen-
sorship power to preventing the disclosure of "classified" 
information. Moreover, even if such a wide-ranging prior 
restraint would be good national security policy, I would have 
great difficulty reconciling it with the demands of the First 
Amendment. 
The Court also relies to some extent on the Government's 
theory at trial that Snepp caused it harm by flouting his pre-
publication review obligation and thus making it appear that 
the CIA was powerless to prevent its agents from publishing 
any information they chose to publish, whether classified or 
not. The Government theorized that this appearance of 
weakness would discourage foreign governments from coop-
erating with the CIA because of a fear that their secrets might 
also be compromised. In support of its position that Snepp's 
book had in fact had such an impact, the Government intro-
duced testimony by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stans-
field Turner. stating that Snepp's book and others like it had 
jeopardized the CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence 
services by making them unsure of the agency's ability to 
maintain confidentiality. Admiral Turner's truncated testi-
mony does not explain. however, whether these unidentified 
"other'' books actually contained classified information.12 If 
so, it is difficult to believe that the publication of a book like 
12 The District. Judge sustained the Governnwnt's objections to ques-
tions concerning the identity of other agents who had published the unau-
thorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 136. However, 
Admiral Turner did testify that the harmful materials involved "[p]ri-
marily the appearance in the United States media of identification of 
sources and methods of collecting intelligence .... " Tr. 143. This type 
of information is rPrtainly cla;;Hifird and i:; :spPcifically the typr of in-
formation that Snepp ha:s maintained he did not reveal in Decent Interval. 
See, e. g., Snepp's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show, 
in which he stated: " ... I have made a very determined effort not to 
expose sources or methods .... " GO\·ernment's Requests for Admissions, 
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Snepp's, which does not reveal classified information, has 
significantly weakened the agency's position. Nor does it 
explain whether the unidentified foreign agencies who have 
stopped cooperating with the CIA have done so because of 
a legitimate fear that secrets will be revealed or because they 
merely disagree with our Government's classification policies.13 
In any event. to the extent that the Government seeks to 
punish Snepp for the generalized harm he has caused by 
failing to submit to prepublication review and to deter others 
from following in his footsteps, punitive damages is, as the 
Court of Appeals held. clearly the preferable remedy " ... since 
a constructive trust depends on the concept of unjust enrich-
ment rather than deterrence and punishment. See D. Dobbs, 
Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 aud § 4.3 at 246 (1973)." 595 
F. 2d, at 937.11 
II 
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on 
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is 
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits. 
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth 
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunc-
tion requiring him to submit all future manuscripts for pre-
publication review and remanded for a determination of 
whether punitive damages would be appropriate for his failure 
to submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication. 
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a cross-
1 8 Snepp'::; attonwy::; were foreclosrd from asking Admiral Turner whether 
particular foreign ::;ource::: had stopped cooprrating with United States' 
authorities as a. direct. re:sult of the publimtion of Decent Interval. Tr. 
138. Thus, it. is uuclrar whether or why foreign ;.;ources may have rei~cted 
unfavorably to it~ publication. However, William E. Colby, the CIA's 
former Director, did indicate in his testimony that foreign nations generally 
have a strietrr ~:;rerery code than doef: the United States. Tr. 175-176. 
14 One of the Court'H ju;:tificationH for its constructive trust remedy is 
that "it cannot :;addle the Jormrr agent with exrmplary damages out of all 
proportion to his gain." Ante, at 9. This .-olieitude for Snepp's welfare 
is rather ironic in view of the dmconian nature of the remedy imposed by 
the Court today. 
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petition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated1 
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire 
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide 
to grant Snepp's petition. The Government explained that 
"[b] ecause the con tract remedy provided by the court of ap-
peals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency;s 
interest, the government has not independently sought review in 
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government 
stated that "[i]f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petition for a 
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871, it should also grant this cross-
petition. If the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this peti-
tion should also be denied." Petition, at 5. 
Given the Government's position, it would be highly inap-
propriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction, 
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's. 
Yet that is in essence what has been done.15 The majority 
obviously does not believe that Snepp,s claims merit this 
Court';, consideration, for they are summarily dismissed in a 
footnote . Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that Snepp's petition 
would Hot have been granted on its own 'merits. 
The Court's opiniM is a good demonstration of why this 
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily 
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact 
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive 
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the 
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the 
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not 
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against 
similar breaches of security," ante, at 7, and (b) that it might 
require the Government to reveal confidential information 
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather 
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might 
15 I have been unable to discover any previous case in which the Court 
has acted as it does today, reaching the merits of a conditional cross-
petition de~pite its belief that the petition d:oes not merit granting 
certiorari. 
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thus be left with "no remedy at all," ante, at 8. It seems 
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either 
ground by the Government's acquiescence in the punitive 
damage remedy. Moreover, the second rationale 16 is entirely 
speculative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong. 
The Court states that: 
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an 
award of punitive damages might force the Government 
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised 
to protect." 
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government 
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving 
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to 
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepubli-
cation review and that the Government relied on these mis-
representations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a 
showing would require the Government to reveal any con-
fidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery 
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 8 . 
. III 
The uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking 
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable 
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this 
case. 
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused 
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that 
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an 
opportunity to appra.ise the adequacy of the punitive damage 
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion 
that equitable relief is necessary. 
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware 
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to 
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to 
16 Which, it ;;houl<i br no1 ed, does not appenr anywhere in the Govern· 
ment's 5-page cross-pHition. 
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criticize his government.17 Inherent in this prior restraint is 
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority 
to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an 
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the de-
mands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior 
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy 
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It 
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me 
that that burden has been met. 
I respectfully dissent. 
17 The mere fact that the agency has the authority to review the text 
of a critical book in search of classified information before it is published 
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover, 
the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form 
of prior restraint that would not be tolerated in other contexts. See, 
e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska 
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539. In view of the national interest 
in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I am not prepared to say 
that the restraint, is nece::;sarily intolerable in this context. I am, however, 
prepared to say that, certiorari having been granted, the is::;ue surely 
should not be resolved in the absence of fu:ll briefing and argument. 
